Michael Moore, Secretary of State for Scotland, stated yesterday that independence for Scotland would require two referendums. The first would be an advisory referendum, which would seek a mandate for the Scottish government to negotiate with the UK government at Westminster to work out an agreed position. Any settlement deal reached would then also need to be put to the Scottish people in a referendum for the UK government to approve it.

Moore’s two-referendum statement was immediately rejected by Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond.

I admit to not having followed the evolution of the Scottish independence movement, and so I am busily researching the issue as it will undoubtedly remain very topical over the course of the next four years. Consequently, I am bound to miss out some key point here and there, and would appreciate more informed readers correcting me when needed. What I have been reading, however, seems like a very strong case of déjà vu. For anyone familiar with the Quebec independence saga, there are very striking similarities.

According to Mr. Moore, a binding referendum would be for the UK government to determine, according to UK constitutional law, but existing rules and regulations would allow for an advisory referendum to be held. An advisory referendum is one wherein voters make their views known on important issues without thereby binding legislation to action. Consequently, a referendum question seeking a mandate to negotiate some form of independence for Scotland would not be a binding referendum on independence itself – it would simply indicate if a majority of voters in Scotland would like such talks to proceed. Hence Moore’s opinion that a referendum of that nature would require a second vote, which would be binding. The second referendum would be to seek approval of the deal negotiated by the Scottish and UK governments.

This is rejected by Mr. Salmond, who argues:

Acknowledged experts have made it clear that the people of Scotland have the right to choose independence on the basis of one referendum agreed by the Scottish parliament, on a published proposal, which is then implemented – exactly as was done for devolution in 1997.

Any Canadians who remember the first Quebec referendum in 1980 (or who studied it in school) should be experiencing that déjà vu I mentioned above. In 1979, the Quebec government made public its constitutional proposal in a white paper entitled Québec-Canada: A New Deal. The Québec Government Proposal for a New Partnership Between Equals: Sovereignty-Association. The province-wide referendum took place on Tuesday, May 20, 1980, and the question on the ballot was:

“The Government of Quebec has made public its proposal to negotiate a new agreement with the rest of Canada, based on the equality of nations; this agreement would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, levy its taxes and establish relations abroad — in other words, sovereignty — and at the same time to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency; any change in political status resulting from these negotiations will only be implemented with popular approval through another referendum; on these terms, do you give the Government of Quebec the mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada?”

As we can see, this was clearly a two-referendum approach. The first referendum sought a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association with Canada, and promised that the results of the negotiations would only be implemented if approved by Quebecers in a second referendum. Of course, there was no second referendum because the the government of Quebec failed to get a mandate to negotiate, with the proposal defeated by a 59.56% 40.44% margin.

While reading up on the issue of Scottish independence, and more specifically, the Scottish National Party’s position, I came across a very interesting article in the Caledonian Mercury. The article claims that the English media and political establishment are “some way behind the curve” on the issue of Scottish independence, “debating, fighting and challenging constitutional arguments that were current a decade ago but which are not topical today.”

The article claims that Alex Salmond’s views on independence are radically different to what he and the SNP espoused in the 1990s. It would seem, from my reading, that the SNP is now pursuing what the Parti Québécois under René Lévesque pursued back in the day: sovereignty-association.

The article refers to a blog post by SNP policy advisor Stephen Noon, the “brains and heart of the SNP in government”, and in that post, Noon writes that the main problem facing the anti-independence cause is:

they will be arguing against independence in a way that ignores the reality of what independence would be. They will be attacking so-called separatism when separatism is not on the agenda.

Noon goes on to quote Alex Salmond from 2007:

“Independence will bring many opportunities for our nation, and with those opportunities also greater success and prosperity. And with independence I look forward to a new partnership with our neighbours in England – one where we will be equal partners, not surly lodgers.

In that new relationship the Queen would remain the Head of State in Scotland. The current parliamentary and political Union would become a monarchical and social union – United Kingdoms rather than a United Kingdom – maintaining a relationship first forged in 1603 by the Union of the Crowns.

Independence for Scotland in the 21st century would reflect the reality of existing interdependence: partnership in these Islands and more widely across Europe.”

Going back to the Caledonian Mercury article, we learn that senior SNP sources told Angus MacLeod of The Times (which I can’t link to because The Times is behind a paywall) that:

Scottish independence was entirely compatible with some form of set payment from the Scottish to the English Government, covering such items as defence and the diplomatic service, which would be retained for the UK and run by London, as they are now.

Professor James Mitchell of Strathclyde University interviewed 80 senior nationalist politicians to discover what they meant by independence:

“I was surprised by just how pragmatic the senior members were in terms of what they understood independence to mean. I would describe what they are thinking about as being much more of a confederate arrangement within these islands than the traditional concept of independence.”

In other words, it sounds as if what the SNP wants isn’t so much actual full-on independence, but federalism:

At its heart, this new approach would involve the handing upwards of certain powers, over defence, macro-economic management and foreign affairs to run on behalf of both countries, as is done now.

The major difference is that this would be at the discretion of the smaller country which would hand over money to pay for them, not have that money held back – as is the case at the moment.

Of course, all of this is pure speculation at this point, since the SNP has not produced a white paper or any form of published proposal that would form the basis for a referendum. But it is nonetheless interesting that the debate, at least for the SNP, has moved from full on independence to some form of independence-lite. The question that then arises is this: what is the difference between independence-lite and increased devolution?

Stuart Crawford asks just that in a guest piece in the Caledonian Mercury. Strongly in favour of full on independence for Scotland, Crawford writes:

There has been much thinking out loud and policy on the hoof, but what seems to be emerging is a loose consensus amongst some on a concept inevitably labelled “independence-lite”. Although there doesn’t appear to be a formal policy statement on this – yet – most people think it describes an arrangement whereby Scotland would raise all its own finances (full fiscal autonomy) and then “buy” what it needs in terms of defence and foreign policy – and possibly other things such as macroeconomic policy – from the rest of the UK.

In terms of a future Scottish defence policy under this arrangement, senior SNP members have even suggested that Scotland would wish to be able to “choose” which operations “its” defence forces participated in. A little knowledge is clearly a dangerous thing, and we can only hope that wiser heads will point out the difficulties with such a proposition, not least of which is in terms of the party’s current position on NATO.

Be that as it may, independence-lite is an interesting idea, and worth further discussion in a more intellectually coherent manner in due course. What I find difficult at the moment, and perhaps others do too, is how the concept differs fundamentally from “devolution-max”, or indeed any of the other models of enhanced devolution which have been mooted from time to time.

Because, to the layman at least, independence-lite and devolution-max look almost indistinguishable. And given that the opposition parties in the Scottish parliament are more or less all signed up to some form of enhanced devolution, is this a sudden outbreak of consensus?

Also interesting is that Crawford believes that the SNP’s conversion to independence-lite/sovereignty-association/federalism – whatever you want to call it – is purely pragmatic. The SNP knows they couldn’t win a referendum on full independence, so they are willing to abandon “the primary principle behind its raison d’être” in favour of what they hope might be actually achievable:

Faced with mounting evidence that a vote in the Holyrood elections for the SNP is not, per se, a vote for Scottish independence, party apparatchiks are now watering down its independence message to make it more widely palatable, electorally speaking.

It is important to keep in mind that the Scottish Parliament does not have the authority to declare Scotland an independent country. This is true of the province of Quebec as well, as I discussed in this post. However, a strong yes vote would make it difficult for the UK government to refuse to negotiate. Another key point: in the event of a “No” vote in a referendum, that would apparently be the end of things – no one wants to turn this into another Quebec:

Alex Salmond has described the independence referendum as a once-in-a-generation event.

All the parties – unionist and pro-independence – are keen to avoid the situation which has unfolded in the Canadian province of Quebec, where debate over multiple independence referenda over the years has been dubbed the “neverendum”.

At worst, a “No” result in the referendum could spell the end for the SNP as a mainstream political force.

It’s also likely focus would shift back to the debate over more powers for Holyrood – with full fiscal autonomy, as opposed to relying on the Treasury block grant, probably becoming a more serious option.

Of course, that remains to be seen. I don’t have that much trouble imagining a scenario where the result is very close, and those in favour of some form of independence for Scotland decide that another kick at the can is justifiable down the road. And a “No” vote certainly wouldn’t need to spell the end for the SNP. Scottish voters might find that they like having a strong, pro-Scotland party in power, even if they don’t want to follow it down the road to full independence. After all, two failed referendums haven’t led to the demise of the Parti Québécois in Quebec.

Related Posts:

• Scottish Consultation on Independence Referendum
• The debate on Scotland indepedence heats up
• Some interesting links
• On secession
• Important Political Resources