Proposal for elected Commons committee chairs

For the past three years now, this blog has explored some of the more interesting developments in parliamentary procedure in various jurisdictions (primarily the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Regular readers know that I am a big fan of many of the reforms introduced in the UK House of Commons in 2010, as per the recommendations of the Wright report.

One of those reforms involved select committee chairs being elected by the whole House, as I’ve blogged about in detail in other posts. For example, back in April 2011, I wrote one of my Fixing Ottawa posts, this one focused on Committees, wherein I explained in detail how UK select committee chairs and members are now elected. In another post written later that same year, I discussed the findings of the UK House of Commons Procedure committee’s report reviewing the elections held, for the first time, in most cases, to fill various positions in the House, including, of course, the election of committee chairs and members. If you read either or both of those posts, you will see that I am quite fond of this reform, and would very much like to see it adopted here in Canada.

Consequently, I was very pleased to read, via Kady O’Malley’s Inside Politics Blog, that a Conservative backbench MP, Brad Trost, will be putting forward a motion proposing something very similar to what the UK House of Commons – that is, have the House elect committee chairs via a preferential ballot.

As Kady O’Malley points out, if this motion passes, “it would be binding, as it would constitute an instruction to the House.”

If you are interested in parliamentary reform, I would strongly encourage you to contact your MP and ask them to support this motion. It has made a huge different in the UK with committees becoming far more independent, less partisan, and generally more effective.

Further reading

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Coalition government is not a marriage

On 7 January 2012, Conservative Party leader David Cameron and Liberal Democrat Party leader Nick Clegg held a joint press conference, which you can watch here, to promote the Coalition government’s Mid-Term Review. That review lists what the government says it has achieved in meeting its coalition agreement and outlines further reforms to come. Both Cameron and Clegg stressed that the coalition would last the full five-year term.

One of the stranger questions asked during the press conference was if the coalition was like a marriage. Indeed, when Cameron and Clegg held their first press conference together back in 2010 to launch the coalition, some of the press coverage read as if it should have been on the Society pages rather than in the Politics section (see for example, this piece, or this one). Cameron answered that question thusly:

“To me it’s not a marriage, it’s a Ronseal deal, it does what it says on the tin – we said we would come together, we said we would form a government, we said we would tackle these problems, we said we would get on with it in a mature and sensible way, and that is exactly what we’ve done.”

This prompted the BBC’s political editor to write a column entitled: Coalition: Official – it’s not a marriage. The column starts:

It’s not a marriage. It never was. They were never in love so they are not renewing their vows.

That, in summary, is the reaction inside Downing Street to how the media, including me, have spoken about today’s joint news conference to be held at Downing Street by David Cameron and Nick Clegg.

Robinson goes on to explain:

The reason this debate about terminology is revealing is that both sides of this coalition have concluded that all this talk of marriage is toxic as it invites hacks like me to conclude that the Tory and Lib Dem partners are still “in love” – something which infuriates many of their natural supporters – or preparing to “divorce” in the run-up to the next election.

The Cameron/Clegg talk of their strengthened “shared purpose” was, of course, always going to make it hard to resist the temptation to ask whether both men are protesting too much. I doubt that many hacks today will resist.

It’s not surprising that the UK media haven’t known exactly how to cover the coalition – it is a rarity in First-Past-the-Post jurisdictions such as the UK. Indeed, the UK media, almost from day one, has regularly speculated not on if the coalition would collapse – that seemed to be a given, but when this would occur. At times it seemed that every single policy was “the one that will tear the coalition apart”, bring about the aforementioned “divorce”.  What the press have failed to understand is that, in the words of the Constitution Unit’s Robert Hazell, is that the UK has a coalition government, but not a coalition Parliament.

The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats have not merged their two parties, therefore it is not surprising – or at least, should not be surprising – that the backbenches of each party often disagree. Such disagreement in the House does not mean that the coalition itself is coming apart at the seams. Indeed, even the parliamentary splits aren’t always divisions between the Lib Dems and the Tories, but divisions within the Conservative Party itself, as this other analysis from the Constitution Unit explains. A coalition is not merger of two parties; it is an attempt by two parties to find common ground in order to govern jointly.

Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg was questioned by the House of Lords Constitution Committee on 9 January 2012 and addressed many of the issues surrounding the workings of the coalition, in particular how it impacts the doctrine of collective ministerial responsibility. It’s an interesting discussion and I recommend watching it.

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Procedure Committee Review of the Backbench Business Committee

Back in March, I wrote about a motion adopted by the UK House of Commons which changed how members of the Backbench Business Committee (BBCom) are elected:

The current members of the Backbench Business Committee were elected by the entire membership of the House of Commons. Members of most of the other Select Committees were elected only by their own caucuses, meaning Labour MPs serving on a committee were elected only by Labour MPs, Conservative members of committees elected only by their fellow Conservative MPs, and the same for the Liberal Democrats (there are no members of smaller parties on any committees).

Backbenchers argued strenuously that the BBBCom was different, and that it was right that its members be elected by the entire House. Changing that so that the elections were controlled by the parties risked making the BBBCom more partisan.

What also upset many at the time that the motion was debated and voted on was that the Procedure Committee had only just undertook a review into the operation of backbench business, and many felt the Government should have waited for that report to be presented to the House before moving forward with any changes to the Committee.

That report was published on 22 November 2012. Overall, the report notes that there is widespread satisfaction with the work and functioning of the BBCom, and concludes that while there is “no need for major substantial change to the practices or procedures which have developed around backbench business and the work of the Committee, a number of proposals could improve and refine the framework within which it operates.” (link)

The report does address the matter of the election of members to the Committee and the changes to that process brought forward and adopted in March. I found that section to be particularly interesting. The Backbench Business Committee is one of the many reforms proposed by the the Wright Committee in its report, Rebuilding the House. The Wright Committee explicitly recommended that the BBCom:

should be comprised of between seven and nine members elected by secret ballot of the House as a whole, with safeguards to ensure a due reflection of party proportionality in the House as a whole. (p. 8 – italics added)

In October 2011, the Procedure Committee released a report reviewing the process of electing the Speaker, committee chairs and members, which had been tried for the first time at the start of the new Parliament following the May 2010 election. The Government responded to that report and in its response stated:

It would be appropriate for the House to address the anomaly whereby members of the Backbench Business Committee other than the Chair (unlike those of other select committees) are elected by the House as a whole rather than by Members of the political party to which they belong. (p. 10)

In this report, the Procedure Committee rightly notes that the earlier report “had noted no such anomaly, nor had the Government sought to draw our attention to it in the course of our inquiry.”

In oral evidence to the Committee, Tony Wright did not agree with the Leader’s use of the term “anomaly” to describe the system of whole House elections for membership of the Backbench Business Committee. He said:

Whatever else it was, it wasn’t an anomaly. It was there by design. The intention was that there should be a collective House mechanism: something that wasn’t the usual kind of party business that dominates most of what goes on here.

He went on to describe the changes brought forward by the Government as “a retrograde step.” Dr Meg Russell, who was specialist adviser to the Wright Committee, described the changes as “very much contrary to the spirit of what the Wright Committee proposed.” (pp. 8-9)

The committee was “disappointed” that the Government had proceeded to change how BBCom members are elected without waiting for the Procedure Committee to conclude its review and remains unconvinced by the arguments put forward by the Government justifying the need for the change:

We are not persuaded that it was necessary to change the method of electing members of the Backbench Business Committee. In our report on 2010 elections to positions in the House, we noted that we had “received no adverse comments on the arrangements for the elections to the Backbench Business Committee”.  Apart from the comments from the Leader and the Shadow Leader, nor did we receive any such comments in this inquiry. Backbenchers who submitted evidence to this inquiry were content with the method of election as originally proposed by Wright and as enshrined in the relevant Standing Order when the Backbench Business Committee was established. Nevertheless, the House made its decision in March this year and we do not consider it appropriate to recommend further changes so soon afterwards. We will return to these matters in a future inquiry. (p. 9)

One of the interesting (to me) recommendations in the report concerns select committee statements. The BBCom had begun the practice of scheduling short debates on select committee reports. While in many parliaments, debate on committee reports is fairly straightforward, in the UK House of Commons, it is a rather cumbersome process: “the Chair of the Committee in question must move a motion that the House takes note of the report, and Members who wish to ask questions must make interventions.”(p. 21) The matter was studied by the Liaison Committee:

In its report on select committee powers, resources and effectiveness, that Committee proposes that a statement on a select committee report should be able to be made “within a reasonable period of the publication of the report: say, within 10 sitting days”. It further proposes that it should be for the Speaker (in consultation with the Chair of the Liaison Committee), rather than the Backbench Business Committee, to decide whether a select committee report is sufficiently topical and significant to merit a statement on the floor of the House on any sitting day. (p. 22)

The Procedure Committee endorses this proposal adding the suggestion that such statements could also be taken in Westminster Hall.

Another interesting recommendation is the proposal to limit how much speaking time can be taken up by the frontbenches during BBCom debates. There aren’t proscribed time limits on speeches in the UK House of Commons as there are in the Canadian House of Commons, for example, but the Speaker can impose time limits when there is a lot of interest among MPs in participating in a particular debate. However, the Speaker’s ability to limit frontbench speaking time is circumscribed by the Standing Orders:

Under Standing Order No. 47, he may do so in respect of both backbench speeches (under paragraph (2)) and frontbench speeches (paragraphs (3) and (4)). The limit in respect of frontbench speeches is, however, subject to paragraph (5)(b), which requires the Speaker to add to the twenty minutes (or ten, in the case of a topical debate) to which frontbench speeches may be limited up to a further fifteen minutes for interventions. The power to impose a time limit on frontbench speeches is thus not used, because a limit of thirty-five minutes would not be worth imposing. Jane Ellison described the lack of any effective power to limit frontbench speeches as “a pressing problem”, saying that “to see backbenchers in a backbench debate being reduced to a four-minute time limit almost immediately when you have had two 25-minute Front-Bench speeches is not the right way round.” (p. 27)

The report recommends amending SO 47 to allow the Speaker greater discretion in applying limits to frontbench speeches.

Other recommendations found in the report include increasing the number of days available to Backbench business from the current 27 to 35; that the Government allow the Backbench Business Committee a legitimate expectation of a backbench business slot, in the Chamber or in Westminster Hall, in every sitting week, with exceptions at certain times of the parliamentary year (for example, the debate on the Queen’s Speech and the Budget); that the Committee be given the power to table business motions to regulate the time for which it is responsible; and finally, that responsibility for scheduling one of the four 90-minute adjournment debates that occur each week in Westminster Hall be transferred from the Speaker to the Backbench Business Committee, on a one-year trial basis.

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Committee rejects MP Recall proposals

An important item of note concerning political and constitutional reform occurred this week in the United Kingdom.

This was the release of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee’s report on the Government’s draft bill on Recall of MPs. Regular readers of this blog know that I am not a fan of recall – I think it is yet another measure designed to save voters from themselves – but even so, I had issues with the proposals the Government had put forward, and the Committee has largely agreed with me, essentially recommending that the Government simply drop plans for MP recall.

The Committee’s report comes in at an impressive 148 pages, but most of that is written evidence and other documentation received by the committee. As I had noted in my own critique of the Government’s draft proposals, the Committee noted that what the Government was proposing would do little to build public confidence in the political system. Indeed, because voters would not be able to initiate recall proceedings themselves, it might actually further undermine public confidence. There wasn’t really anything the committee liked about the Government’s proposals. The committee’s main concerns with the Government’s proposals are as follows:

  • With regards to for the purposes of the first  trigger of a custodial sentence of 12 months or less, the Government change its decision not to take account of the motivation of the MP in committing the offence.  One  possibility would be to enable the House itself to decide whether there should be an exemption from a recall petition in a particular instance because of the political nature of the crime.   The committee was particularly concerned with cases wherein an MP or group of MPs might be convicted for civil disobedience, for example.
  • With regards to a petition triggered by a resolution of the House of Commons, this too was problematic because the Government did not want to define what would constitute a “serious wrongdoing”. If these were limited to breaches of the Code of Conduct for MPs, this might not take into account actions or behaviour that the public would consider serious wrongdoings and worth of recall.
  • If a recall petition were launched, the Government proposes that it be in one central location for signing. The committee believes this too restrictive and would be a deterrent for voters in large constituencies, particularly rural ones. The Government should replace the requirement for a single designated location for signing the petition with arequirement for at least two and no more than four designated locations, and even send out signing sheets to those who are registered for postal voting.
  • The Committee also had reservations about the 10% threshold for a successful petition and recommended that if the Government takes  the steps the Committee recommended to make signing the petition easier—having several designated locations and those who have an extant postal vote automatically being sent a  postal signature sheet—it should raise thethreshold from 10% to at least 20%, which would represent a significant level of dissatisfaction with the sitting MP.

While these are just some of the concerns the Committee has with the mechanics of the recall procedure as proposed, perhaps most damning was their verdict on the Government’s justification for recall (p. 26):

76. The Government has not made  the case for introducing recall.  We have not seen enough evidence to support the suggestion that it will increase public confidence in politics, and fear that the restricted form of recall proposed could even reduce confidence by creating expectations that are not fulfilled.  The aftermath of the expenses scandal has shown that MPs can be, and are, removed by current processes as quickly as they would be by recall.

The Committee noted that the majority of witnesses who gave evidence rejected the Government’s proposals. Witnesses fell into one of two camps: those who favoured total recall, and those who felt recall wasn’t at all necessary. Concerning the arguments in favour of total recall, the Committee noted some important concerns, such as MPs who have dual roles: local MP and cabinet minister.  With recall, there might be “a danger that Ministers might be less willing to make decisions in the long-term national interest if they feared that they could face a recall petition because their decision would be unpopular in the short term or unpopular locally.” (p. 27) Also, recall could be used against the person, when it was really the party and its policies that had upset voters:

There is not a single, clear job description for an MP and everyone will have their own idea about what behaviour constitutes being a “good MP”.  To an extent, individual MPs must decide for themselves what their job entails.  If their constituents disagree, they have an opportunity to vote for someone else at the next general election.  Differences of opinion about what constitutes the proper role of an MP should not be allowed to trigger recall petitions.

84. We believe that a system of full recall may deter MPs from taking decisions that are unpopular locally or unpopular in the short-term, but  which are in the long-term national interest.  It may also discourage them from taking on powerful interests, or expressing controversial or unusual opinions.  The Government argues that a recall mechanism should not leave MPs vulnerable to attack from those who simply disagree with them.  We agree.  For these reasons, we cannot support a system of full recall. (p. 28)

Ultimately, the Committee agreed with those who don’t think recall is necessary:

89. We do not believe that there is a gap in the House’s disciplinary procedures which needs to be filled by the introduction of  recall.  The House already has the power to expel Members who are guilty of serious wrongdoing.  This should be regarded as an active option; rather than a theoretical possibility.  We note that expulsion would not prevent the person concerned standing in the resulting by-election.   We recommend that the Government abandon  its plans to introduce a power of recall and use the parliamentary time this would free up to better effect. (p. 29)

I must say that I agree with the Committee’s recommendation that recall be abandoned. However, I urge you to read their report for yourself and come to your own conclusions.

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Parliamentary reform would work

In a recent article, Don Lenihan argues that parliamentary reform won’t “force a government to engage in meaningful debate” and reverse the fact that Parliament is, in his words “broken”. Lenihan writes:

MPs like Michael Chong and Nathan Cullen remain hopeful. They think that the right combination of rules and procedures can fix Parliament. Unfortunately, if “fixing” it means rekindling meaningful debate, they are wrong. House Speaker Andrew Scheer’s ruling on the F-35s last week inadvertently shows why.

Scheer argues that a minister cannot be charged with misleading the House unless it can be proved that he/she intended to do so. Intentions, however, are slippery things.

(…)

Scheer’s point is that, when a minister declares that he/she is not lying, it is very hard to prove otherwise, which usually results in a standoff between the government and the opposition.

The disconcerting lesson for parliamentary reform is that no package of rules or procedures can force a government to engage in meaningful debate. As long as its members pretend to be sincere, they can weave and bob, dance and spin, and there is little anyone can do to stop them. Good politicians have this down to an art.

I disagree heartedly with Mr. Lenihan. I strongly believe that there are a number of procedural and Standing Order changes which could be implemented in the Canadian House of Commons which would not only greatly improve the quality of debate, but also make it much more difficult for the ministry to shirk its responsibilities and force them to be much more accountable to the House. I will leave aside the matter of Speaker Scheer’s recent ruling referred to above, since the issue of misleading the House is in many ways completely separate from simply making Parliament more effective and functional.

I have written in depth about many of these in earlier posts, and so won’t go into great detail herein. I will provide links to my earlier posts, so that any reader interested in some of these changes can read the older posts. Most of what I will propose are practices which currently exist in the UK House of Commons. I know Mr. Lenihan writes that a similar trend to what he describes here in Canada is occurring in the UK, but again, I disagree. As someone who follows the UK House of Commons very closely (much more closely than I do the Canadian parliament, I must admit), the reality is that ministers in the UK are far more accountable to the House, and the House has been greatly empowered in the past few years.

The first procedure Canada could borrow from the UK is the UK format for Questions to ministers. I have written extensively about everything that is wrong with the current Question Period in Ottawa. The biggest problem is the time limits on both questions and answers (35 seconds for each). How anyone thinks for one instant that they’re going to solicit any sort of detailed exchange of information in 35 seconds is quite beyond me. The UK format sees one ministry only face questions each day (or the one-hour time slot can be split between two or more smaller agencies and ministries). Questions are submitted three days beforehand to give ministers the time to prepare comprehensive answers. They are very civil, even dull at times, exchanges, but at least actual information is exchanged. Ministers must answer the questions. They cannot refuse to do so, as they can here, nor can another minister from a different ministry answer on their behalf, as occurs here.

Along with the UK format for Questions to ministers, we should also adopt both Urgent Questions (UQ), which don’t exist here at all, and revamp our ministerial statements. UQs are initiated by any backbench MP – if the Speaker approves the question, a minister is hauled before the House on relatively short notice to address the question. Other MPs can also question the minister on that particular matter. This normally lasts about an hour. (Urgent questions are described in the blog post linked to above.)

Ministerial statements in the UK are also very useful, unlike their Canadian counterparts. While initiated by the minister, MPs are then able to question the minister following his or her statement. This isn’t allowed in Canada. Ministerial statements also normally last about an hour, but the Speaker can let them go on much longer if there is sufficient interest. Recently, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Finance minister) was kept at the despatch box taking questions following his statement for close to three hours. This post has video clips from the UK of oral questions (not PMQs), an urgent question and a ministerial statement, to give you a better idea of how these procedures actually work.

Canada would also do well to get rid of time limits on debate and members speeches. Again, these don’t exist in the UK, and the quality of debate reflects that. We should return to the practice of giving way, which we used to do, until time limits on speeches were brought in. By allowing members to interrupt the MP speaking to ask a question or comment on what they’ve just said, the debate becomes much more interactive. Our debates tend to sound like a rota of read speeches.

Make all MPs refer to each other as “honourable”. This may sound quaint, but I think it contributes greatly to a greater sense of decorum and respect in the UK House of Commons. All members refer to each other as “the honourable lady”, “my honourable friend”, “the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister”, etc.

Ban the reading of speeches. The rules already prohibit this, but it is never enforced. No one reads from prepared texts in the UK House of Commons, and any MP who wishes to participate in a debate must refer to comments made by the 3 or 4 MPs who spoke before they did before moving on to their own comments. This is a sign of respect that one was in the Chamber, following the debate, paying attention, etc. Members must also stay around after they’ve delivered their comments to see how their comments are received by the next few speakers. Participating in debates should not be some form of torture or punishment – it should be something MPs want to do and look forward to doing.

The biggest problem in the Canadian House of Commons is the dominance of the Executive, and in particular the Prime Minister, on the one hand, and party discipline on the other. MPs are so whipped in the Canadian House of Commons, they don’t dare speak out against their own party’s position on anything. The Whips have virtual control over everything – when they speak, what they say, if they participate on a committee, etc. This is not healthy and greatly undermines the effectiveness of our Parliament.

The UK has a huge advantage on that front simply because of the sheer number of MPs – 650 compared to 308 in Canada. Most backbenchers in the UK know they will not sit on committees or be on the front bench, and so it is more difficult for the Whips to exert total control over them. Consequently, MP rebellions are very common – on both sides of the House. But while we don’t have the same numbers of MPs here in Canada, there are still many things which could be done which would lessen the dominance of party Whips.

First, Canada could introduce the UK’s system of one- , two- and three-line whips, which would allow MPs more freedom in how they vote on various measures.

Next, committee reform. I’ve written at length about the committee reforms in the UK, but to summarise: committees chairships are divided up amongst the main parties roughly in proportion to their representation in the House. Chairs of most of the select committees are now elected by their fellow MPs. Members of the committees are now elected by their respective caucuses. This has made the committees much more independent and much more accountable to the House, rather than to party Whips. I’ve written about how Committees in Ottawa could be strengthened.

The UK now has a Backbench Business Committee which determines what business will be debated on 35 days each session. This will be business that is of interest to backbenchers. There are plans to bring in a House Business Committee, which in theory would program all business in the House – which is currently controlled by the Executive.

In the UK, ministers regularly appear before the Select Committee oversees their department. Even the Prime Minister is not immune from this: the PM appears before the Liaison Committee, which is a sort of super-committee whose membership consists of the chairs of all of the other select committees, and is grilled by the committee for a couple of hours. You can see Prime Minister David Cameron’s most recent appearance before the Liaison Committee here. (Side note, around the 37:30 mark, they start discussing accountability in general, then more specifically ministerial accountability.)

There are undoubtedly more rules from the UK House of Commons which would be of interest, but as you can see from the above, it is false to say that different rules wouldn’t improve things. If the House of Commons were empowered, if MPs were less whipped, the Ministry would have to adopt a different attitude towards it and engage more fully. The simple reality is that the current government here in Canada wouldn’t survive two minutes in the UK House of Commons if they attempted to conduct themselves in Parliament there the way they do here. They’d be ripped to shreds by the Speaker, the Opposition, and perhaps more importantly, the press and the general public. It simply wouldn’t be tolerated.

And that is another important difference. I think there is a greater public awareness of Parliament in the UK, and greater media focus as well. If you take the time to look at any UK media source online, there is no shortage of political liveblogging and detailed coverage of happenings in Parliament (well beyond PMQs). Perhaps that is in part because it is the only parliament (not counting the devolved assemblies of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). Canadians – those who bother at least- find their attention divided between City Hall, their provincial or territorial legislature, and Ottawa. And for many, Ottawa is very, very far away.

Finally, regarding Mr. Lenihan’s references to the problems of ministers lying or misleading Parliament, this isn’t really the issue. The Canadian House of Commons is very weak, and it is very easy for the Executive to undermine it – even without outright lying. Adopting any or all of the measures described above of course would not stop a minister from lying, but they would go a long way towards empowering the House vis-à-vis the Executive, and giving backbenchers more freedom from their own parties (it’s not just the government that is the problem here – all of our parties need to stop controlling their MPs to the degree that they currently do). It would be more difficult for a minister to mislead the House, deliberately or otherwise, if the House wasn’t so impotent.

Also, as I explained in this post, charges of misleading the House are extremely difficult to prove. I know that there has been a lot of criticism of Speaker Scheer over the 7 May 2012 ruling, but it was a given that he wouldn’t be able to find that the minister had lied or deliberately misled the House. To the best of my knowledge, there has been only one instance anywhere in the Commonwealth of a minister found in contempt for misleading the House, and that was in 1963, the case of John Profumo in the UK. And he was only found in contempt after he admitted to the House that he had indeed lied, and deliberately so, with intent to mislead. You may disagree with this, but procedural convention is what it is.

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Politicians don’t understand the internet

As someone who uses the internet exhaustively, both as part of my work and for personal reasons, such as maintaining this blog, I am of course concerned about the various pieces of legislation governments bring forward that seek to either control how people use the internet, or invade individual privacy online. Whether known by an acronym (SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, etc.) or a bill number (C-30, C-11), they are all cause for concern.

I won’t attempt to explain why these bills are problematic. There are far more qualified persons out there already doing just that, for example, Canada’s Michael Geist. If you don’t read Geist’s blog, you should. You can also follow him on Twitter. What interests me more is why do governments regularly and persistently introduce such flawed legislation when it comes to anything involving the internet? This is endemic of all governments, regardless of which party (or group of parties) is in power.

One of the best blog posts I’ve read of late which attempts to explain why governments bring forward such poor legislation is this one by the UK’s Paul Bernal. Bernal identifies four main reasons why digital policy is always so bad:

  1. Governments don’t understand the internet;
  2. Governments don’t understand the entertainment industry;
  3. Governments don’t understand law; and
  4. Governments don’t understand privacy.

I will let you read Bernal’s blog post for his explanations of the above. I want to focus on the first point – governments don’t understand the internet. In fact, I would say more broadly that politicians in general don’t understand the internet.

I recently started doing some research for a post on how different legislatures approach the use of computers, smartphones and other such devices in the Chamber. Part of that research included reading through the evidence of the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs from 20 April 2010. The committee was investigating “new technologies and their impact on House and committee proceedings”. This arose from an incident wherein one MP had tweeted from the floor of the House about the absence of another MP. For the uninitiated, Members are not allowed to refer to another Member’s absence in the House, however, there are no rules prohibiting sending that information by email or text message or posting it on Twitter.

As I read through the transcript from that meeting, I was struck but comments made by some of the committee members as well as Speaker and Clerk of the House of Commons, who were appearing before the committee. It was quite clear that the concepts of “Twitter”, “Facebook” and in some cases, the internet in general, were rather foreign to them. For example:

“My feeling was that since Mr. Galipeau was actually Twittering from his seat in the House, it should have been ruled out of order.” – Mr. Tom Lukiwski (Regina-Lumsden-Lake Centre, CPC)

“I’m not particularly good at computers anyway and I can’t use one. There’s one in front of me, but the clerks run it. I have no mouse or anything. I can’t do a thing on it except look, and I point out errors, so that’s about the extent of my stuff.” – the Hon. Peter Milliken, Speaker.

“We have seen, though, a couple of instances – both, frankly, from the government side – where it’s been discovered that members have either Twittered or tweeted about the proceedings going on…” – Tom Lukiwski

“Is typing a note on Twitter, or tweeting – however you do that, I don’t know – different from going out and saying, …” – Speaker Milliken.

“I am technologically illiterate, or almost illiterate, but I know that when a posting goes up on Twitter, the time it goes up is indicated. So if you can prove that a member was in the chamber at six minutes past two, when he Twittered who was present and who was absent, you can say he did it from the floor of the House, which is unacceptable.” – Mr. Michel Guimond (Montmorency- Charlevoix-Haute-Cote-Nord, BQ).

There are many more examples, but you get the idea. The lack of understanding of how social media functions is quite obvious.

More recently, the Canadian Public Safety Minister, the Hon. Vic Toews, raised a point of privilege alleging interference of his ability to discharge his responsibilities following the posting of a series of videos on Youtube by “Anonymous” which included threats should the government proceed with Bill C-30, An Act to enact the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act and to amend the Criminal Code and other Acts. The Speaker, in a rather unfortunate ruling, found a prima facie case of privilege:

I have carefully reviewed the online videos in which the language used does indeed constitute a direct threat to the Minister in particular, as well as all other Members. These threats demonstrate a flagrant disregard of our traditions and a subversive attack on the most fundamental privileges of this House. As your Speaker and the guardian of those privileges, I have concluded that this aspect- the videos posted on the Internet by Anonymous – therefore constitutes a prima facie question of privilege and I invite the Minister to move his motion.

That motion was to refer the matter to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, which has held three hearings to date on the matter. It was quite clear that members of the committee really didn’t understand who or what “Anonymous” is, and that trying to bring the person/persons/group to justice was pretty much a complete waste of time. More often than not, the committee hearings deviated into discussions of personal computer security (e.g. keep your anti-virus software updated, don’t click on suspicious links and use a firewall!).

The first hearing held, on 28 March 2012, included House of Commons Clerk Audrey O’Brien, Chief Information Officer Louis Bard and Sergeant at Arms Kevin Vickers as witnesses. Committee member Tom Lukiwski asked to hear an assessment of how vulnerable MPs are, both on Parliament Hill and in their constituency offices, “ if Anonymous wants to hack in”  to which the Clerk replied that the alleged threats by “Anonymous” “really had nothing to do with the network. This was something posted on YouTube, so it’s completely outside our control or our environment.” Other committee members then proceeded to ask about the security of their computers on the Hill, in their ridings, at home, and what happens when they travel internationally – how secure are their devices then – which again, have nothing to do with the question of privilege at hand, which is whether tying the future publication of details of the minister’s private life to a specific act – in this case, proceeding with Bill C-30, constitutes an attempt to influence House proceedings. MP Laurie Hawn said of “Anonymous”: “they’re like the Taliban: we’ll never run out of them; they’re always going to be there.”  Another MP, Bob Zimmer, invites “Anonymous” to dialogue with him on Twitter, while another, Marc Garneau, asks if there are any checks on Youtube or can anyone post anything they want.

The one sensible intervention comes from MP Alexandrine Latendresse. She acknowledges that the direct threats against the minister came from an organization so intangible, it can’t even be described as such, and consequently she asks isn’t it possible that no action can be taken? Clerk O’Brien agrees entirely. In response to another committee member, Ms. O’Brien says that “frankly I’m not sure that seeking out a culprit as such wouldn’t be a giant waste of time, because I think that the nature of these attacks, as I understand it and from the reading that I’ve done, is that they’re extremely fluid.”

The second hearing, on 29 March, wasn’t much better, although some members of the committee seem to have finally grasped the futility of trying to identify and punish “Anonymous”. The Minister targetted by “Anonymous”, Vic Toews, appeared before the Committee and when MP Tom Lukiwski acknowledges that it might be “outright impossible” to identify and punish Anonymous and asks Toews what advice he has for the committee regarding how to proceed, Toews replies that he vehemently disagreed with what Clerk O’Brien’s comment in the first hearing that it was a giant waste of time:

I read with interest the comments of the Clerk, indicating that this study may be a “giant waste of time”. Those were her words. I couldn’t disagree more. In terms of its impact on the democratic process, studying this issue is not a waste of time. I couldn’t disagree more. Whether or not the committee is ultimately successful in drawing any conclusions on who’s behind this attack, I think the House should be examining preventive or safeguard measures to protect members.

This is an issue that crosses party and ideological lines. Just this past weekend, we saw an Internet attack on the electronic voting system used to choose the new leader of the NDP. In my opinion, it is a very frightening prospect, especially as Canadians are looking more and more to Internet voting and Internet advances, to see our democracy being threatened when we attempt to use new mechanisms that will involve more people in the democratic process. I think all Canadians should be concerned by these types of threats posed to our democracy by these online bullies and thugs who, in fact, are intimidating the democratic process.

Various committee members repeatedly asked Mr. Toews what he expected the committee should or could do, with Toews making references to looking at “how the computer and Internet impact on the institutional integrity of Parliament”, and admitted that he wasn’t “an expert on the computer and the Internet”. MP Chris Charlton compared the “Anonymous” videos to a “21st-century version of an anonymous letter” and asked Mr. Toews “If someone in the 1970s or 1980s sent an anonymous letter with the exact same message, what would have happened?” Toews replied:

Certainly, there would have been a criminal investigation, but there may well have been certain steps that the House might have taken. The actual mechanism by which the threat is being conveyed is a new phenomenon for members of Parliament. How do we respond to something like this? Is it acceptable because we don’t have the technological tools to ferret out those who are responsible? Is there nothing we can do? Maybe that will be the conclusion of the committee, but I don’t think that an investigation by this committee is a waste of time.

The third session took place on 3 April, but as of this writing, the transcripts are not yet available online.

I won’t quote more, but if you take the time to read through the transcripts from these meetings, the one impression you’ll be left with is that the majority of members of the committee are rather clueless not just about the nature of “Anonymous”, but about most aspects of internet culture.  It isn’t surprising however, that so many MPs are this clueless about our brave new digital world. The average age of the committee members is 55. There are six members of the committee in their 60s, one in his 50s, four in their 40s, and only one member, Ms. Latendresse, is under 30. At 28, she is undoubtedly far more attuned to everything internet than are most of her colleagues, and this was reflected in her line of questioning.

If MPs struggle to understand the concept of “Anonymous”, and can’t easily differentiate between hacking someone’s computer and uploading a video to Youtube, it’s then not at surprising that they inevitably come up with legislation that completely fails to fully understand what the internet is all about and how “real” people use it. It isn’t simply an online mall or a dark shadowy place where some people engage in questionable activity. This is obviously problematic since there is very little today that doesn’t depend on or involve the internet in some way.

There is also the question of how knowledgeable are the civil servants who advise ministers on internet policy. I don’t know what the median age of the civil service is, but I’m willing to wager there aren’t too many in their mid-twenties to early thirties.

Of course there are some MPs in every party who do get the internet. I don’t for one instant mean to tar and feather all MPs as computer illiterate – some are quite net savvy and do actually understand life online. They need to be at the forefront whenever any political party attempts to formulate policy involving the internet.

On the whole, I can’t disagree with any of the recommendations Paul Bernal put forward in his post, which I linked to above. For those who didn’t read it, I will paraphrase, removing the UK-specific references:

  1. Admit they have a problem. Governments need to take a long, hard look at themselves.
  2. Start talking to the right people – and at the right time. Who really does understand the internet? Civil society, hackers, maybe even some academics – understand it much, much more than politicians, and than industry lobby groups.
  3. When the real experts talk, listen!
  4. Put the lobby groups back in their place. These industry groups need to be listening to others themselves!
  5. Be willing to admit you were wrong. It’s hard, because politicians seem to be under the impression that changing your mind is completely unacceptable. It shouldn’t be – if you find out you’re wrong about something, admit it!
  6. Let those within your party who DO understand it take a bigger role.
  7. Be brave enough to face up to the security pressure groups, both internal and external. At the moment, just the barest whisper of the word ‘terrorism’ seems to make politicians of almost all parties quiver at the knees and sacrifice their own principles and OUR rights.
  8. Start to trust real people a bit more… and then real people might begin to trust you a bit more.

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Has the Backbench Business Committee been too successful?

Previously, I wrote a post in response to search queries from people wondering if the Backbench Business Committee (or BBBCom) has been a success. In that post, I noted that it was a bit difficult to answer that question because I wasn’t certain how one would measure  – or even define – success in this context.

Recent events in the UK House of Commons are perhaps a greater indication that indeed, the BBBCom has been a success. So much so that perhaps the Government felt a need to try to curtail it to a degree – or at least, that is what some think might be going on.

On Monday, 12 March 2012, the Government moved a motion that would bring about changes which might lessen the impact of the BBBCom. The main proposal would affect how members of the BBBCom were elected, bringing procedure in line with how members of most of the other Select Committees are elected. The current members of the Backbench Business Committee were elected by the entire membership of the House of Commons. Members of most of the other Select Committees were elected only by their own caucuses, meaning Labour MPs serving on a committee were elected only by Labour MPs, Conservative members of committees elected only by their fellow Conservative MPs, and the same for the Liberal Democrats (there are no members of smaller parties on any committees).

Backbenchers argued strenuously that the BBBCom was different, and that it was right that its members be elected by the entire House. Changing that so that the elections were controlled by the parties risked making the BBBCom more partisan. I have previously pointed out that it is important to the BBBCom that the issues they bring forward for debate have support across party lines (which is one of the main reasons why the request for a debate on the e-petition to drop the NHS bill was turned down). More importantly, there would be possibility that the party whips could ensure that far more “docile” backbenchers were elected to the committee, and perhaps make it less likely that the Committee would debate issues the government would prefer not be debated. Conservative MP and member of the BBBCom Peter Bone put it quite well:

The Government are proposing that future members of the Committee will be elected by party group. There are two distinct disadvantages to that proposal. The first—I suggest that this is the reason for it—is that it will give the Government, as well as the shadow Government, greater influence in deciding who is elected to the Backbench Business Committee. Through their Whips Offices, they will try to engineer more pliable Members to be elected to the Committee. I believe that this will make the Committee much more divided on party lines. In all the time that the current Committee has met, there has been only one vote, and that did not divide it along party lines. The Government’s proposal will reduce the likelihood that independent parliamentarians will be elected to the Committee.

Secondly, the authority that members of the Committee hold is greatly enhanced by their being chosen by the whole House. Their mandate comes from Back Benchers of all political persuasions, not by a narrow party group. The Wright Committee was clear on that issue, saying in paragraph 180 of its report on page 54:

“We therefore recommend that a Backbench Business Committee be created. It should be comprised of between seven and nine members elected by secret ballot of the House as a whole”.

So there we have it: the Wright report recommends that individual members of the Committee should be elected by the whole House, not by party groups. That is what the House agreed when setting up the Backbench Business Committee—the House agreed with the Wright Committee. Now the Government want to change Standing Orders while a Select Committee is looking into the matter, and against the wishes of the Wright Committee and an earlier decision of the House.

Along the same lines, Committee chair Natascha Engle stated:

(…) the Backbench Business Committee is not broken. We do not vote on party lines and the discussions we have are not on party lines. Its members are independent-minded. They are members of different political parties, but the wider issue is about how we best represent Back Benchers as a whole. We currently have a spread on the Committee, with every type of Back Bencher in today’s Parliament represented.

Particularly grating for many MPs was the fact that both the BBBcom and the Procedure Committee are currently working on their own reviews into the operation of backbench business, and many felt the Government should have waited until those reports were presented to the House before moving forward with any changes to the Committee. When asked about that in the House, the Parliamentary Secretary, Office of the Leader of the House of Commons, Mr. Heath replied:

the Procedure Committee’s conclusions to be of great value, as they have been on a number of other topics. I want to emphasise that today’s motion is not intended to pre-empt the review—[ Interruption. ] Well, it simply does not. It makes three changes that need to be made this Session in order to take effect before the next elections for members of the Backbench Business Committee and therefore before the completion of the review. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, those changes arise in part from points made in evidence to the Procedure Committee’s inquiry into the 2010 elections and that Committee itself envisaged changes as regards minority parties being made in advance of the review.

Most MPs taking part in the debate weren’t convinced by the Government’s explanation. This was reinforced by the fact that ministers and parliamentary private secretaries were being whipped to support the changes. If the real reason behind these changes wasn’t simply housekeeping, why was the Government so keen to move this motion at this time?

The BBC’s Mark D’Arcy notes that:

Having scheduled debates on Afghanistan, Iran, a European referendum and other subjects the government was not especially keen to talk about, the committee was not exactly flavour of the month with ministers (and some shadow ministers).

The novel experience of being able to debate at least some of the things they want to debate has been exhilarating for MPs, and rather disorientating for the party whips. It has produced some of the best moments of the current parliament – and has given ministers some rather uncomfortable interludes at the dispatch box.

The motion was passed, Ayes 203, Noes 82. We won’t be able to assess until next session what these changes might mean for the BBBCom. As well, it will be interesting to see what the Government and House might do if both the Procedure and Backbench Business Committees’ reviews of backbench business include recommendations which run counter to the changes adopted. This is most certainly a “to be continued”.

Related Posts:

Public Perception of Access to Parliament

UK House of Commons Speaker John Bercow established the Speaker’s Advisory Council on Public Engagement (SACPE) which provides informal, independent advice from an external perspective on the programs which the House of Commons has already introduced to improve outreach and to serve as a vehicle for thinking about what Parliament needs to do to convince the public that it has reformed and that it is really relevant to them.

Recently, SACPE chairperson, Professor Jonathan Drori, appeared before the House of Commons Administration Committee as part of their inquiry into Visitor Access and Facilities in the House of Commons.

It was an interesting meeting. There appeared to be a degree of tension between Dr. Drori’s ideas for how Parliament should be made more accessible and open to the public and some MPs’ focus on cost and practicality and feasibility of doing just that. Dr. Drori emphasized what he believed to be the larger issue: that people needed to value democracy and in order for this to happen, they needed to be engaged. This would happen via education: ensuring people understand the mechanics of democracy – voting, how laws are made, the differences between local politics and national politics, etc., but also via Parliament ensuring that the people understand the work it does. He repeatedly stressed the need for a new education centre, a project which has been discussed in Parliament for several years now, but the development of which seems to be largely hampered by two issues: cost and lack of space.

Drori also stressed that Parliament needs to employ all means available to reach out to the general public and to engage citizens by providing means for them to participate and contribute on a larger scale. He encouraged the members of the Committee to adopt a mindset of experimentation in order to seek out the best ways to achieve these ends.

One member of the Committee, Dr. Phillip Lee appeared to disagree with Dr. Drori that Parliament wasn’t accessible to the public, explaining that they could watch proceedings on television or online, or listen to them on the radio. He seemed particularly unhappy with the idea of increasing visitation to Parliament, saying that on some days, it was already “like a school playground” given the number of school groups visiting. Dr. Lee added that the design of the buildings and security concerns made greater access impractical. Dr. Drori noted that viewing Parliamentary proceedings on television or online simply did not provide the same level of experience and reminded the members that the public paid their salaries.

Indeed, much of the meeting did focus on the logistics of balancing greater access with security concerns, and the physical limitations of the Parliament buildings themselves. Dr. Drori tried many times to suggest that there were initiatives that could be undertaken that would allow for greater public access without them getting in the way, and that it was most important that the public not be kept out. He stressed that it really came down to an attitudinal divide: some MPs simply don’t like having members of the public around.

At one point near the end of the meeting, Dr. Drori stated that Parliament’s portcullis logo wasn’t viewed as particularly welcoming by the general public, that it was seen as a gate, something to keep the people out. This statement seemed to upset at least one member of the Committee, Labour MP Rosie Cooper who said she’d never heard such a thing and demanded to know where Dr. Drori got that information. He said it was research that had been shown to SACPE members at one of the meetings, and that he would be willing to provide the details to the Committee.

Of course, the portcullis is a gate. The symbol was developed as part of Sir Charles Barry’s plans for the rebuilt Palace of Westminster after the original burned down on 16 October 1834; he conceptualized the new Palace as a “legislative castle”, and the symbol of a castle gate, a portcullis, fitted well with the scheme. The Portcullis with a crown on top has come to be accepted as the emblem of both Houses of Parliament. In 1996 the use of the crowned Portcullis was formally authorised by license granted by the Queen. Dr. Drori was quick to explain that he wasn’t advocating that Parliament discard its symbols and logos, but that it was crucial that it be aware of public perception and views regarding these matters: “People need to see that Parliament is theirs, that it is of them and for them.”

You can watch the committee meeting with Dr. Drori here.

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Some parliamentary reforms to look forward to in 2012

The BBC’s parliamentary correspondent, Mark D’Arcy, has an interesting look ahead  at what to expect at Westminster in 2012, with two items in particular worthy of special attention.

The first will be a review of the Backbench Business Committee. I have written a number of posts about this new committee, and many readers have frequently asked if the Backbench Business Committee has been a success. By most accounts, it has, which is why the review will take on added importance. As D’Arcy notes:

While the Leader of the House, Sir George Young, and his Lib Dem deputy, David Heath, are both convinced reformers, not everyone is an unalloyed fan of the new empowerment of backbenchers.

“Too keen on confrontational debates”, murmur some voices. “Too ready to schedule debates on a Thursday on voteable motions”, complain others. They might want to clip the committee’s wings by limiting its powers in some way.

It is not clear when this review will take place – D’Arcy has it listed under the April to October timeframe.

He also writes that both the chair and members of the Backbench Business Committee will be up for re-election, probably some time in June:

having realised the power it wields, committee places and perhaps even the chair will be hotly contested.

In particular, I’d be slightly surprised if the contingent of Tory awkward squaddies on the committee remained unscathed.

The other item of note is in some ways the counterpart to the Backbench Business Committee: the creation of a House Business Committee. The Coalition Government had promised to institute a House Business Committee by 2013, therefore in order to meet that deadline, moves in that direction will have to occur this year.

What is a House Business Committee and what will it do? In theory at least (since nothing has yet been proposed), it will be a Committee of the House of Commons, with (one assumes) an elected chair and members similar to most of the other Select Committees, which will organize most, if not all, other debates in the House of Commons. This might not sound particularly important, but it is very close to revolutionary change since it is currently the Government which has full control in deciding the House’s business agenda. As D’Arcy explains:

A house business committee would decide how much time would be devoted to particular bills, which matters more than you might imagine.

In the last Parliament [under Labour] it was quite usual to see heavily-amended legislation hammered through the Commons in a single day’s debate on “remaining stages” – report and third reading – with the result that scores of important changes were voted through unscrutinised.

To its credit, this government has avoided that particular practice – but a more open approach to scheduling debates, something more than the normal carve-up between government and official opposition, could still produce improvements.

The key would be that the agenda for coming weeks was presented as a voteable motion – so MPs who were unhappy that not enough time was being devoted to some bill or debate could attempt to amend it.

Not everyone likes this idea. “I’m not having the business of the House decided by (shudder) Peter Bone,” one upwardly mobile backbencher told me.

Some fear the government would lose the ability to put its bills before the House – defying the time-honoured maxim that the government “must get its business”.

Others fear that a house business committee would amount to no more than the same old backroom dealing, but clothed with a little extra legitimacy because a few establishment grandees had been in the room when it was sealed.

But for those who want the Commons to control its own business, and not have it handed down from on high, the key will be that voteable motion.

They argue that the prospect of being over-ridden by a vote in the House will help ensure the concerns of backbenchers are not ignored.

This innovation should be of great interest to Canadian readers, particularly given the current Canadian government’s propensity to curtail debate through the use of time allocation and closure motions. This is one initiative that I will follow with great interest, and keep readers updated on developments as they occur.

One other item of note will be the Coalition’s draft bill on Lords’ reform. That draft bill is currently being scrutinised by a committee of MPs and peers, and the committee is due to report in March, which means there would be a Lords Reform Bill available to be put into the coalition’s next Queen’s Speech (what Canadians call the Speech from the Throne).

All in all, for those interested in parliamentary and procedural reform, the coming year at Westminster promises to be an interesting one.

Related Posts:

Some Interesting Links

Blogging has been and will continue to be rather light over the next few weeks due to other pressing demands that arise during the holiday season. However, I do want to share a few interesting links with readers.

1. Codifying the UK Constitution

Last year, the UK House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee launched an inquiry into Mapping the path to codifying – or not codifying – the UK’s Constitution. On 8 December 2011, a fourth hearing took place, with the following individuals appearing as witnesses:

  • Rt Hon Tony Benn, former parliamentarian
  • Richard Gordon QC
  • Frank Vibert, Department of Government, London School of Economics

It was a fascinating discussion, and you can watch it in its entirety here.

2. Constitutional Crisis in Papua New Guinea

At the time of writing this, Papua New Guinea (PNG) finds itself with two Governors General, two Prime Ministers, two cabinets and two police commissioners. The Australian provides a good backgrounder to how this situation came about here. Australian and New Zealand media seem to be covering the story quite well. For anyone on Twitter, you may be interested in following @Tavurvur, who has been tweeting regular updates about the crisis. He also blogs.

3. Canada’s Governor General

The Walrus magazine has an interesting, in-depth profile of Canada’s current Governor General, His Excellency the Right Honourable David Johnston. The article also contains quite a bit of information about the post of Governor General.

4. Changing the Rules of Royal Succession: Committee Report

As I have previously mentioned, the UK Political and Constitutional Reform committee conducted an inquiry into changing the rules of royal succession. The Committee’s report was released on 7 December 2011, and you can read it online here.

5. Call for Evidence: Recall of MPs

The UK Coalition Government has put forward a draft bill on the recall of MPs. The House of Commons Political and Constitution Reform committee is examining the Government’s proposals and is soliciting public input. If you are interested in putting forward your views in the draft bill, please read this page for how to proceed. The deadline for submissions is 30 January 2012. You do not have to be a resident of the UK to comment.  (For more information what is a draft bill, you may want to read this post.) The Canadian province of British Columbia is the only Canadian jurisdiction which has recall legislation in place, as I discussed in this post.

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