Politics | On procedure and politics

Reasons for not voting in the May 2011 election

Declining voter turnout is a problem confronting many democracies. In the most recent federal general election in Canada (May 2011), voter turnout was 61%, which is only marginally better than the turnout for the previous election in 2008, 58.8%.

A study by Statistics Canada finds that of the 7.5 million eligible voters who did not cast ballots in the May 2011 election, 27.7% didn’t vote because they weren’t interested. This also includes those who believed that their vote would not make a difference. Another 23% didn’t vote because they were too busy. Ten percent didn’t vote because they were out of town/away, 8.5% didn’t vote because of illness or disability, and 7.6% didn’t vote because they didn’t like the candidates or the issues.

It’s rather unfortunate that Statistics Canada lumped those who didn’t vote because they believe their vote would not make a difference into the same category as those who indicated they weren’t interested in politics. It would have been interesting to know if those who felt their vote wouldn’t make a difference constituted a majority of the “not interested” group. As well, I think these are two very different reasons for not voting, therefore it would have been more informative to leave them as separate reasons. Given that the “out of town/away” option was left separate from the “too busy” option, the “my vote wouldn’t make a difference” option should and could have been left separate from the “not interested in politics” option.

I don’t have much sympathy for those who said they didn’t vote because they were “too busy”. Canadians have opportunities to vote in advance polls, which are generally held on the 10th, 9th and 7th days before the actual election day (this is based on a 36-day timeline, counting down from the issuing of the writs (day 36) to election day, day 0). The Statistics Canada report states that “too busy” also includes family obligations and work/school schedule conflict. Again, I find it rather difficult to believe that these family obligations and work/school conflicts were issues during the advanced polls and on election day. On election day itself, polls are open for twelve hours, ranging from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. to 8:30 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. depending on which province or territory you live in. There may be some people who work 12-hour shifts that coincided with polling hours, but surely they weren’t the majority of the “too busy” crowd.

Still, there are ways to improve opportunities to vote. In 2007, the Government had introduced the Expanded Voting Opportunities Bill which proposed to provide even more opportunities for Canadians to vote in general elections, by adding two new advance polling days: the Sunday, the eighth day before election day, and the Sunday, the day before election day. While at best a band-aid solution, the bill never even made it to second reading.

A better option to consider would be to adopt something Australia does: allow voters to vote at any polling station in their constituency, rather than at one designated polling place. This way, polling booths could be set up in malls, in the lobbies of businesses, perhaps even in subway stations, etc. Since everything can now be computerised, I fail to see what logic there is in continuing to force people to vote at one designated spot, usually a church basement or school gymnasium, which might not be the most convenient place for many.

While there is certainly nothing wrong with providing voters with even more occasions to vote prior to the actual election day, this won’t do much to address the issue of people simply not caring enough to vote, or not voting because they don’t think their vote will matter.

As I stated above, these are very different reasons for not voting. Someone who doesn’t vote because they think there is no point, that their vote won’t matter at all, obviously is interested in politics and the election. They are simply frustrated by Canada’s continued use of First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) which more often than not returns results that do not reflect actual voting patterns, such as majority governments elected with a minority of the vote. Or they may live in a “safe” riding, where one party is guaranteed to win, no matter who they run as a candidate. Adopting some form of PR, which would result in a parliament that more closely reflected exactly how people actually voted would certainly help people feel as if their ballots did make a difference. Even in parts of the country which are traditionally dominated by one political party (thanks to FPTP), votes cast for other parties would result in seats under PR.

Of course, this would be the most difficult change to implement, not simply because some political parties remain opposed to any form of proportional representation, but many voters are also wary of voting systems other than FPTP.

One of the more curious reasons for not voting must be the “did not like the candidates/issues” group. I can understand not liking the candidates, but not liking the issues? Granted, the May 2011 election was the result of the Government being defeated on a confidence motion following two findings of the Government being in contempt of Parliament, which perhaps some believed wasn’t sufficient reason to force an election, but the campaign itself did not centre solely on that issue. Many issues were raised during the campaign, but even if none of the issues discussed were priorities for some voters, do they not have an opinion on which party they think would provide the best government?

As for those who are genuinely not interested in politics/voting, there is no simple solution. You can’t force people to care about or take an interest in things. Some might advocate compulsory voting, but I don’t think forcing people who really don’t care about politics to vote will result in better government. There is more to be gained by addressing issues that will encourage those who are interested and engaged to vote, such as reforming the voting system and modernising how, when and where we can vote. Voting via the internet should be looked at – if we can file our taxes and fill out our census forms online, we can probably find a way to ensure secure online voting for a general election.

And who knows? Maybe if Canada were to adopt a better electoral system, some of those “not interested” non-voters might become a bit more interested.

Ministerial responsibility

Ministerial responsibility takes two forms — collective cabinet responsibility (or ‘cabinet solidarity’) and individual ministerial responsibility. Both concepts are governed by conventions inherited from Westminster and both are central to the working of responsible government.

Cabinet is collectively responsible to the people, through the Parliament, for determining and implementing policies for national government. Broadly, it is required by convention that all Ministers must be prepared to accept collective responsibility for, and defend publicly, the policies and actions of the Government. Part of this, of course, requires that the loss of a vote on a no-confidence motion or on a major issue is expected to lead to the resignation of the whole Government. You may want to have a look at this post on collective ministerial responsibility and coalition government.

What I want to look at in this post, however, is the matter of individual responsibility.

As explained in House of Commons Procedure and Practice (2nd ed., p. 32):

The individual or personal responsibility of the Minister derives from a time when in practice and not just in theory the Crown governed; Ministers merely advised the Sovereign and were responsible to the Sovereign for their advice. The principle of individual ministerial responsibility holds that Ministers are accountable not only for their own actions as department heads, but also for the actions of their subordinates; individual ministerial responsibility provides the basis for accountability throughout the system. Virtually all departmental activity is carried out in the name of a Minister who, in turn, is responsible to Parliament for those acts. Ministers exercise power and are constitutionally responsible for the provision and conduct of government; Parliament holds them personally responsible for it.

We’ve seen some good examples of this with the Coalition government in the United Kingdom. By my count, there have been at least four such instances during the Coalition’s first year in power. It isn’t that surprising that the Coalition has had a bit of a rocky start – few in cabinet have had previous government experience, and the merging of two very different parties was bound to create a few headaches along the way. What is interesting to me, however, is that the apologies have occurred promptly after the incident that triggered them.

The first minister to issue a full apology was Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, on 7 July 2010. On 5 July, Gove had made a ministerial statement to the House announcing the cancellation of a Schools Rebuilding Fund, which meant that many schools would see planned renovations cancelled. Accompanying his statement, Gove tabled a list of the affected schools. It turned out that many schools had been miscategorized, which caused great confusion and consternation among local councils across the country. In his 7 July statement before the House, Gove apologised for the way information accompanying his earlier statement was provided to Members, for the inaccurate information provided, and for the confusion caused by the inaccurate information and media speculation over the nature of his apology.

On 17 February 2011, Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Caroline Spelman, apologised for the Government’s plan to sell off public forests. According to many accounts I’d read, the policy in itself was a good one; the initial problem was how the government presented it and its failure to communicate it effectively, allowing environmental activists to mount strong opposition. Spelman took full responsibility “for the situation” and ended her statement with “I am sorry we got this one wrong, but we have listened to people’s concerns.”

A couple of weeks later, Prime Minister David Cameron apologised for botched attempts to rescue UK citizens from Libya. The House was not sitting at the time, so his apologies were made to the press. Cameron stated:

Of course I am incredibly sorry. They have had a difficult time. The conditions at the airport have been extremely poor.

There are going to be lessons to be learned from this and we will make absolutely sure that we learn them for the future but, right now, the priority has got to be getting those British nationals home. (…)

This is not an easy situation to deal with. It is immensely frustrating for the people on the ground and we will do everything we can to get those people home.

Cameron also delivered a full statement to the House of Commons when it met again on 28 February 2011. He didn’t apologise, but updated Members on the situation in Libya and the Government’s response.

This contrasts sharply with Canada’s own problems rescuing Canadians from Libya. Neither the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense nor the Minister of External Affairs apologised for the problems, and in some interviews, the Minister of Defense seemed to be laying the blame on External Affairs (which violates the convention of collective responsibility) and denied planes had left Tripoli empty. The Prime Minister also announced sanctions and other measures, not in the House of Commons, but in a televised address.

Meanwhile, back in the UK, on 7 March 2011, Foreign Secretary William Hague took full responsibility for what had gone wrong with a special forces’ mission to Libya. Hague didn’t apologise, but he did assume full responsibility for the botched mission.

In Canada, on 25 May, 2010, following requests that ministers’ staff members appear before committees to testify, the Government House Leader stated in the Canadian House of Commons that:

In our system of government, the powers of the Crown are exercised by ministers who are, in turn, answerable to Parliament. Ministers are individually and collectively responsible to the House of Commons for the policies, programs and activities of the government. They are supported in the exercise of their responsibilities by the public servants and by members of their office staffs.

It is the responsibility of individual public servants and office staff members to provide advice and information to ministers, to carry out faithfully the directions given by ministers, and in so doing, to serve the people of Canada. These employees are accountable to their superiors, and ultimately to their minister, for the proper and competent execution of their duties.

Ours is a system of responsible government because the government must retain the confidence of the House of Commons and because ministers are responsible to the House for everything that is done under their authority. We ministers are answerable to Parliament and to its committees. It is ministers who decide policy and ministers who must defend it before the House and ultimately before the people of Canada.

Accordingly, responsibility for providing information to Parliament and its committees rests with ministers. Officials have no constitutional responsibility to Parliament, nor do they share in that of ministers. They do, however, support ministers in their relationship with Parliament, and to this extent, they may be said to assist in the answerability of ministers to Parliament.

(…)

There is a clear case to be made that the accountability of political staff ought to be satisfied through ministers. Ministers ran for office and accepted the role and responsibility of being a minister. Staff did not.

Interestingly, the new version of the “Guide for Ministers and Ministers of State” published in May 2011, contains the following passage:

Ministerial accountability to Parliament does not mean that a Minister is presumed to have knowledge of every matter that occurs within his or her department or portfolio, nor that the Minister is necessarily required to accept blame for every matter. (p. 3)

When a minster does take responsibility and apologises to the House, there are frequently calls for the minister to resign. Many are quick to assume that if a minister apologises, then there was some error or wrongdoing that occurred, otherwise, the minister wouldn’t apologise. And if some wrongdoing occurred, then the minister is ultimately responsible, and should therefore resign. However, ministerial responsibility is not that black and white. Taking responsibility for mistakes made by staff does not mean the minister is directly responsible for those mistakes occurring. It simply means the minister acknowledges that mistakes were made in his or her deparment, the department regrets that fact, and the matter will be corrected.

Unless there is very clear evidence linking the minister directly to whatever departmental wrongdoing has come to light, ministers can accept responsibility, but lay the blame on department staff. What is far more likely to bring down a minister is a matter of personal misconduct. Sexual or financial scandals, rather than administrative failure, have been far more likely to destroy a ministerial career.

Members leaving the House

As similar as are the UK and Canadian parliamentary systems, there are some very interesting differences. One of these is the fact that British MPs can’t resign their seat the same way Canadian (and Australian and New Zealand) MPs can, as I blogged about in this post.

Similar to that, Lords can’t resign either. Lords are appointed for life and there is no procedure available to them that would allow them to retire from the Upper Chamber. Canadian Senators also used to be appointed for life, but this was changed in 1965, setting an age limit of 75. However, if a Senator wishes to resign his or her seat before that, they can do so by advising the Governor General in writing to this effect. Also, Senators can be removed from office. A Senator’s place becomes vacant if the Senator is absent for two consecutive sessions; becomes bankrupt or insolvent or a public defaulter; becomes a citizen or subject of any foreign power; is attainted of treason or convicted of any infamous crime; or ceases to be qualified in respect of property or residence.

The number of Senators in Canada is fixed at 105. The UK House of Lords has no membership limits. New Senators are appointed in Canada only when a vacancy occurs; in the UK, appointments are made at different times throughout the year. There is only one type of Senator, there are three different types of Lords. Life Peers (Lords Temporal) are appointed for their lifetime only, these Lords’ titles are not passed on to their children. The Queen formally appoints life Peers on the advice and recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Lords Spiritual consist of 26 Church of England archbishops and bishops who pass their membership on to the next most senior bishop when they retire. The Archbishops of Canterbury and York traditionally get life peerages on retirement. Finally, there are the Elected hereditary Peers. The right of hereditary Peers to sit and vote in the House of Lords was ended in 1999 by the House of Lords Act but 92 Members were elected internally to remain until the next stage of the Lords reform process.

Because there is no fixed membership number, successive prime ministers continue to appoint new life peers to the House of Lords. Current membership in the House of Lords is 828 members, of whom 22 are on leave of absence and 16 are disqualified as judges or MEPs, and the Peers themselves acknowledge that this is problematic. The House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee recently organised a seminar to discuss the House of Lords and published a short Report highlighting specific proposals for Lords reform to address key issues, the most urgent of which was identified as the growth in the membership of the Lords which is threatening to undermine its functionality.

All that to point out that unlike the Canadian Senate, membership in the House of Lords is, in theory, unlimited, and the fact that Lords have no means by which they can resign is causing serious problems.

Yesterday (Monday 27 June 2011), the House of Lords was invited to approve the report from its Procedure Committee, Members leaving the House, which proposes a procedure by which peers would be able, for the first time, to retire from the House.

The voluntary retirement scheme would allow any member of the House of Lords who wishes to retire to do so by writing to the Clerk of the Parliaments indicating his or her wish to permanently retire from the service of the House. Having received an application to retire, the Clerk of the Parliaments would consult with the Lord Speaker and the member’s party or group, who in turn would consult with the member to seek confirmation that they do indeed intend to retire permanently.

The report was unanimously approved without a vote.

Filibusters in the House of Commons, part 2

In my first post on this topic, I explained that filibusters are very rare in the Canadian House of Commons because various rules have been introduced over time to both strictly regulate proceedings in the Chamber, and to allow Government to introduce measures to curtail debate when they deem it necessary to do so. As stated in House of Commons Procedure and Practice, “one of the fundamental principles of parliamentary procedure is that debate in the House of Commons must lead to a decision within a reasonable period of time.” (p. 647)

While filibusters are rare, and certain procedural loopholes have been closed over time, this does not mean that Opposition parties cannot drag out debate for days, even weeks, if they so choose simply by taking advantage of existing rules. They can do so, but rarely choose to. Filibusters are most commonly instigated when a Government tries to move a controversial bill rapidly through the legislative process, usually by time allocating some or all aspects of the bill.

Normal procedure for a bill is that notice of motion for leave to introduce a bill is placed on the Order paper. At least two days later, the bill is given first reading, when the bill is introduced into the House. There is no debate at this stage. Because normally no bill can pass through more than one stage in the same sessional day, the bill won’t be called again until at least the next day to begin second reading debate. This debate stage can last up to 10 hours, not including the time given to the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, who can both speak for as long as they want. This 10 hours usually occurs over several days, even weeks or months, depending on how often the Government will call the bill during Orders of the Day. Following second reading debate, the bill is then usually referred to Committee for consideration. This is when the bill can be amended. Committee stage also can take several days or weeks. The bill is then returned to the House and then at least two days later, House will then consider any changes made by the Committee (report stage debate). Once the Bill has passed the report stage, the motion for third reading is called. The rules for third reading debate are the same as for second reading debate. Once the bill has received third reading, it then goes to the Senate. Please note that this explanation of the legislative process is greatly simplified. For a more detailed explanation of the legisative process, please click here.

In some instances, however, a Government may want to expedite the passage of a piece of legislation. It might introduce a time allocation motion to by-pass the committee stage, or to set very specific time limits on how long second reading debate and/or the committee stage will last. Sometimes it will seek to have a bill pass through two or more stages in a single day. It is usually moves by a Government to limit debate and speed passage of a bill that will prompt Opposition Members to try to halt the inevitable by filibustering. For example, with regards to the bill to end the strike by Canada Post workers that provoked the filibuster which began on June 23, 2011, the Government moved the following motion:

That, notwithstanding any Standing Order or usual practice of the House, a bill in the name of the Minister of Labour, entitled An Act to provide for the resumption and continuation of postal services, shall be disposed of as follows: (a) commencing when the said bill is read a first time and concluding when the said bill is read a third time, the House shall not adjourn except pursuant to a motion proposed by a Minister of the Crown; (b) the said bill may be read twice or thrice in one sitting; (c) after being read a second time, the said bill shall be referred to a Committee of the Whole; and (d) during consideration of the said bill, no division shall be deferred.

As we can see, this motion does several things to circumvent the usual legislative process. It specifies that debate will begin with first reading; that the House will not adjourn until the bill has received all three readings; that it may be read two or more times in one sitting; that the bill will be referred to Committee of the Whole rather than a Standing Committee following second reading; and during consideration of the bill, any divisions required will not be deferred. (Committee of the Whole House is the entire House of Commons sitting as a committee and is presided over by the Deputy Speaker rather than the Speaker. The Speaker’s chair remains empty.) If the Opposition parties had been in agreement with the bill to resume postal service, it could have passed in the House of Commons in a matter of hours. For example, legislation to end a strike by Toronto transit workers was passed by the Ontario Legislative Assembly in half an hour on April 27, 2008.

There are no rules for filibustering. A filibuster occurs when MPs use existing procedural rules to purposefully delay government business for as long as possible. As I stated in my first post, while most Members speaking to a motion or bill have strict time limits on how long they can speak, usually 20 minutes, sometimes 10, there are a couple of exceptions. The Prime Minister and Leader of the Official Opposition do not have any time limits in many cases. Similarly, a Minister moving a government motion (or the Parliamentary Secretary speaking on his or her behalf) and the Member speaking in reply both have unlimited time. In these instances, the Leader of the Official Opposition or the Member speaking in reply to the Minister moving a government motion could simply talk and talk and talk and talk and talk. This is called extended remarks and is, in a way, a one-person filibuster. However, Fidel Castro notwithstanding, there are limits to how long a single person can speak, and so opposition parties tend to favour other procedural options.

A favourite, and one that is easily implemented, is simply to get every MP in the opposition party’s caucus to speak to the motion. Under normal circumstances, only some members from each party will speak to a bill or motion when it is being debated. If a party has 120 MPs, and each MP is allowed to speak for 20 minutes, followed by a 10 minutes questions and comments, this will drag out debate over at least a couple of days.

Opposition parties can also introduce amendments and subamendments to a motion being debated. Each amendment then needs to be debated and voted on before debate resumes on the main motion or bill. The introduction of a new question into the debate, which is what an amendment does, means that Members who have already spoken on the main motion can speak again on the amendment and/or subamendment.

I referred to hoist and reasoned motions in my first post. Members can also move dilatory motions. Dilatory motions are superseding motions (which are moved for the purpose of superseding (or replacing) the question before the House) intended to dispose of the original question before the House either for the time being or permanently. Although dilatory motions are often moved for the express purpose of causing delay, they may also be used to advance the business of the House. Thus, dilatory motions are used both by the government and the opposition. Dilatory motions can only be moved by a Member who has been recognized by the Chair in the regular course of debate, and not on a point of order. Dilatory motions include motions:

to proceed to the Orders of the Day;
to proceed to another order of business;
to postpone consideration of a question until a later date;
to adjourn the House; and
to adjourn the debate.

Dilatory motions used to be debatable, but the rules were changed in 1913. Now, however, a recorded division is usually demanded and the bells ring for a maximum of 30 minutes to summon the Members, thus delaying debate on other matters before the House.

In the earlier post, I also referred to Members raising frequent points of order and questions of Privilege. Both of these delay debate because each point of order or question of Privilege has to be heard and dealt with by the Speaker. Points of order are usually quite brief and easily ruled on by the Speaker, but questions of Privilege can be quite lengthy and often require the Speaker to recess the House in order to consider the matter and return with a ruling. I referred to the Progressive Conservative party using this tactic in 1981, and successfully dragging out debate on constitutional reforms for over two weeks. At the outset of this filibuster, the Speaker, Jeanne Sauvé, gave opposition Members 20 minutes to make their case. After five days, this was reduced to 10 minutes, then she continued to progressively shortened the length of time for questions of Privilege as the filibuster dragged on. She eventually warned the Opposition that if they couldn’t convince her that they had a legitimate question of Privilege in their first two sentences, she wouldn’t hear them any further. (Source: Her Excellency Jeanne Sauvé, by Shirley Woods, p. 167)

Most, if not all, of these various procedural manoevres can be repeated at each stage of the debate but eventually, all filibusters come to an end, and the will of a majority government will prevail.

Initial thoughts on the Senate Reform Bill

Canada’s Conservative government introduced its legislation to reform the Canada Senate. There are some interesting parallels with the UK Coalition Government’s draft bill for reform of the House of Lords. I’ve discussed the UK proposals here and some of my concerns regarding these proposals here.

Current Status of the Senate and Senators

Currently, the Canadian Senate is organised around regional representation, meaning regions of the country, rather than the actual provinces and territories, are equally represented. Both Ontario and Quebec each have 24 Senators, 24 Senators represent the three Maritime Provinces (New Brunswick 10, Nova Scotia 10 and Prince Edward Island 4), and another 24 Senators represent the four Western provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia – six Senators each). As Newfoundland and Labrador was the last province to join Confederation in 1949, it has six Senators, and each of the three territories has one. Anyone even remotely familiar with the populations of the various provinces and territories can immediately appreciate how unbalanced this regional representation is. Newfoundland and Labrador has a population of just over 500,000, yet has six Senators, the same as each of the four Western provinces which all have greater populations, significantly greater in the case of British Columbia (4.5 million) and Alberta (3.7 million).

Senators are appointed by the Governor General, although, in modern practice, he or she makes appointments only on the advice of the prime minister, and serve until the age of 75. Prime ministers normally choose members of their own parties to be senators, though they sometimes nominate independents or members of opposing parties. In practice, a large number of the members of the Senate are ex-Cabinet ministers, ex-provincial premiers, and other eminent people.

Proposed Reforms

Bill C-7, An Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits, proposes to set term limits for persons serving in the Senate, and that future appointments to the Senate will be made from lists of nominees of individuals elected in their respective provinces and territories.

1. Term Limits

As stated above, currently, persons appointed to the Senate serve until the age of 75, meaning that an individual could serve as Senator for 45 years, as one must be at least 30 years old in order to be appointed Senator. The new bill proposes limiting Senators to one term of nine years. If their term in office were to be interrupted for any reason (illness, for example), they could be reappointed at a later date, but only for the unused portion of their original nine year term.

2. Election of Senators

Senators would still be appointed by the Prime Minister, the only difference this bill would make is that the nominees to the Senate from each province and territory would be elected by the voters in each province and territory. Indeed, the bulk of the bill, pages 4-20, outlines the three options provinces and territories can use to elect their Senate nominees, and covers all aspects of said election process, from the nomination process to financing rules to judicial recounts in the case of a tie vote. The three options open to provinces and territories is 1) to choose their Senate nominees in an election held at the same time as a general election to elect members to the provincial or territorial assembly; 2) to hold the Senate nominees election on a separate date to be determined by the province’s Lieutenant Governor or the territorial Commissioner; or 3) hold the Senate nominees election at the same time as municipal elections in the province or territory.

Initial thoughts on the proposed changes

I have to say that my initial reaction to the proposed changes is that they seem rather pointless. The bill’s preamble makes many references to democracy and democratic ideals (emphasis added):

Whereas it is important that Canada’s representative institutions, including the Senate, continue to evolve in accordance with the principles of modern democracy and the expectations of Canadians;

Whereas the Government of Canada has undertaken to explore means to enable the Senate better to reflect the democratic values of Canadians and respond to the needs of Canada’s regions;

(…)

Whereas it is appropriate that those whose names are submitted to the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada for summons to the Senate be determined by democratic election by the people of the province or territory that a senator is to represent;

(…)

Whereas the tenure of senators should be consistent with modern democratic principles;

However, in my view, this bill falls short. I know this is in large part due to the fact that the Government feels it needs to avoid constitutional changes that would require negotiations with the provinces, and therefore is limiting itself to changes it thinks it can make unilaterally, but there are major problems with the bill.

Accountability

The preamble states that the tenure of senators should be consistent with modern democratic principles, and for some reason the Government believes that a term limit of nine years better serves that purpose than an age limit of 75. In my view, both fail on that count because modern democratic principles are that it is the people, voters, who determine when a politician’s tenure in office should come to an end. MPs have to seek re-election – that is where the accountability comes into play. In my critique of the UK Lords’ Reform proposals, I wrote:

Democracy is about being accountable to the people. Being able to get rid of someone is as important as the ability to elect them in the first place. If a peer never has to face the electorate again, I don’t see how this makes them more accountable to anyone. They’ve simply gone from being appointed for life by the PM to being appointed for 15 years by voters.

The same holds true here. If a Senator never has to face the electorate again, how does this make them more accountable? They’ve simply gone from being appointed until the age of 75 by the PM to being appointed by the PM for nine years.

And yes, they are still being appointed by the Prime Minister. The only difference, in theory at least, is that he or she will have to make future appointments from a list of elected nominees. I say “in theory” because I find that the bill uses some rather interesting wording. For example:

3. If a province or territory has enacted legislation that is substantially in accordance with the framework set out in the schedule, the Prime Minister, in recommending Senate nominees to the Governor General, must consider names from the most current list of Senate nominees selected for that province or territory.

The Prime Minister “must consider” names from the most current list. To me that doesn’t mean the PM is under any obligation to actually appoint someone from the list. He or she only has to consider the list.

Further on, in the Schedule, under Part 1, General, Basic Principles, we find a similar passage:

1. Senators to be appointed for a province or territory should be chosen from a list of Senate nominees submitted by the government of the province or territory.

Again, to me “should be chosen” doesn’t mean they have to be or will be. It’s more of a strong recommendation – they should be, but if the PM doesn’t like any of them, or if they’re all from parties other than his or her own, well… As far as I can tell, there isn’t anything in the bill that forces the PM to actually appoint someone from one of these lists of elected nominees. Indeed, there is nothing in the bill that overrides the provision in the Constitution Act which gives the Governor General the power to appoint Senators.

Term Lengths and Limits

A single nine-year term to me is not an improvement. It’s the same problem I have with the single 15-year term limit proposed for peers in the UK, and what I wrote in the post linked to above applies here as well. I would accept a nine-year term limit if and only if Senators were allowed to seek re-election. It’s this insistence on serving one term only that completely baffles me. If MPs can serve for decades because voters keep re-electing them, why shouldn’t Senators be allowed to serve more than one term? I think everyone agrees that the main strength of the Senate (and Lords) is the fact that they serve a long time and become experts in key areas. Why undermine that? If one is going to insist that a Senator serve one term only, make it longer – 20 years maybe. If it’s shorter, let then stand for re-election. One short-ish term seems to undermine the whole raison d’être of the upper chamber as well as the key principle of democracy – accountability.

Elected if necessary but not really elected

At least the UK is going all out and proposing a mostly (or completely) elected upper-chamber, elected using some form of proportional representation. The Canadian bill is proposing that voters get to elect nominees – but they still won’t really have any say over who their Senator will be. If the PM ends up with a list of 10 nominees from a province and there is only one vacancy to fill, voters might well still end up with the least popular of the lot. Is this really an improvement? There’s nothing in the bill explaining how the PM will choose from among the nominees put forward by each province or territory. Will the PM look at how decisively some candidates were elected over others? Will they continue to favour nominees from their own party over those from opposition parties? What if there is complete and utter political apathy in some provinces and voter turnout for Senate nominee elections is well below 50%? Remember – people won’t really be voting to elect a Senator, they’ll be voting to elect a nominee whose name will sit on a list for a maximum of six years – meaning the odds are they’ll never actually get to be a Senator. How many people are going to get really excited about coming out to vote for that? The entire exercise strikes me as an exercise in futility that will probably be met with one huge collective shrug from voters.

The regional unfairness remains

The oddest thing about the Canadian Senate is the insistence on regional representation rather than actual provincial representation. There might have been some logic behind this arrangement back in 1867, but it’s grossly unfair now -very much contrary to modern democratic principles this bill purports to support. Of course, changing that to make the Senate actually equal – the same number of Senators from each province (slightly fewer from each territory) would require major constitutional talks with the provinces and probably not be achievable; there would be many who would object to smaller provinces such as PEI, with its population of 150,000 being on equal footing in the Senate with much larger provinces. I think there is a tolerance of the current regional imbalance because of the fact that the Senate itself is not elected. However, if the Senate was perceived to be more democratic because Senators were now elected, sort of – at least elected and then appointed – people might start to cast a more critical look at the regional representation aspect.

Increased legitimacy?

If the UK does end up with a mostly or fully elected House of Lords, and elected using some form of PR at that, there is bound to be conflict between the Lords and the House of Commons because the Lords will have a legitimacy it now lacks. Indeed, as I wrote in my other post, “a House of Lords elected by proportional representation might not be viewed in some ways as more legitimate than the House of Commons elected by FPTP because it would better reflect actual voting patterns.”

Obviously, that won’t be a problem here in Canada – at least not to the same extent. We in Canada will not be having Senate elections, we’ll be electing nominees who may or may not be appointed by the Prime Minister using some completely unknown selection process – the bill neither really commits the PM to having to choose people from those lists, nor does it outline how the PM will choose from the list. Yet, persons who are elected appointments to the Senate are still going to be tempted to flex their muscles more so than the currently un-elected appointments to the Senate – they will have some added legitimacy, after all.

The current PM is already facing backlash from some of his Senate appointees who were named to the Senate specifically to get this sort of legislation passed without too much opposition, which he’s apparently not to happy about. Imagine what would happen if he has to deal with Senators who think they have actual legitimacy.

I maintain what I’ve argued in other posts. The real issue with the Senate is not that Senators are appointed, it’s the appointment process. A much better reform would be to remove the appointment process from the Prime Minister completely – which this bill fails to do. I’ve previously blogged about the proposals put forth by B. Thomas Hall and W. T. Stanbury, which to me are really the ideal solution. You can read about them in this post (starts about mid-way through the post). That would be much more productive Senate reform – certainly better than what is being proposed in Bill C-7.

Filibusters in the Canadian House of Commons

(See follow-up post here.)

I discussed the issue of filibusters in a previous post, focusing primarily on the UK House of Lords as it tried to filibuster the Government’s Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill earlier this year. In that post, I wrote that filibusters in the Canadian Parliament were quite rare.

The reasons why filibusters are rare in Ottawa is that over the years, various changes have been made to the Standing Orders that have resulted in very orderly, tightly orchestrated proceedings with very specific time limits in place for most proceedings during the course of the parliamentary day.

Indeed, if one looks at the order paper for the day’s proceedings in the House of Commons, the timetable governing debates and other measures is quite clearly specified. For example, from today’s Order Paper (uploaded as a PDF for future reference), we see that the day’s business begins at 11:00 a.m. with an Opposition motion. The length of speeches for all Members is clearly listed at 20 minutes maximum and subject to a 10-minute question and comment period, voting on the motion will take place not later than 15-minutes before the expiry of the time provided for Government Orders, and if a recorded division is requested, the length of the bells will be a maximum 15 minutes. Following that, there is statements by Members, from 2:00 to 2:15 p.m., and the statements are not to exceed one minute each. Oral Questions begins not later than 2:15. Routine Proceedings then follows at 3:00, and among those, Petitions must not take up more than 15 minutes, etc. With these specific time limits in place, it becomes very difficult for the Opposition to hijack proceedings and cause a filibuster.

As well, other measures have been adopted which allow the government of the day to curtail debate and limit certain tactics previously employed by opposition parties to filibuster pieces of Government legislation. To quote from House of Commons Procedure and Practice (2nd ed.), pp. 648-9:

At Confederation, few rules existed to curtail debate. Even then, it was recognized that unlimited debate was not desirable and that some restraint would have to be exercised or some accommodation reached in order for the House to conduct its business with reasonable despatch.For the first 45 years following Confederation, the only tool at the government’s disposal was the previous question, (…) Not only was there no other way of putting an end to a specific debate within a reasonable time, but there were no formal time limits of any kind on debates. The length of speeches was unlimited. The conduct and duration of proceedings in the House were based largely upon a spirit of mutual fair play where informal arrangements, or “closure by consent”, governed the debate. In the words of Prime Minister Robert Borden:

… at a definite stage in a debate, when, in the judgment of the leading men of both sides of the House, it has proceeded far enough, it has been the practice for a consultation to be held and a date to be fixed; and members who are not able to catch the Speaker’s eye within the period so fixed are, by arrangements made on both sides of the House, practically excluded from taking part in the debate on that subject and the question is brought to an issue in that way. (Debates, April 9, 1913, col. 7391.)

In the early days of Confederation, the main business of the House involved the consideration of private bills and other business sponsored by private Members. Because the government played only a minor role in the economy, government business made up only a small part of the House’s workload. After 1900, the changing nature of the business coming before the House, especially the growing volume of business initiated by the government, led to a steady increase in the time that the House set aside for Government Orders. The time of the House became a precious commodity and a source of sometimes fierce partisan contention. This was manifested by a growing propensity on the part of the opposition to thwart the passage of government bills through delay and obstruction.

These changes in parliamentarians’ attitudes and in the government workload led the House to adopt rules and practices that would, on the one hand, facilitate the daily management of its time and, on the other, limit debate and expedite the normal course of events in cases deemed of an important or urgent nature.

One of the first changes made was the introduction of the closure rule in 1913. Closure is a procedural device used to bring debate on a question to a conclusion by a majority vote in the House, even though all MPs who wanted to speak to the matter have not had the chance to do so. This rule has remained virtually unchanged since its adoption in 1913, and has been used more than 60 times. Talk of repealing the closure rule has surfaced on occasion, but no action has ever been taken in that regard. However, in October 2001, the House adopted a new Standing Order which allowed for a questions and answers period of at most 30 minutes following the moving of a motion of closure. The purpose of this questions and answers period is to promote ministerial accountability and allow the government to justify the use of this measure. Closure can be invoked on any debatable matter, including bills and motions, but not on proceedings in committees.

Also in 1913, the House adopted amendments to existing Rule 17 which restricted the number of debatable motions, and provided that on two days of the week certain motions which would ordinarily be debatable, specifically, motions for the House to resolve into the Committee of Supply or into the Committee of Ways and Means, would not be debatable.

In 1927, the House adopted its first rule to limit the speeches of a majority of Members to 40 minutes each. Further restrictions were imposed in 1955 when limits were placed on the length of the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne and Budget debates, on debates in Committee of the Whole and on debate on the motion for the House to resolve itself into the Committee of Supply. Permanent changes to the Standing Orders in 1962 provided further limitations on the Address and Budget debates and on debate during Private Members’ Business. In 1968, amendments were made to the Standing Order limiting speeches in a Committee of the Whole. In 1991, the duration of the Address and Budget debates was further limited to a maximum of six and four days respectively. In 2001, the House adopted rules allowing the study of budgetary appropriations again in Committee of the Whole. The maximum length of debate on a series of Votes was then five hours. Two years later, it was limited to four hours and at the same time Members’ speeches were reduced to a maximum of 15 minutes. In 2003, the House reduced the period allowed for the first speakers from each of the recognized parties to speak in debate at the second and third reading stages of government bills from 40 to 20 minutes. A few years later, debate on the adoption of reports from standing or special committees was limited to three hours.

The current provisions in the Standing Orders concerning the length of Members’ speeches during debate are as follows. In most cases, the maximum length of a speech is either 20 minutes or 10 minutes. Members may speak for up to 20 minutes on:

on the motion for an Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne;
on a motion for second or third reading of a government bill, when the Member is the first to speak on behalf of their party or when participating in the first five hours of debate after the initial round of speakers;
on a motion regarding Senate amendments to a government bill;
on a motion considered under government orders, including opposition motions on allotted days and motions for concurrence of the estimates;
on a motion for concurrence in a committee report;
during the Budget debate;
during an emergency debate; and
on a motion in Committee of the Whole.

These 20-speeches are generally followed by a 10-minute period during which other Members may ask questions or comment briefly on the speech and receive a reply from the Member. The Standing Orders allow the Whip of a recognized party to indicate that Members of their party will split their 20-minute speaking time in two. In such cases, Members speak for 10 minutes, followed by a question and comment period of 5 minutes.

Members are limited to 10-minute speeches on the following:

on an item of Private Members’ Business;
on a motion or group of motions in amendment at report stage;
on a motion to refer a bill to committee before second reading;
on a motion to instruct a committee to prepare a bill;
on a motion for the second or third reading of a bill, when the Member is participating after the first five hours of debate following the initial round of speakers;
during a take note debate; and
on a motion regarding delegated legislation.

There are a few exceptions to the above, where Members are not subject to any time limit. For example, a Minister moving a government motion (or the Parliamentary Secretary speaking on his or her behalf) and the Member speaking in reply both have unlimited time. This also applies to consideration of motions relating to Senate amendments. In many cases, the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition are not subject to any time limit.

Another measure used to curtail debate is the time allocation motion. Time allocation came about because the closure motion alone was perceived as rather inflexible and inadequate for the demands of a modern Parliament. The time allocation rule allows for specific lengths of time to be set aside for the consideration of one or more stages of a public bill. The House began considering an alternative to the closure motion in the 1960s, but it wasn’t until 1969, after debate that lasted 12 sitting days was curtailed by a motion of closure, that the House adopted a report recommending a measure for allocation of time, a forerunner to the present rule:

In its simplest form, the newly adopted Standing Order envisaged three options under which a time allotment order could be made, ranging from agreement between all parties to the government acting alone after negotiation had failed to rally the support of any other party. Time allocation motions moved with the agreement of all parties were put immediately, without debate or amendment. Those called with the agreement of a majority of parties or no opposition parties could, however, be amended, and they could also be debated for up to two hours, at which point all questions necessary to dispose of the motions were to be put by the Chair.

Members of the opposition later expressed dissatisfaction with the interpretation of this Standing Order.The fact that negotiations were to be held between parties, thus excluding independent Members, was also raised. (House of Commons Procedure and Practice, 2nd ed., p. 663)

Indeed, these concerns have gradually been addressed via various Speakers’ rulings, which have sought to clarify when and how time allocation motions can be used. In 2001, the House adopted a Standing Order allowing for a 30-minute questions and answers period (such as the one for closure motions) to be applied when a time allocation motion was moved without the agreement of any of the opposition parties, again to enhance ministerial accountability and allow the Government to justify the need for the time allocation motion.

What has happened over time is that whenever the opposition has found ways to use existing procedural rules to stymie the progress of Government business, the Standing Orders have been amended in order to either close that option or else introduce a new measure that would allow the Government to curtail it in some way. For example, in 1982, the Progressive Conservatives resorted to a filibuster tactic to block the Government’s Energy Security Bill. At that time, the Standing Orders provided no time limit for bells rung for unscheduled votes. A recorded vote was demanded on a motion to adjourn. The Opposition Whip refused to accompany the Government Whip into the Chamber to indicate to the Speaker their readiness to proceed with the vote. Consequently, the division bells rang continuously for over 14 days (Debates, March 2, 1982, pp. 15539-41; March 18, 1982, pp. 15555-7). As a result of this episode, the Standing Orders were amended so that now, division bells can ring for a maximum of either 15 or 30 minutes. Once they stop ringing, the vote proceeds, as long as the required quorum is present.

Another tactic used by Opposition parties in the past to cause a filibuster in the House of Commons is the constant raising of points of order and questions of Privilege. The Speaker must then rule on the length and relevancy of each point of order and question of Privilege raised. While most will be frivolous, this is not the point. The point is to stall debate for as long as possible. In 1981, the Progressive Conservatives employed such tactics in an attempt to block the Liberal Government’s constitutional reforms. Faced with the prospect of a time allocation motion to limit debate and force a vote, the PCs resorted to the aforementioned filibuster tactics. After two weeks of such manoeuvres, the Government moved a motion of closure.

There are few parliamentary procedures left that Opposition parties can exploit for the purpose of filibustering that can’t be countered by the Government. Apart from dragging out debate as long as possible by ensuring as many Members as possible speak and resorting to raising repeated points of order and questions of Privilege, there are also hoist amendments and reasoned amendments.

A hoist amendment is an amendment that may be moved to a motion for the second reading of a bill. Its effect is to prevent a bill from being “now” read a second time, and to postpone the reading for three or six months. If it is adopted, the bill is deemed withdrawn for the remainder of the current session. If it is defeated, the debate has nonetheless been extended as a result and Members enabled to speak a second time. Prior to 1920, because the House had so little time for Government business, it was the Government that resorted to hoist amendments. Since 1920, it has been used primarily by the Opposition as means of prolonging debate. However, only four have been successful, and all four where moved by the Government with the intent of disposing of a private Member’s bill.

A reasoned amendment, which may also be moved during debate on a motion for second reading, generally takes the form of a proposal that the House decline to give a bill second reading, for a specific reason. When a reasoned amendment is ruled in order, the House must dispose of it. To date, the House has never decided in favour of a reasoned amendment. Were it to do so, debate on the bill would end, as would debate on the motion for second reading of the bill. The order relating to the bill would then disappear from the Order Paper.

It should be noted that whatever filibustering still occurs in the House of Commons usually occurs in Committees, not in the House itself.

As stated in House of Commons Procedure and Practice, “one of the fundamental principles of parliamentary procedure is that debate in the House of Commons must lead to a decision within a reasonable period of time.” (p. 647) The key is to find a balance between the right to speak at as much length as seems desirable, and the right of parliament to make decisions. After all, while parliamentary Privilege gives Members freedom to say what they want without fear of legal prosecution, it does not grant them an unlimited right to speak.

(Click here for Part 2)

The media and oral questions

Contemporary mediated democracies may have enlightenment trappings, but in the Twenty-first century Question Time is essentially a media event. Especially if you’re, say, helping to turn it into a collective viewing experience on the #qt stream, there’s not much point complaining about that. (source)

It was a shocking experience – the first nice prime minister’s questions I can recall. This was a huge disappointment for everyone in the public, press and peers’ gallery and for MPs themselves. (source)

But the painful truth is that, while the theatrics of Question Period in the past may have debased the House of Commons, they enlivened it as well, generating heat if not often much light. This week QP mostly generated a refreshing afternoon nap. (source)

Question period, Questions, PMQs, Question Time, Oral Questions – by whatever name you want to call it, is the part of the parliamentary day where the government is held accountable for its administrative policies and the conduct of its Ministers, both individually and collectively. How effective oral questions can be at achieving this goal depends on various factors. The opposition must ask clear, relevant questions – too often they ask rhetorical questions that really can’t be answered, or use the question to highlight their own party’s position; sometimes they ignore questioning the government on policy and instead look to score points by focusing on personalities or other less relevant matters. The government should provide clear, factual answers; too often, they reply with quips, or turn the question asked into a criticism of the opposition’s policies, or simply refuse to answer the question or defer the question to another minister.

There is another factor that affects the effectiveness of Question Period, and that is the atmosphere in the House and the behaviour of the members in attendance. We’ve all read countless opinion pieces bemoaning the conduct of MPs in the House – the catcalls, the insults, the hyper-partisanship. The more disruptive everyone’s behaviour, the more time is taken away from the actual asking of questions. Since oral questions in every jurisdiction that has one is often the only part of the parliamentary day that will make the evening news cycle, this proceeding has become the public face of parliamentary business for most citizens, and more often than not, it isn’t a very pretty face that is put forward. There is no shortage of opinion conceding that the overall boorishness that too often predominates has done much to undermine the public image of politicians.

Against this background, there was much buzz in the Canadian media when, at the outset of the new Parliament, the new Official Opposition party, the New Democratic Party (NDP), vowed to stop heckling and catcalling, and instead maintain the strictest decorum during Question Period. Some, such as Globe and Mail columnist John Ibbitson, found the quieter, gentler Question Period a rather somnolent affair and said of himself and his fellow journalists: “we’re dyin’ here.” Sun News Reporter Bryn Weese labelled the new Question Period “boring as sin“. Others have commented on how many more questions get asked now because less time is lost to attempts to regain order in the House. However, a rather informal count on my part reveals that there aren’t really that many more questions being asked; on average, only about three additional questions are asked in the new session of Parliament, compared to the last session of the previous Parliament.

The first two quotes at the outset of this post refer to Question Time in the Australian House of Representatives and Prime Minister’s Questions in the UK, respectively. In both instances, the writers clearly favour a rough and tumble oral questions over one governed by order and decorum. From a journalistic point of view, this makes sense. Most debate in the House of Commons (not only in Canada – pretty much in any deliberative body) is, to be blunt, boring. That is why the media very rarely covers anything outside of oral questions. Oral questions devoid of insults, jeering, cheap shots and other forms of grandstanding are also boring – because then all that is left are questions and answers about legislation, policy and programs, which are complex matters, and, as I’ve stated in previous posts, often of little interest to the vast majority of voters, and, it would seem, most political reporters.

Yet the point of oral questions is not to be entertaining, it’s to hold the government to account. The Australian blogger responsible for the first quote believes that this notion is passé, and that Question Time has evolved in the 21st century to be purely a media event. That may be so, to a certain extent, but is that a good thing? If oral questions were always as civil and uneventful as most other business conducted in Parliament, would the media simply stop covering it? Is the real problem not whether politicians get rowdy during oral questions, but that the media isn’t really interested in reporting about the actual content of the legislative agenda of the House unless they can be guaranteed some sort of show?

The substance of questions asked, or the answers received, is almost never discussed in the media. Reporters look for soundbites, for clips that will play well. Members yelling across the room at one another, the leader of the opposition stabbing the air with their finger in mock outrage, the Prime Minister rolling his or her eyes in exaggerated exasperation, etc. What they’re so outraged about, does anyone ever remember? It’s all about the show, the point scoring. An insult caught off-mike will garner more air time than any policy-related matter that comes up during questioning. For the media, politics has to have a winner and a loser. This is always the assessment of the weekly PMQs in the UK House of Commons. Who won this week – the PM or the Leader of the Opposition? And even this focus ignores the bulk of PMQs – the Leader of the Opposition asks only six questions – the rest of the time is taken up by questions from other MPs. But those questions are, for the most part, ignored. PMQs comes down to a scoring match between David Cameron and Ed Miliband. The language used in the media is telling: “Mr Miliband sank to the occasion with a surprise attack”, “next few minutes were enveloped in the fog of war”, “Cameron conducted himself like a Guards officer who finds himself ambushed”, ‘Cameron hadn’t anticipated this attack”, “[T]actical success was gained”, “two leaders continued to trade blows”, “Miliband had scored a clear points victory”. One wonders if one is reading the sports section and not the politics section.

I have to wonder if this reality is a sort of a “chicken or the egg” situation. Is Question Period/PMQs/Question Time rowdy because the media is covering it, or does the media only cover it because it is rowdy? The media rarely reports on other parts of the parliamentary process, which tend on the whole to be much more civil. If cameras were removed from the press gallery, would order and decorum return to oral questions? If the press suddenly decided to cover debates as extensively as they cover oral questions, would the usual decorum fly out the window?

Despite what our Australian blogger believes, Question Period is still first and foremost an attempt to hold the government to account and solicit information from it. Perhaps if the media made a concerted effort focus on the substance of the questions asked and answers given instead of who scored the most direct hits, all members participating – opposition and government alike, would strive to improve the quality of both their questions and answers. But as long as the media essentially ignores the content and focuses only on the performance, there will be little incentive for things to improve.

Our politicians know that it’s not a thoughtful, well-researched speech during a debate on some piece of legislation on agricultural policy that will get them headlines, it’s “scoring” during oral questions. We can’t expect voters to be interested in politics and the issues being debated by our legislators if their only exposure to Parliamentary business is the media’s interpretation of oral questions as being primarily about point scoring, who’s up and who’s down, conflict, us vs. them.

Oral questions is about holding the government to account – and that applies to the media as well. If the government regularly refuses to provide answers with any substance to them, that is what the media should focus on, not who got in the best one-liner. If some reporters feel that they’re “dyin’” because oral questions isn’t a fireworks display anymore, perhaps they could revive themselves by looking at what is being said rather than how it is being said. And if it’s “boring as sin”, then perhaps they should consider covering sports rather than politics.

It’s my party

About a month ago, Samara, an independent charitable organization, founded in 2008 to study citizen engagement with Canadian democracy, released three reports based on exit interviews with Canadian MPs who had decided not to seek re-election in the next general election. While all three reports are worth looking at, I was particularly interested in the findings of the third, entitled, “It’s My Party”: Parliamentary Dysfunction Reconsidered, which blamed much of the “brokenness” of Canada’s Parliament on political parties and how they manage themselves, their members and their work.

The report describes two trends. First, it found that what MPs described as their “real work” was done away from the public spotlight, in venues such as committees and party caucus meetings. The politics that played out on TV, such as Question Period, embarrassed them and accomplished little. Second, the report also found that even though the researchers did not specifically ask about political parties, over and over again, the MPs they interviewed stated that the greatest frustrations they faced came from their own parties.

On the first point, when discussing their work, MPs stressed that it was only when they worked away from public scrutiny – and the dictates of their party - were they able to work constructively:

It was in the less publicized venues of committees and the private space of caucus that they said they were able to transcend the partisanship on display on TV, engage in vigorous debates, advance policy issues, work within and across parties to improve legislation, and influence their party leadership.

Public aspects of work on Parliament hill, such as Question Period, bore little relationship to the actual work they did. Indeed, the MPs interviewed insisted Question Period “misrepresented the daily work of a Parliamentarian” and “stained the public’s perception of politics and those who practiced it.” One MP went so far as to say “I think that Question Period had become the greatest embarrassment and one of the reasons politicians are frowned upon.”

The MPs also disliked how party leadership “staged” Question Period, how MPs were required to fill empty seats around the televised speakers, with some characterizing their role as that of a potted plant moved around for decoration. Others compared themselves to trained seals, where all they had to do was show up and clap on demand. Other work carried out in the House – attending and participating in debates – wasn’t much better. MPs felt the debates had little significance, and were ignored by both the media and the parties. Many MPs were told to make speeches on topics they knew little or nothing about, and often with little or no advance notice.

Voting procedures in the House also came under criticism. This was in part due to the fact that it was the party leadership which dictated, more often than not, how they had to vote, often without any form of consultation. Many MPs said they didn’t understand how their party determined its position on various issues, and that it was often impossible to keep track of what they were being asked to vote on:

“Virtually all MPs, with the exception of maybe the whips, go into the House of Commons with a bill and 18 to 20 amendments, and don’t have a damned clue of what the amendments say,” said one MP.

Furthermore, many said it was impossible to keep track of the bills on which they were called to vote. “I hate to tell you how many bills I had very little idea what I was voting on. That’s not necessarily my weakness, that’s just the reality,” one MP said.

Others felt voting interfered with their “real work” – forcing them cancel committee consultations in other cities because they had to return to Ottawa for a possible vote. Many recommended that some form of electronic voting or remote voting be adopted, so they wouldn’t even have to be in the House to vote in divisions.

All of this contrasted with the parliamentary work done in more private settings. Committee work was highly valued, and while most committee hearings are public, they are rarely covered by the media, which allows for more constructive debate and creates a largely non-partisan environment. Party caucus meetings, which are limited to only MPs, Senators and senior political staff were also productive:

In caucus meetings, the MPs told us they were able to engage and debate with their party colleagues and leaders, raise constituents’ concerns and through coalition building with their fellow MPs, push local issues onto the national stage.

Unlike in the House, differences of opinion were valued in caucus.

As stated at the start, the second trend identified by the report was that the MPs overwhelmingly felt that the political parties were more of a hindrance than a positive force. They complained that the party leadership regularly encouraged the overly partisan behaviour familiar to all during Question Period. There was also the problem of rather arbitrary decisions regarding advancement and discipline. And lastly, the parties also interfered with what MPs called their “real work”.

The MPs interviewed lamented that they had no idea how their party leadership evaluated individual MPs, deciding who would be promoted (to cabinet or committees) and who would be punished. Many felt frustrated that some appointments to cabinet were clearly undeserved, but given to less competent people because of political debts, and some who were promoted to cabinet were often baffled by the post they were given – it often had nothing to do with their background or area of expertise. MPs were also confused over to what extent they could risk disagreeing with their party.

When it came to their “real work” however, MPs complained that the parties intervened too much in that area as well. As stated above, while usually open to the public, most committee hearings aren’t televised. However, if one was, the the parties would substitute committee members, removing the usual member and replacing them with “hitters” who would put on a more partisan show. Similarly, any committee member suspected of not toeing the party line would be replaced without notice. One MP recalled:

“We had members of the committee listening to witnesses and coming up with agreements on amendments. On the day of the vote, the whip substituted every member of the committee on the government side. They’re out and new bunch of guys are in, whose only qualification is that they will vote the way they’re told.”

Parties also interfered with so-called free votes, which normally were limited to votes on private members’ bills. These are bills introduced by individual backbench MPs from any party, rather than by the government. These are supposed to be free votes, with MPs from all parties free to vote as they see fit. However, most MPs interviewed said that even with private members’ bills, they’d be pressured to vote a certain way. They also complained that parties would encroach on MPs’ freedom to introduce their own bills, using them instead to test a potential piece of legislation.

Most MPs interviewed also felt they received little or no guidance from their party on how to do their jobs effectively:

In fact, most MPs said they were left with little direction on how to perform their roles effectively, and it was the random and often opaque leadership of the political parties in the House of Commons that perpetuated a political culture dominated by aggravation and resentment.

There is much more in this report, and I would encourage readers to take a look at the entire report since it touches on issues that are central to the health of Canadian democracy. As the report concludes:

Political parties are organizations made up of citizens. Reforming them, therefore, requires citizen participation. However, it would seem that we are currently in a vicious circle. parties need to be renewed, but parties turn people off from politics. Disengaged citizens do not want to join parties, and so parties are not being renewed or reformed in the direction the citizenry would like.

Perhaps the first step in breaking this circle is to openly discuss how exactly Canadian want political parties to work within our democratic institutions – essentially, how we want them to work for and with us.

Keyword post: Some answers to search results

This post will provide answers to actual search engine queries that led people to this blog. None of these would really make a full blog post on their own, which is why I’ve decided to answer a few in one post.

1. How many people did/didn’t vote for David Cameron?

This one is very easy to answer. Exactly 23,796 people did not vote for David Cameron in the May 2010 general election. Cameron stood for election in the constituency of Witney, opposed by nine other candidates. Voter turnout in that riding was 57,769 (73.8%), and of that, 33,973, or 58.8% voted for Cameron, meaning 23,796 voters voted for other candidates.

It is important to remember that in parliamentary systems such as those we have in the UK, Canada, Australia, etc., people do not vote directly for the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is simply whichever MP is also leader of the party which forms the government. Please see this post for more information.

2. Has the fixed term parliaments bill passed/been defeated?

The fixed term parliaments bill received Royal Assent on 15 September 2011. You can track the progress of any bill currently before Parliament on the Bills before Parliament page of the UK Parliament’s website.

3. What is the procedure to recall a Canadian Member of Parliament (MP)?

There is no procedure to recall MPs in Canada. There is only one jurisdiction in Canada (indeed, in the entire Commonwealth) which has recall legislation, and that is the province of British Columbia. The UK Coalition Government has introduced a draft bill on MP recall. You can read more about how recall works in British Columbia in this post.

4. How does one address the Lieutenant Governor in a speech?

“Your Honour” first, then “Sir” or “Madam” or “Mr./Mrs./Ms./Miss (name)”.

Everything you ever wanted to know about styles of address can be found here. You may want to consult this post for other useful political resources.

5. How many people voted for the NDP?

For any elections-related questions, your first stop should always be Elections Canada. In the 2 May 2011 general election, 4,508,474 voters across the country cast votes for an NDP candidate, or 30.63% of voters who bothered to turnout for the election (turnout was 61.4%).

6. Does the government know what questions will be coming forward in question period?

Yes and no. In Canada, the opposition does not usually provide the government with advance notice of what questions it intends to ask, however, there is nothing preventing it from doing so. Indeed, if there is a question that an opposition MP feels the government might not expect to have come up, he or she might inform the Minister concerned beforehand that they intend to raise the matter during oral questions. In general, the government will have a good sense of what questions to expect because the opposition will hone in on any topic that is currently in the news. As well, the government carefully scripts the questions asked by its own backbenchers, so those questions (and their answers) are quite carefully rehearsed.

In the UK, questions for departments must be submitted three days in advance, specifically to give the concerned minister the time to prepare answers. However, the last 10-15 minutes of each day’s questions are reserved for “topical questions”, which aren’t submitted ahead of time, so the minister will not know exactly what questions to expect (although he or she, like their Canadian counterparts, can assume they will be on more current matters). Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) aren’t submitted ahead of time, although loyal government MPs will often give Downing Street advance notice of their question, or try to ask something ‘helpful’ – possibly to try to impress the PM or those looking out for future ministerial talent. But the PM can be asked about anything at all for which the government is responsible, which means they have to be up to speed on all areas of policy.

The empty House

If you limit your viewing of parliamentary proceedings to Question Period (in Ottawa) or Prime Minister’s Questions (in the UK), you may be under the impression that the House of Commons is always well-attended. Indeed, both events usually play out to a full House as MPs from all parties turn up for what is without question the most media-friendly event in the House.

Should you decide to watch other proceedings in either House, you may well be shocked to see that more often than not, the Chamber will be close to empty, with only a skeleton crew of MPs present to ensure that the required quorum is met. In the Canadian House of Commons, 20 MPs (out of the total 308) constitute a quorum. That means only 6.5% of MPs need to be present for business to take place and for Parliamentary decisions to be valid. In the UK House of Commons, that number is 40, out of 650 MPs, which represents just over 6%, and that quorum is needed only for votes.

In Canada, it is sufficient that 20 members be in attendance, regardless of their party affiliations or whether they are in government or opposition. In this regard, the Deputy Speaker of the House stated in 1998:

The count is for the minimum number of 20 members. If 20 members are present the debate resumes. The Speaker is disinterested as to whether it is all government members, all opposition members or a mixture of members from both sides forming the quorum. As such the Speaker is not in a position to tell members from either side of the House who should be in his or her place or how many members should be available for any debate. (Debates, May 7, 1998, p. 6644.)

This number, 20, has remained unchanged since Confederation in 1867, although there have been several attempts to increase it. At the time the House is scheduled to meet, a count of the House is taken by the Speaker. If fewer than 20 Members are present, the Speaker may adjourn the House until the next sitting day. During a sitting, any Member may draw the attention of the Speaker to the lack of a quorum, requesting a “count” of the Members present. If a quorum is obviously present, the Speaker may simply announce that there is a quorum and dispense with the count; the House then returns to its business. If there is some doubt as to there being a quorum, a count is made by the Speaker. If a quorum is present, business continues. However, if no quorum exists after the first count, the bells are ordered to sound for no longer than 15 minutes. Within that time period, if a second count determines that a quorum is present, the Speaker will order the bells silenced and the House will proceed with the business before it. If at the end of the 15 minutes a second count reveals that there is still no quorum, the Speaker adjourns the House until the next sitting day, and the names of the Members present are recorded in the Journals.

In the UK, quorum is required only for Parliamentary decisions to be valid. There is no need for a quorum to be present at all times – in fact, Commons debates could theoretically continue even if attendance in the chamber dwindled to just one MP and the Speaker. But if a division (vote) is called and fewer than 40 MPs are present to vote, then a decision on the business being considered is postponed and the House moves on to consider the next item of business.

The glaring reality is that apart from the well-attended occasions of Question Period and PMQs, major debates and roll-call votes, the House of Commons in both countries is nearly deserted. The question then arises as to why so few MPs are present most of the time. In many instances, the absences are justifiable. Modern-day demands on Members’ time are such that attending the sittings of the House is only one of many duties. MPs have myriad other responsibilities they must attend to, from committee work to dealing with the concerns of constituents. Ministers are almost never in the House, except for perhaps the one responsible for whichever bill is being debated, but even then, it will usually be the parliamentary secretary who is present. The government House leader is usually present since he or she is the one who determines which piece of government business will be called. Ministers have numerous meetings to attend outside of parliament – department meetings, meetings with lobbyists and stakeholders, etc. Party leaders (as well as MPs) must also attend to party-related functions that take them away from the House.

However, in both the UK and Canada, there is no way to know how present MPs are over the course of a parliamentary session. As this Globe and Mail article states:

Unlike senators, whose appearances in the Red Chamber are made public each month, MPs’ attendance records are confidential, offering little accountability on one of elected officials’ most basic functions: being present to debate and vote on the laws of the land on behalf of their constituents.

In the UK, attendance by MPs in parliament is not required or monitored.

While there are legitimate reasons why some MPs would need to miss some parts of the parlimentary day, this doesn’t explain why most MPs seem to be nowhere to be found. They can’t all be attending committee hearings, meeting with constituents or attending a party fundraiser all at the same time.

In a report prepared by Samara, It’s my Party: Parliamentary Dysfunction Reconsidered, exit interviews conducted with MPs who were not seeking re-election in the recent 2 May 2011 general election found that:

Outside of Question Period, most MPs sit in the Commons only when they’re on “house duty” – a period of time assigned by the party whip when they are required to represent their party in the House. Most MPs we spoke to viewed house duty as monotonous and a general waste of time.

The report goes on to state that even when in the House, most MPs were “on their computer, catching up on correspondence”, most there only because they had to be, few there because they actually wanted to be. Many felt debates didn’t matter because they were ignored by the media and other MPs. Other MPs stated they were “told to make speeches on subjects they knew nothing about.”

The over-focus on Question Period (and in the UK, PMQs), is reflected in this devastating assessment of Canada’s Parliament by Aaron Wherry:

Except for perhaps a dozen MPs and the odd tourist group, the vast room sits empty for almost the entire day. Thousands and thousands of words are spoken to little obvious notice or consequence—the press gallery mostly ignoring the proceedings and almost all votes of any importance destined to break along party lines. Power has coalesced around the offices of party leaders. Decisions are made elsewhere and then imposed on this place, debate seemingly rendered moot. For all its hallowed tradition and sombre ritual, the floor of the House of Commons cannot now be said, except on a purely geographic level, to be at the centre of political life. But for all the modern laments about the emptiness of our politics, here would seem to be the yawning gap at the heart of it all.

(…)

In the beginning, House debates were covered extensively in the popular media. Up until the mid-1980s, the Canadian Press kept a reporter in the House for the duration of each sitting day. But those days are gone and, besides, despite the impressive decor—carved sandstone and wood, chandeliers and stained glass—a lack of wireless Internet access makes the chamber something less than a modern workplace for reporters.

But the sight of the ornate room sitting mostly empty, an MP on his or her feet pontificating into the abyss, speaks as well to the undeniable obscurity of the institution at this point in history. Because the debates don’t matter, the press doesn’t cover them and because the press doesn’t cover them, the debates don’t matter. Instead of covering the exchanges that occur each day in the House, the evening political shows prefer to assemble their own panels of MPs to exchange shouted talking points.

Because the House is so sparsely attended most of the time, this helps foster the impression that MPs are lazy and don’t do any actual work. This couldn’t be further from the truth, as this column by C.E.S. Franks points out:

Studies have found that the time devoted by MPs to their jobs far exceeds that of most working Canadians. MPs spend as much as 70 hours a week on their various tasks as elected representatives when the House is in session, and 45 when it is not.

The Hansard Society found a similar situation in the UK:

While most MPs had expected to work a 60-hour week, on average they were doing nine hours more.

The respondents said they spent more time on constituency casework than any other matter and that they passed 63% of their time in Westminster compared to 37% in their constituency.

C.E.S. Franks concludes his article:

For most of the time, our House of Commons is like Canada itself: a vast sparsely populated tract dotted with isolated human settlements. Is this what we want?

I don’t think it is what most Canadians want, but there are no easy ways to “fix” the situation. I have tried to suggest some ways of improving how business is conducted in Ottawa in my Fixing Ottawa series of posts, yet most of those suggestions are based on current practice in the UK House of Commons, and MP attendance at Westminster isn’t any better than MP attendance in Ottawa. Giving MPs more freedom in the House in terms of how they vote on bills, and freedom to ask the questions they want to ask during oral questions would help. Giving more power to the House in general to decide the order of business – essentially moving power away from the executive and giving it back to the legislative, might also help MPs feel as if what they did really mattered. Will this increase overall attendance? It’s impossible to say.

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