Politics

Some final thoughts on the Reform Act

In my first post on the Reform Act, I addressed the proposal of allowing a caucus to implement a leadership review upon a petition of 15% of the elected members and a secret ballot vote garnering over 50% support. This was complemented by a brief look at how this process has worked in other jurisdictions. My second Reform Act post focused on the proposal that we remove the party leader’s veto over riding nominations. This last post will focus on Chong’s proposal that caucuses elect their chairs and admit and eject caucus members based on the 15%/50% rules employed to trigger a leadership review.

I will start by saying that I honestly have no real opinion concerning the matter of caucus chairs. I don’t know what procedure is currently used by any party in Canada. I have no objection to caucus chairs being elected, and think that this is probably a good idea to pursue, but honestly – I have no problem leaving this to each party to decide. I will say that I don’t think this is something that should be enshrined in law – much like the leadership review rules. It is something that should be in a party constitution.

I will address the proposal governing the expulsion and re-admission of a member from caucus. The Reform Act proposes that the Parliament of Canada Act be amended to include the following:

49.2 A member of a caucus may only be expelled from it if
(a) the caucus chair has received a written notice signed by at least 15% of the members of the caucus requesting that the member’s membership be reviewed at a meeting of the caucus; and
(b) the expulsion of the member is approved by a majority vote by secret ballot of the caucus members present at that meeting.
49.3 A member of the House of Commons who has been expelled from the caucus of a party may only be readmitted to the caucus
(a) if the member is re-elected to the House of Commons as a candidate for that party; or
(b) if
(i) the caucus chair has received a written notice signed by at least 15% of the members of the caucus requesting that the member’s readmission to the caucus be considered at a meeting of the caucus, and
(ii) the readmission of the member is approved by a majority vote by secret ballot of the caucus members present at that meeting.

I admit to mixed feelings about this proposal. Again, I don’t believe this is something that should be legislated, but incorporated in a party constitution. I do understand why Mr. Chong is seeking to incorporate these reforms in either the Canada Elections Act or the Parliament of Canada Act – it would be the only way to guarantee that every party adopt and abide by such reforms, but ideally, it would be better if parties voluntarily incorporated these reforms (or similar reforms) in their own governing documents.

In the UK, as I have explained in my previous posts on this topic (and repeatedly in other posts on this blog) political parties already have caucus-based leadership review mechanisms in place and candidate selection procedures which do not at all involve the party leader. However, to the best of my knowledge, the decision to expel someone from caucus remains very much in the hands of the party leadership in the House. What is interesting here is that given the relative independence of UK MPs vis à vis their Canadian counterparts, it is very rare that the whip is withdrawn, as they say in the UK.

It is important to understand a couple of points before proceeding with this discussion. In the UK, as I have explained in other posts, backbench MPs from all parties – including the government party (or in the current Parliament, government parties) rebel much more frequently than do Canadian MPs. See for example, this post from 2011 on UK MPs rebellions in the current Parliament, and this post on the total absence of MP rebellions here in Canada. The current UK Parliament is on track to be the most rebellious since World War II, and this is in no small part due to the fact that it is a Coalition government – Conservative MPs in particular feel less loyalty to the government since it is not a Conservative government. However, as Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart note:

this Parliament is on course to be the most rebellious since the war. But before the most rebellious was the 2005 Parliament, and before that the 2001 Parliament. For sure, there has been an increase in assertiveness since 2010, but it is merely the latest stage in the growing independence of the British MP.

There are a myriad of reasons why it is easier for UK MPs to rebel by voting against their party; I go over some of them in that 2011 post mentioned above. Perhaps the most important of these is the system of three-line whips used in the UK House of Commons which means party discipline doesn’t apply on all votes. But even on three-line votes, MPs will still defy their party whips. Because it is a relatively normal thing for UK MPs to rebel – and this includes government party backbenchers voting against the Government as well as opposition MPs voting against their party’s stated position (and perhaps supporting a Government bill, for example), it is very rare that an MP in the UK will be expelled from caucus. And when an MP is expelled from caucus, it’s usually not for voting against a bill. I point this out only because voting against your party in the Canadian House of Commons is probably the surest way of being expelled, and also the main reasons why Canadian MPs very rarely ever do so.

In the current (41st) Parliament of Canada, five MPs have left their caucus. Three did so voluntarily, two because they were facing charges (one has since rejoined caucus), the other due to what he believed to be the “Government’s lack of commitment to transparency and open government.” The other two MPs, both from opposition parties, were expelled because they disagreed with their party’s line. One voted against the party’s stated position (and with the Government), the other was expelled for criticizing her party’s support for a provincial initiative.

In the current UK Parliament, 8 MPs have either resigned the whip (voluntarily left caucus) or had the whip withdrawn (been expelled from caucus). Of those, none were for voting against the party or over policy disagreements. Two resigned the whip while facing accusations or charges of sexual assault – one had the matter settled and returned to caucus, the other is still waiting for the matter to be settled. The other six had the whip withdrawn and the reasons are as follows: for questioning the continued existence of Israel; for taking time off from Parliament to compete in a reality show; for allegations of lobbying; for criminal charges following the expenses scandal.

This is why I don’t have an issue with party leadership retaining the right to decide if an MP should have the whip withdrawn – as long as it is done judiciously and for serious offenses or behaviour. Voting against the party line, except on confidence matters (if you’re a government backbencher), should not be a reason to expel someone from caucus. So while most critics of the Reform Act object to it over the leadership review and candidate nomination proposals, my main objection concerns the caucus control of who gets expelled and re-admitted to caucus. I’d like to believe that if the first two reforms were implemented, this reform might not be necessary.

Related Posts:

Powered by: Wordpress