Balancing Canada’s constitution: a proposal for Senate reform (pt.2)

(The following is part 2 of a two-part post by guest blogger JD Mussel. You can read part 1 here. JD is a Dutch-Israeli undergraduate student at Leiden University College in the Hague, the Netherlands. He is majoring in policy science with a focus on constitutional design. He frequently contributes to the political science blog Fruits and Votes. JD’s opinions are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of this blog’s administrator.)

Part 2: The specifics of Senate reform and their effects

In my previous post I discussed the problems of majoritarianism and the resulting executive dominance in Canada’s system of government. In this post I will explore in detail my specific recommendations for reform, as well as the way in which they would empower the Senate to fulfil its role of balancing out the power of the government and holding it to account, all the while better representing Provincial interests.

Creating bicameral incongruence

An interesting question is by what formula the Provinces should be represented in the Senate; it would be reasonable to think that a different basis of representation, such as equal representation for each province, could make the partisan composition of the Senate become incongruent to that of the Commons. However, such change to the current situation is not critical, much less sufficient for that end. Instead, the decisive factor would be the method of appointment or election, which must be one which makes a one-party majority very unlikely.

One way to appoint Senators that is likely to both create intercameral incongruence and a ‘Provinces’ chamber’ would be appointment by Provincial governments or legislatures. The main drawback of this solution would be an entanglement of provincial and federal politics, eliminating the separation between the two which is one of the advantages of federalism. People would no longer be able to vote in provincial elections without effecting the federal government. In the long term, this strongly incentivises federal parties to take over control of the provincial party systems, which would severely undermine any role the Senate may at first have as an agent of the Provinces’ interests.

The way forward would appear to be direct elections. In order to prevent governments from winning upper-house majorities – the absolutely crucial part of the equation – the electoral system should be some form of proportional representation. In order to avoid excessive party domination, it would be a good idea to choose a candidate-based PR system, such as the single transferable vote (STV). This fully candidate-based proportional system would inject a dose of intraparty competition that is not only likely to weaken the parties, but strengthen the role of provincial interests. The way for candidates to compete against other candidates of the same party is to differentiate themselves by catering to particularistic interests of the electoral district, in this case – the Provinces. Meanwhile, the degree of choice voters have under STV in ranking candidates from various parties (very much unlike the first-part-the-post used for elections to the House of Commons) is also commendable, and is more likely to result in the election of independents than other PR systems. The result of this electoral system should be a diverse representation of the electorate, with a majority for any single party becoming a highly unlikely prospect.

Proposal 1: that the Senate be directly elected, using proportional representation by means of STV

The next question is the election cycle. The best possibility would be to simply to hold Senate elections concurrently with elections to the House of Commons. Such elections would, however, best be staggered, with half of the Senate being elected at each general election, for two main reasons: firstly, it would increase the Senate’s independence by reducing the prime minister’s power to threaten dissolution to one that concerns only the more senior half. Secondly, in combination with proportional representation, it would make it more difficult for a government to achieve a majority in the upper house. Under PR, a party needs close to or over 50% of the vote to win a majority of seats contested – therefore, if Senate elections were staggered, two successive landslide wins would be necessary for a single party to win a Senate majority. Furthermore, longer terms may lead to longer-term thinking in the Senate as a result of the delay in concern for re-election. For these reasons one-half of each Province’s Senators should be elected at each federal parliamentary election, which would currently mean a term of no longer than eight years, while the minimum would depend on the frequency of elections.

Proposal 2: that elections to the Senate be staggered, with one-half elected at each general election; Senators’ terms last from election to the one after next.

Breaking Deadlock

Currently, the Senate’s full power is used only sparingly, due to the way in which it is appointed; there can be no doubt that an elected Senate would be much more assertive. For enabling an effective role for the Senate in review of legislation and government actions the crucial factor is that the Senate retain a large degree of power over legislation. The only reason governments have to co-operate with a Senate’s accountability measures, such as inquiry or information disclosure order is the latter’s potential threat of declining to pass government legislation until the government complies. A house of review with no legislative power would be ineffective, as it could simply be ignored. Likewise, a house that chooses to not exercise its legislative power is also a poor check. Therefore an assertive body of senators is essential to allow the senate to fulfil is role a check on government power.

Nevertheless, for good and effective government, complete deadlock should be avoided. A good mechanism would therefore be needed, in order to resolve disagreements between the Houses and to encourage Senators to work towards a compromise instead of being obstructive. The current formal powers of the Senate are almost symmetrical to that of the House of Commons, with only very few limits, specifically regarding initiative and amendment of money bills. A deadlock-breaking mechanism exists, in a form inspired by the British Constitution: additional appointments can be made (on the prime minister’s advice), limited to either 4 or 8 extra senators. As a deadlock breaker it is simply a way for the government party to come closer to having a majority in the Senate. If the Senate were elected, it is possible that governments will get into the habit of making these appointments at the start of each session, effectively a government bonus in the Senate which has no place in the reformed institution proposed here.

Actually, a certain deadlock-breaking mechanism is already inherent in the election cycle proposed above. Should the two houses disagree on a bill, and the government is well-positioned in the opinion polls to win an election, there’s an incentive for the prime minister to advise a ‘one-and-a-half’ dissolution, whereby the House of Commons and half of the Senate face new elections. This threat would be a potent bargaining tool in the hands of the PM, while also poses its own risks for him. A government which is not faring well in the polls will almost certainly not make use of this avenue. In such a case, there is a greater threat of deadlock; seeing as the Senate can block supply, there is even a threat that the opposition in the Senate will try to bring down the government and force an election. There is a good case for removing the Senate’s power to block supply, which effectively makes the government depend on both houses for funding. It can be argued that the government should only be responsible to one house to avoid the deleterious effects of instability, not to mention government shutdowns. Secondly, one could argue for removal in the interest of the financial efficiency that one-party government promotes; if such a government must compromise with other parties to pass its budget, this potential will decrease. However, a check on the government’s finances is as important as any other for the Senate for checking the government’s power and keeping it accountable.  I would suggest some limitation to the Senate’s power to block supply, so that it cannot veto the bare essentials necessary to fund government, but so that it can still veto radical changes to fiscal policy, including such things as tax increases.

Proposal 3: that the Senate’s power to block supply be somewhat constrained to the effect of preventing government shutdowns as a result of deadlock.

The proposals

Proposal 1: that the Senate be directly elected, using proportional representation by means of STV

Proposal 2: that elections to the Senate be staggered, with one-half elected at each general election; Senators’ terms last from election to the one after next.

Proposal 3: that the Senate’s power to block supply be somewhat constrained, to the effect of preventing government shutdowns as a result of deadlock.

Conclusion: curbing the excesses of the Westminster system

Some readers of this blog will note similarities between the proposal outlined here and the system existing in Australia on the federal level as well as in several states, and indeed, the Australian experience was the inspiration. As in Canada, the Australian government utterly dominates the lower house; but unlike its Canadian counterpart, the Australian Senate, elected through PR, has a very effective review role. The Australian Senate not only improves and moderates legislation, but also holds the government accountable and transparent in various ways, creating checks and balances not present in most versions of the Westminster system.

The Australian system of government, the inspiration for these proposals. Note well the intercameral incongruence, which is created through the use of PR for Senate elections.

The Australian system of government, the inspiration for these proposals. Note well the intercameral incongruence, which is created through the use of PR for Senate elections.

In all probability, a Canadian Senate reconstituted along the lines described above would be similarly empowered to increase scrutiny and oversight, carrying out inquiries and ordering the disclosure of information from the government, thereby checking executive power and increasing transparency. In the new Senate, devoid of a government majority, governments will have to negotiate with other parties to pass much of their legislation. Most proposals should pass with no significant clashes, or with improvements arising from bipartisan collaboration, but more controversial bills will have to be toned down and negotiated to have a chance of success.

Due to the more frequent need to secure compromises, the government’s ex-post accountability before the electorate would be watered down somewhat. Nonetheless, majority governments will remain in a very powerful position; the Senate will be able to constrain a government, but not to force one out. Since the other parties will remain unable to either remove such a government, or pass anything without its concurrence, a majority government would be partly responsible for any proposal that does pass, keeping accountability strong. The situation would of course be different, as it is now, in the case of a minority or ‘hung’ parliament. Such scenarios may sometimes prove trickier for governments than today, but in most cases, if a majority can be secured for some bill in the House, the same parties’ support will also be sufficient in the Senate.

In the long term, elections to the two houses may become strongly defined by the system. Elections to the House of Commons would become more strictly about the choice of government, with more people likely to vote strategically, voting their true preference in the Senate election.  Due to its electoral system, the Senate will almost certainly become more representative of the electorate than the House of Commons. Among its ranks there will be small parties which have great difficulty in capturing seats in the lower house. Such small parties (and independents) will begin focussing on elections to the Senate, where they will have a real chance to influence policy. They may also come to emphasise their role in making the Senate the place where the government is held to account, as the Australian Democrats did with their slogan ‘keep the bastards honest!’ Meanwhile, for the big parties, the distinguishing element of Senate elections would become competition among candidates of the same party (under STV). In order to differentiate themselves, a party’s candidates are will likely compete with each other in terms of bringing various benefits to their province.

Of course, this is not the whole picture; an elected Senate, where the government is permanently in minority, would fundamentally transform Canada’s political equation. Executive dominance, largely the unfortunate side-effect of the Westminster system’s majoritarianism, would be remedied while preserving most of its benefits. While the government, in most cases, should be able to continue to control the House, opposition parties in the Senate will have not only the power, but also the mandate to hold governments to account and subject their policies to a ‘sober second thought’. This, I am convinced, would be the best way of curbing the excesses of the Westminster system – by accomplishing what few of the participants in the FPTP-vs.-PR debate seem to contemplate: an elegant compromise between the accountability of the former and the representativeness of the latter.

Suggested further reading

Platypus and Parliament: The Australian Senate in Theory and Practice

Accountability Versus Government Control: the Effect of Proportional Representation

From breaking governments to a brake on government: a new bicameralism in Victoria?

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Balancing Canada’s constitution: a proposal for Senate reform (pt. 1)

(The following is part 1 of a two-part post by guest blogger JD Mussel. JD is a Dutch-Israeli undergraduate student at Leiden University College in the Hague, the Netherlands. He is majoring in policy science with a focus on constitutional design. He frequently contributes to the political science blog Fruits and Votes. JD’s opinions are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of this blog’s administrator.)

Part 1: Curbing the excesses of majoritarianism

Introduction

Canada has a parliamentary form of government, using first-past-the post to elect the members of its confidence chamber, the House of Commons. Despite the recent period of minority governments from 2004 to 2011, minorities are the exception in Canada as elections usually result in a Commons majority for one party. House majorities don’t usually result from majorities in vote terms, but are manufactured by the majoritarian first-past-the-post electoral system. The upper house, the Senate, is formally co-equal but is appointed on advice of the prime minister. While this doesn’t always mean that the Senate has a government majority, it has usually made the Senate passive even in times of a split parliament (different majorities in each house) as it usually defers to the greater legitimacy of the elected House of Commons. Meanwhile, the Constitution’s division of power between the federal level and the provinces may be said to favour the federal level, particularly in light of the fact that the Supreme Court is appointed by the federal government. Canada therefore has a constitution which can be characterized as being as close to Westminster’s as possible for a federal country with judicial review, having a lower house elected using a majoritarian electoral system, with few checks on the government’s power.

election chart

The electoral mechanics of first-past-the-post illustrated: in 2011 the Conservative Party won a House majority on just under forty percent of the vote. Not a representative result, but one offering ex-post accountability.

The main advantages of Canada’s system of government is that the way in which governments are formed flows directly from election results, providing a strong sense of accountability. Voters generally have the choice between two parties that could potentially form a government, and the party that receives the most votes usually receives a working majority to do so. Canada does not have a two-party system, but there has been a two-party alternation in government. When voters rally behind one opposition party, they can replace an unpopular government with relative ease. As a result of the system’s concentration of power, it is easier for Canadian governments to act decisively, an advantage in a crisis as well as a virtue for the democratic process, as it allows parties to more faithfully stick to their election promises. But much more important is the accountability this affords: majority governments, not having to compromise with other parties, have wide latitude to carry out their election promises, and can consequently be held accountable for its actions at the next election. It is far more straightforward to assign blame to the single party that forms government than it is in the context of a coalition or even a minority government.

The problem

The main drawback of Canada’s system of government is the lack of a check on the power of the government, a government rarely formed on true majority support. As a result of the development of party discipline, which is as strong in Canada as in any parliamentary regime, ‘responsibility’ to parliament is almost symbolic. The government so dominates parliament that one might almost say that the true relationship is the opposite: that the House of Commons is responsible to the government, which can dissolve it at any time, and which can order its parliamentary majority to pass laws with few constraints additional to that of public opinion. Some have gone so far as to call it an ‘elective dictatorship’, and there’s some truth to that. This excessive concentration of power in the federal executive has brought about polarising decisions, sharp swings in policy from one government to the next, as well as clashes between the federal government and the provinces. The case could be made that part of the problem is that Canadian government is too centralised, with no actor with an effective mandate to represent provincial interests at the federal level.  But the broader underlying issue is the shortage of actors of any type that would check the government and balance Canadian politics. As Madison wrote in Federalist no. 51, ‘A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions’. Though the danger of a lack of checks and balances may not have fully materialised yet, the power of the executive should not remain unconstrained, particularly in light of the fact that it rarely rests on majority support. On the whole therefore, what Canada’s constitutional situation calls for is more veto players: political actors with the power to act as a check on the party in government.

Reform alternatives and a proposed framework

There are a number of conceivable approaches to this question. One possible way of increasing the number of veto players would be to change the electoral system for the House of Commons to some form of proportional representation. Minority or ‘hung’ parliaments would become the norm, and parties would need to secure other parties’ support in order to remain in government. As currently happens as a result of hung parliament, the first governments under this system will be minority governments, but coalitions are likely to form eventually. By increasing the number of parties necessary, in most cases, to form a government and make policy, this would mostly solve the current ‘elected dictatorship’ and policy instability problems. However, this would come at the cost of the main benefits of the current system. The current efficient choice of government at the polls, the decisiveness of election results and resulting accountability and decisive policymaking would greatly diminish under proportional representation in the House of Commons. Besides, while proportional representation may ensure that no party achieves a majority in the House, it is no guarantee for effective review. A coalition government may be constrained by the divergent agendas of its constituent parties, but once coalition partners agree on a broad legislative programme, they can dominate the House to a degree not much lesser than a single-party majority government.

There is however a different option for reform, providing a new veto player by reforming a different institution: the Senate. In order for it to form an effective check on government power, its partisan makeup needs to become incongruent with that of the House: the parties in opposition should have a majority in the Senate. The Senate could then become an effective ‘house of review’, empowered not only to improve legislation and moderate policy but also hold governments to account. A secondary aim would be to give Senators institutional incentives to stand up for provincial interests and making the Senate into an institution geared to protect the provinces against federal encroachments, just as the ‘triple-E Senate’ campaign prevalent in Western Canada has in mind. Besides, it would put an end to the current patronage and lack of accountability in the current Senate.

For these reasons, the path forward should be in reforming the Senate. The primary goal should be to prevent the party in government from attaining a majority in that chamber, with a secondary goal of having Senators chosen in such a way that offers some incentive for protecting provincial interests. The aim is to strengthen the position of the Senate vis-à-vis the government of the day in order to limit the existing executive dominance over the system, thus transforming bicameralism into a source of checks and balances in Canada’s constitution. My next post will explore and identify more specifically how this goal would best be fulfilled and what Canadian politics would look like after the change.

(Part 2)

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On programming motions

Maclean’s Aaron Wherry’s recent column looks at the current Canadian government’s extreme fondness for using time allocation to speed passage of its legislation through the House of Commons. I strongly urge everyone to read it.

What I found particularly interesting in the piece was the Government House Leader’s justification for use of time allocation. In essence, they are using it to, in his words, schedule how legislation proceeds through the various stages:’

There’s no doubt we have used it as a scheduling device, not as a limiting of debate device. So, yeah, we’ve tried to change the culture around it, the whole meaning of it and what it does. In the past, I think, while it was intended when drafted as a scheduling device, the way it was used in practice, and the rhetoric around it, had meant that it was for shutting down debate.

The Government House Leader is a bit confused. Time Allocation was always meant to be a means (ideally of last resort) of curtailing debate, not as a means of scheduling a bill’s progress through the House. Going by the above quote, what the Government is trying to do is use time allocation as a programming motion.  Perhaps it would make more sense then for the Canadian House of Commons to adopt a new procedure, namely, programming motions similar (or identical to) those used in the UK House of Commons?

No one disputes the reality that time is limited in the House of Commons, and that a sitting Government does have the right to get its business before the House. However, some pieces of legislation will go over less well than others. As noted in Erskine May, to secure the passage of particularly important and controversial pieces of legislation, a government may face a series of difficult choices:

1) taking special powers to curtail debate;
2) cutting down their normal programme to an undesirable extent;
3) prolonging the sittings of Parliament; or
4) acknowledging the impotence of the majority of the House in the face of resistance from the minority. (May, p. 468)

Before 1997, when faced with such a situation, UK governments would resort to allocation of time motions, or as they are more commonly called over there, guillotine motions – a much more appropriate expression, in my view. However, since 1997, use of the guillotine has been replaced by programming of bills. Introduced at first on a pilot basis following a report of the Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons, it was enshrined in the standing orders in 2004. Since then, programming has become an established and broadly accepted feature of the transaction of Parliamentary business. In recent testimony before the House of Commons Procedure Committee, the Government stated that “There now appears to be a clear majority view in the House that, in principle, programming is beneficial to the scrutiny of legislation.” The Opposition concurred, saying they “support its continued use. In opposition we have sought through the usual channels to make programming work by acknowledging the executive’s need to manage the legislative timetable while censuring sufficient opportunity is available for members to scrutinize legislation.” (Procedure Committee, Third Report of Session 2013-14) The majority of government bills are now programmed.

The differences between time allocation and programming motions might appear minor at first glance, but they are very different procedures. Time allocation motions have one purpose, and that is to cut off debate – hence why they are called guillotine motions. They are normally moved during 2nd reading debate, but after a fair bit of debate has occurred, not right at the outset of 2nd reading debate, as has been the case here in Canada of late.

Programme motions cannot be applied to 2nd reading debate. That is perhaps the most important difference. They are used to guide the progress of a bill through the committee stage, consideration (report) stage and 3rd reading. However, while they can’t be used to curtail 2nd reading debate, notice of programme motions must be given before 2nd reading and they are moved immediately after 2nd reading begins. The programme motion is then voted on, and once adopted by the House, becomes a programme order.

When a programme order covers proceedings which take place in the House itself (committee of the whole House, consideration (report stage) or third reading), a programming committee is appointed, consisting of the Chairman of Ways and Means (the Deputy Speaker) and up to eight other members, nominated by the Speaker. The function of the committee is to divide the bill into various parts and  allot to each part such time as it considers appropriate. This is very important. While the Government determines how much total time will be allocated for consideration of the bill at each stage covered by the programme order, how that time is used is not controlled by the Government. A committee of MPs nominated by the Speaker determine how the time will be used. Proceedings in the programming committee are limited to two hours. The House may debate the programming  committee’s resolution for up to 45 minutes and, if it is agreed to, it has effect as if it were included in the programme  order.

What is interesting about the process in the UK is that if the Government cannot get its programming motion passed, it might opt to abandon the bill if it believes trying to move it through the House without a formal programming motion will take up too much of the House’s time. That is what happened with the House of Lords Reform bill earlier in the current Parliament. House of Lords reform, like Senate reform here in Canada, is one of those issues that pretty much everyone agrees is needed, but there is little agreement on which way to proceed. Consequently, the Coalition Government went to great lengths with this particular bill. They first produced a draft bill in May 2011, and on 23 June 2011, set up a Joint Committee made up of 13 peers and 13 MPs to study the bill in draft form. The Committee heard evidence over the course of the next several months, and reported on the bill in April 2012 – almost a year later. Based on the committee’s recommendations, the Government than produced a final bill which had 1st reading in the House of Commons on 27 June 2012. Second reading debate began on 9 July 2012, and the programme motion was tabled on 10 July. However, there was strong opposition to the programme motion from an alliance of Labour MPs and Tory rebels and the Government, sensing that the programme motion was unlikely to be adopted by the House, dropped it. The bill itself received 2nd reading with strong support (462 votes to 124, a majority of 338) but 91 Conservative MPs voted against it. Without the programme motion, the bill would have faced an incredibly bumpy ride. Faced with this reality, the Government essentially abandoned the bill – and it was formally withdrawn in September 2012.

It might seem ridiculous to some that the Government would abandon a bill into which it had invested so much time and effort simply because it had to drop its programming motion, but despite having sent it in draft form to a committee for pre-legislative study, the bill remained a very controversial one, and the Government feared it would simply tie up the House and detract from the rest of its legislative program. Could it have used guillotine motions to force the bill through? It would have been highly unlikely that any vote on a guillotine motion would have succeeded. Unlike here in Canada, UK Governments cannot count on 100% of their backbenchers supporting them all of the time. As stated above, there was significant dissent among Conservative backbenchers over the very issue of Lords Reform. Also, using time allocation would have been contrary to how business is normally conducted in the House. A majority of MPs on both sides of the House would probably have objected to the Government resorting to guillotine motions. Since programme motions have become standard practice, guillotine motions have become an endangered species.

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More on electing committee chairs

In my previous post, I wrote about the recent election of the new chair of the Select Committee on Health which occurred last week in the UK House of Commons. Dr. Sarah Wollaston was elected by her fellow MPs, winning on the fourth count over four other contenders for the post.

The BBC’s Parliamentary correspondent, Mark D’Arcy’s recent column warns that some Conservative MPs aren’t too happy that Dr. Wollaston won the election. Ms. Wollaston, he explains, “has never been an identikit party trooper.” She was the first Conservative MP chosen via open primary, and has always been very independent as an MP. In fact, she was highly critical of her Government’s original NHS reforms as proposed in the Heath and Social Care Bill back in 2011. Some Conservatives, according to Mr. D’Arcy, fear that having such an independently-minded Conservative heading the committee could be embarrassing for the Government should any major issue involving the country’s health services arise over the course of the final year of this parliament. They also think that this independence is why Dr. Wollaston has so much support from Labour MPs. Because of this, some Conservatives:

are starting to suggest that their party should have some kind of primary process to decide its favoured candidates before the election is thrown to the whole House, or that the election itself should be restricted to MPs from the party which holds the particular committee.

Now for the non-regular readers of this blog, and for those not familiar with how the UK House of Commons chooses committee chairs, let me explain why the above quote is worrisome. Chairs of select committees (the equivalent of Standing Committees here in Canada) are elected by the whole House – by MPs. The chairships are divided amongst the major parties at the outset of a new parliament, in proportion to each party’s share of seats in the House of Commons. This in itself is a major departure from how we do things in Canada. In the Canadian House of Commons, the government party chairs almost every single committee. In the current parliament, 22 of the 26 — 84% of the Standing Committees — are chaired by Conservative MPs, even though the Conservatives hold only 52% of the seats in the House of Commons. The Official Opposition chairs the other four, and the third party Liberals, despite holding 11% of the seats, don’t chair any. This isn’t the case in the UK House of Commons. There are 38 select committees in the UK House of Commons; the Conservative Party chairs 20 (53%), Labour chairs 14 (37%) and the Liberal Democrats chair 4 (10%). This is comparable to their representation in the House where the Conservatives hold 47% of the seats, Labour 40% and the Liberal Democrats 9%. The parties decide amongst themselves which party will chair which committee, although traditionally, the Public Accounts Committee is chaired by the Official Opposition and the Liberal Democrats always take International Development.

The Health Select Committee was allocated to the Conservative party, and thus when the former chair stepped down, only interested Conservative MPs were eligible to put themselves forward as candidates to replace him. However, following the election of two very independent-minded Conservative MPs, Dr. Wollaston at Health and, earlier this year, Rory Stewart at Defence, some within the Conservative party want to control the process of who becomes a committee chair. One way, according to Mr. D’Arcy’s article, would be for the Conservative caucus to decide by some process which of their MPs could stand for election for the post of committee chair. This would, in theory, allow the party (aka the party leadership) to weed out any MPs who are less keen on toeing the party line. Alternatively, any Conservative MP could put themselves forward as a candidate, but rather than the whole House voting to elect the Chair, the vote would be limited to  Conservative MPs (and one assumes they’d want the same process to apply to the election of chairs from other parties – limiting the vote to members of that party only). That would prevent the other parties from backing a candidate that they favour. Suffice it to say that either option completely undermines the entire point of having elected committee chairs and would reverse this very important procedural reform by putting the committee system back under the control of party whips.

However, not all Conservative MPs want the process to change. Mr. D’Arcy heard from a fair number who said they voted for Dr. Wollaston because she is independent-minded and won’t hesitate to criticize the government (and their own party) if that criticism is warranted.

Canadians may not be aware that a Canadian Conservative backbencher, Brad Trost, has successfully moved a motion ordering the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs to study the matter of elected committee chairs. Trost was inspired by the reforms adopted by the UK House of Commons; however, his proposal falls short (in my view) because he does not also recommend distributing the chairships more proportionally among the parties. I don’t know why the government party has almost complete control of the committees here in Canada, but this is something that should be changed. As I mentioned above, in the Canadian House of Commons, the government party chairs almost every single committee. In the current parliament, 22 of the 26 — 84% of the Standing Committees — are chaired by Conservative MPs, even though the Conservatives hold only 52% of the seats in the House of Commons. The Official Opposition chairs the other four, and the third party Liberals, despite holding 11% of the seats, don’t chair any. If the chair positions were divided more proportionally, the Conservatives would chair 14 committees rather than 22, the NDP 8, the Liberals 3 and the Bloc Quebecois 1. But of course, in our system, the BQ can’t chair a committee because they aren’t “recognized” as a party, failing, as they do, to have the magic number of MPs required to be considered a party in the House. And because they don’t meet this magic number, not only are BQ MPs denied the right to chair a committee, they can’t even be members of a committee. This is another thing that we do horribly wrong – the entire concept of “officially recognized party” needs to be tossed out the window.

But that, my friends, is perhaps a post for another day.

(Note: for those interested, Mr. Trost’s motion on electing committee chairs was debated on two occasions, first on October 21 2013, and then again on January 29 2014.)

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New committee chair elected

SarahWollastonMPThe UK House of Commons today elected a new Chair of the Select Committee on Health.

Regular readers of this blog will know that chairs of select committees are elected by the whole House. This is a relatively new development – the reform was adopted at the end of the previous Parliament and implemented for the first time in May 2010, at the start of the current Parliament. By all accounts, it has proven to be a very positive change; select committees have gained a lot of respect and they are seen to be more beholden to the House rather than to party whips.

Committee chairships are allocated among the three main parties roughly in proportion to their representation in the House, unlike here in Canada, where the party which forms the government chairs all but three committees. The Health Committee is chaired by a Conservative, and thus the House had a choice of four Conservative MPs who put themselves forward as candidates: Charlotte Leslie, Dr. Phillip Lee, Dr. Sarah Wollaston and David Tredinnick.

The House uses the Alternative Vote to elect Committee chairs, meaning MPs rank the candidates on the ballot in order of preference. It took four stages of counting before one candidate ended up with the required 50% + 1 of the votes in play, and in the end, Dr. Sarah Wollaston was elected Chair.

Dr. Wollaston is a very interesting person for another reason. Before becoming the Member of Parliament (MP) for Totnes in 2010, she was the first person to be selected as a parliamentary candidate for a major British political party through an open primary, in which she emphasised that she was an outsider to politics, who had worked a ‘real job’. She won the nomination for the Conservative candidature and at the general election won the seat with an increased Conservative majority.

This is how the announcement of the results played out in the House this afternoon:

Mr Speaker: I will now announce the result of the ballot held today for the election of a new Chair of the Select Committee on Health. A total of 433 votes were cast, with two spoilt ballot papers. The counting went to four stages and 421 valid votes were cast in the final round, excluding those ballot papers whose preferences had been exhausted. The quota to be reached was therefore 211 votes. Dr Sarah Wollaston was elected Chair with 226 votes. The other candidate in that round was Dr Phillip Lee, who received 195 votes. Dr Wollaston will take up the post immediately. I warmly congratulate her on her election. The results of the count under the alternative vote system will be made available as soon as possible in the Vote Office and published on the internet for public viewing.

Dr Sarah Wollaston (Totnes) (Con): On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Charnwood (Mr Dorrell) for his exemplary leadership of the Health Committee for more than four years. That leadership has been widely respected. I thank him for everything that he has done on behalf of patients, acting, as he has done, as their voice. The NHS touches people’s lives a million times every 36 hours. It is the most extraordinary achievement and also the most extraordinary challenge. The new chief executive of NHS England has called on everyone in the NHS to think like a patient and act like a taxpayer. The role of the Select Committee is to ask those challenging questions on behalf of patients and taxpayers so that this most cherished institution can continue to be there for all of our constituents when they need it the most.

Mr Speaker: I thank the hon. Lady for her words.

Dr Phillip Lee (Bracknell) (Con): Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston) on her success in the election. I know that she has the knowledge and, above all and perhaps more importantly, the wisdom to be a very good Chair of the Health Committee and I wish her all the very best.

Mr Speaker: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his gracious words.

Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab): On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I know that you know that parliamentary procedure says that we should not be allowed to applaud in this Chamber, but might not this be the kind of occasion when the Speaker abolished the rule and allowed applause?

Mr Speaker: There is an old adage that was taught to me by the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) some 30 years ago that if one is intent upon a particular course of action, one should never give a bureaucrat a chance to say no. I think that I will leave it there for today.

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Ontario Provincial Election June 2014

ontario_smallThis blog will not engage in a discussion of the policies of political parties, either at the provincial or federal level. However, it will provide links to sites that might prove useful to voters for the 12 June 2014 Ontario provincial election.

Vote Compass Ontario 2014

Vote Compass is an educational tool developed by political scientists. Answer a short series of questions to discover how you fit in the Ontario political landscape. If you’re unsure of which party to vote for, this might help. And even if you are certain which party you want to support, the Vote Compass results might surprise you!

Party Platform Comparisons

Comparison of party positions on six key issues from Yahoo News.

Political Party Platform Comparison from the Consulting Engineers of Ontario (PDF)

Comparison of the parties’ education platform from the OSSTF

Comparison of parties’ positions on key issues from the Globe and Mail

General Election Information

Elections Ontario has all the information you need about the upcoming election. Start with their We Make Voting Easy page.

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On by-election timing

I have previously written about the differences in calling by-elections in both Canada and the UK, pointing out that, in general, by-elections in the UK tend to be called within days of a seat becoming vacant, while in Canada, it can often take months for a by-election to be called.

The Canadian federal electoral district of Macleod has been without representation for almost six months now. By-elections must be called within 180 days of the Chief Electoral Officer being officially notified of a vacancy, which means the deadline for calling the by-election will be 17 May 2014. There are currently four other vacant seats in the House of Commons.

In the UK, Conservative MP Patrick Mercer resigned his seat on 29 April 2014. Two days later, on 1 May, the writ was issued and the by-election date set for 5 June. The constituency of Newark will be without an MP for little more than a month.

As I had explained in that earlier post, in Canada, under the Parliament of Canada Act, when a seat in the House is vacant, the Speaker of the House of Commons informs the Chief Electoral Officer by means of a Speaker’s warrant.

After receiving the warrant, section 57 of the Canada Elections Act authorizes the Governor in Council to fix the date on which the Chief Electoral Officer is to issue the writ. The date of issuance must fall between the 11th and 180th days after the Chief Electoral Officer receives the warrant from the Speaker. The Governor in Council also fixes the date for election day, which cannot be earlier than 36 days after the Chief Electoral Officer issues the writ. As I explained, the “Governor in Council” is the Governor General, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister; in other words, it is the Prime Minister who decides when to call a by-election. It is the Prime Minister who determines how long some Canadians will go without representation in the House.

I wonder why things were arranged like this. It isn’t the Prime Minister’s House of Commons; it shouldn’t be up to the PM to decide that some citizens will be denied representation for months on end.

In the UK, the Prime Minster has no say in when by-elections occur.

The writ for a by-election in the UK is usually issued on the same day as or the day following a motion in the Commons for the Speaker to make out the warrant for the issue of a writ. By Parliamentary convention the Chief Whip of the party to which the previous Member belonged will usually arrange for the motion to be moved.

The writ is issued by the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery and sent to the Returning Officer or Acting  Returning  Officer  for  the  constituency. The Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, as explained on the UK Parliament website:

is head of the Crown Office, which has custody of the Great Seal of the Realm, and has administrative functions in connection with the courts and the judicial process. The Clerk of the Crown in Chancery initiates a parliamentary election in a constituency by sending an election writ to the Returning Officer, and receives all ballot papers and ballot stubs after the election is complete; these are retained for a year. Since 1885 the office of Clerk of the Crown in Chancery has been combined with that of Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Justice.

In other words, he or she is a civil servant.

As explained in this Commons Library Standard Note, the by-election timetable is set in motion following the receipt of the writ. Previously, the governing legislation allowed for a 13-day timetable, but in practice no by-election using a 13-day timetable had occurred in the last few decades. The Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013 has lengthened the by-election timetable from between 13 to 19 days to between 21 and 27 days.

The only means by which the UK Government could hold up the process of issuing a writ for a by-election is by delaying the appointment of the MP who is resigning to the Chiltern Hundreds. As I have explained in this post, MPs in the UK cannot actually resign their seat. Death, disqualification and expulsion are the only means by which a Member’s seat may be vacated during the lifetime of a Parliament. When an MP wants to resign his or her seat, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will disqualify them by appointing the MP to one of two offices that are used for disqualification: Crown Steward and Bailiff of the Chiltern Hundreds and of the Manor of Northstead. In the case of former MP Patrick Mercer, he announced his resignation on 29 April, and on 30 April, the Chancellor of the Exchequer appointed him to be Steward and Bailiff of the Chiltern Hundreds. The next day, 1 May, the chief whip of the Conservative Party moved the writ in the House of Commons.

Surely this is a better model? It removes the possibility of a Prime Minister playing politics with by-election timing and in the process, denying citizens their right to representation in the House of Commons for months on end.

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On early candidate selection

There will most likely be general elections in both Canada and the UK next year. I say most likely only because Canada’s “fixed election dates” aren’t binding on the the Prime Minister/Governor General. There will definitely be a general election in the UK – on May 6 2015, to be exact. Their fixed-term parliaments law is binding. The next election in Canada should happen in October 2015, but as I said, the PM could well decide to call one earlier or even later.

As regular readers know by now, I like to highlight differences between how things are done here in Canada and how they are done elsewhere. Today I’m going to focus on when candidates are selected for the next election.

In Canada, political parties tend to wait until a few months or even weeks (or even days) before an election is expected or called to choose their candidates. Some, usually in ridings in which a party isn’t very competitive, might not get a candidate until after the writs have dropped. The deadline for candidate nominations is the 21st day before voting day.

In the UK, parties like to get a much earlier start. In fact, it isn’t at all uncommon for parties to select a candidate years in advance of the next general election.

For example, the last general election in the UK was in May 2010. In January 2011, the Labour party gave the green light to candidate selections in 26 marginal ridings – constituencies in which they had finished a very close second in the May 2010 election. What that means is that Labour had nominated candidates – what are called prospective parliamentary candidates, or PPCs – in place up to four years in advance of the next general election.

Labour isn’t alone in doing this. All three of the main parties will target key ridings that they think they have a chance of winning next time around – the aforementioned marginals – and will try to get a candidate in place at least a year, often 2-3 years ahead of the next election. Parties appearing to lag on this front will be the subject of media attention.

These candidates then have 2-4 years to campaign in their constituency – doing door-to-door canvassing, attending local events – in other words, getting themselves known to local voters. Most of these activities don’t really cost anything – the largest expense would be travelling around the constituency.

I mentioned this to some colleagues and they thought it was extremely bizarre. Why on earth, some asked, would a party want to commit itself or tie itself to a candidate so far ahead of an election? That struck me as a very odd response. If a party is willing to commit itself to a candidate they hope will be one of their MPs for at least the next four years, why wouldn’t they be willing to commit to them 2-3 years before the election date?

Recently, the federal NDP nominated a candidate in the riding of Edmonton-Centre for the 2015 election. A few weeks later, the candidate withdrew due to health concerns. I did see more than a few comments on Twitter questioning the wisdom of selecting a candidate so far in advance of the actual election. Again, I think it makes far more sense to get a candidate in place as early as possible. Health concerns happen; that’s not a good enough reason to not choose someone well in advance of the next election.

Some regularly complain that voters only vote based on party label – that no one votes for the actual individual anymore. Well, that’s hardly surprising if most, if not all, of the candidates in your constituency are nominated only a few weeks before voting day. Odds are most voters don’t know any of these individuals, and won’t be able to get a sense of them during the short election campaign. However, if a party had a candidate in place years in advance, that person would become quite well known in their own right, and some voters at least might be more open to voting for the actual person rather than their party label.

I wouldn’t expect parties to nominate a candidate years in advance in every single constituency. UK parties don’t do that. They target the marginals, the constituencies which they only narrowly lost in the previous election and that they think they have a real shot at winning next time around.

Of course, it is probably a lot easier for PPCs in the UK to campaign well in advance of an actual election; constituencies are much smaller in size – geographically-speaking – and it would be much easier to get around to the various villages and towns. However, the large size of most rural ridings here in Canada is another argument in favour of having a candidate in place 2-3 years ahead of the actual election: that way, the candidate can actually campaign effectively and repeatedly across the entire riding, something that may prove difficult to do during the official 36-day election campaign.

I think it makes a lot of sense for parties to identify seats they might win and ensure that they have candidates in place well in advance of the next general election. It would provide them with an active, constant presence in the riding, and allow their candidate to be known and build a base of support. And maybe it would help voters base their decision on the candidate, rather than just party label, which I think would be a very good thing indeed.

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Report of the Electoral Matters Committee

ParlVicThe Parliament of the Australian state of Victoria’s Electoral Matters Committee released the report of its Inquiry into the future of Victoria’s electoral administration. It’s a lengthy (144 pages) report, and much of it deals with the nitty-gritty of voting in the State of Victoria. Chapter 3, however, might be of more general interest to Canadians who advocate for the adoption of the preferential ballot (aka the ranked ballot, or the Alternative Vote).

There are two different voting systems used in the State of Victoria. Full preferential voting is used to elect Members to the Legislative Assembly, while single transferable vote (STV) is used to elect the upper chamber, the Legislative Council.

Full preferential means that for a ballot to count, what is known in Australia as a formal ballot, the voter has to rank, in order of preference, every single candidate listed on the ballot. If the voter fails to do so, theirs becomes an informal ballot and is not counted – what we here in Canada would call a spoiled ballot.

While one of the main concerns about voting here in Canada is undoubtedly the issue of voter turnout, this is not the case in Australia, which has compulsory voting. Instead, the main concern around the use of full preferential is the increase in the number of informal ballots. This isn’t a phenomenon limited to the State of Victoria; the rates of informal voting are increasing in most Australian jurisdictions, both at the state and federal level.

At the 2010 Victorian state election, the rate of informal voting for the Legislative Assembly was 4.96%, which means that just under 5% of the ballots cast couldn’t be counted because they hadn’t been filled in properly. This is the highest rate of information voting ever, and a 50% increase over the 2002 election. While I can understand why this trend would worry people, when contrasted to Canadian elections which see a voter turnout barely topping 50% at times, I can’t help but see this as a relatively mild concern. Yet, it is a problem, and Chapter Three of the report looks at ways to try to reverse this trend.

Long story short, the Committee put forward the following recommendation:

Recommendations 3.1: The Committee recommends the Victoria Government amend the Electoral Act 2002 (Vic) to introduce a system of optional preferential voting (OPV) for Victorian Legislative Assembly elections. In drafting these amendments the Victorian Government should examine the model of OPB used in NSW and Queensland.

Both New South Wales and Queensland use what the report calls “full” Optional Preferential Voting (OPV). Electors in NSW and Queensland have the choice of voting for one candidate, more than one candidate, or all of the candidates on the ballot paper. In other words, they don’t have to rank every single candidate on the ballot paper; they can rank only their first choice, or rank as many or as few as they please. Both states have lower rates of informal voting than Victoria; the rate for the 2011 Legislative Assembly election in NSW was 3.2%, while the rate in the 2012 Queensland Legislative Assembly vote was 2.2%.

While the rate of informal voting (spoiled ballots) might be better under full OPV, it has other problems associated with it. The report does reference these. The most glaring one, to me at least, is that because voters can choose to rank only one candidate on their ballot, there is a risk that full OPV becomes a de facto First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system. And indeed, there is evidence that this is happening. In 2011, the Queensland Attorney General reported to Cabinet on Queensland’s OPV voting system and noted that in the 2009 state election, 63% of ballot papers were marked “1″ only. At the 2006 election, the rate was 62%. Up until 2001, the rate had been significantly lower – only 20.7% in 1995, for example.

Why does this matter? As I have explained in numerous past posts on this topic, the only advantage any type of ranked ballot has over FPTP is that it is supposed to eliminate candidates being elected without majority support. As we all know, under FPTP, it isn’t unusual for candidates to win with minority support, meaning, they receive less than 50% of the votes cast. A majority of MPs in both the UK and Canadian Houses of Commons were elected with less than 50% support – often a lot less.

There is significant support for adopting preferential voting in Canada – both federally and more recently, it has been proposed for municipalities in Ontario. I don’t think anyone in Canada is proposing full preferential – requiring voters to rank every single candidate on the ballot paper – at least, every single discussion I have seen on the topic here in Canada refers to optional preferential. However, I have also never seen anyone address this reality about OPV – that not all voters will bother to rank candidates, and if most ballots are marked with “1″ only, then we’ll still be stuck with essentially a FPTP system.

Another problem with OPV is that it favours the candidate in first place on the first count. Or as Antony Green put it: “Optional preferential voting makes it easier for the candidate leading on first preferences to reach 50% of a shrinking pool of votes in the count, and harder for a second placed candidate to come from behind and win.” This again reinforces the FPTP-ness of OPV.

Full preferential is problematic in its own right, however. Most ballot papers here in Canada have more than 3-4 candidates on them. While it might be easy enough for most voters to rank candidates from the big parties, how do you then rank independents and candidates representing fringe parties you may never have heard of? Or take the mayoral race for the City of Toronto – while only a handful of candidates get any real media coverage, there are over 40 candidates actually running for mayor at time of writing. Who on earth would even want to attempt to rank all of them in some sort of order of preference?

While the Victoria Electoral Matters Committee is favouring OPV, I think my preferred option would be Modified OPV, as used in Tasmania. It’s sort of a hybrid of full and optional preferential. In Tasmania, for a vote to count, the voter has to rank at least five candidates. They can rank more than five if they want, but the rest are optional. I think this would be a good compromise for any jurisdiction in Canada that might adopt preferential voting. It would ensure that the system doesn’t resort back to a de facto FPTP system, but at the same time, wouldn’t force Canadians into making (too many) “artificial” choices. Note – I’m not 100% beholden to the number five – but I wouldn’t go any lower than 3 and think it might be best if it were more than three as that might have unduly negative consequences for minor parties.

If you’re interested in the Electoral Matters Committee report, it can be downloaded here.

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Australia might be headed for a double dissolution

Australia-VotesAustralia, like Canada and the United Kingdom, has a bicameral parliament, meaning it consists of two Houses, the lower house, the House of Representatives and the upper house, the Senate. Unlike Canada and the United Kingdom, however, Australia’s upper chamber is elected.

The House of Representatives normally lasts no more than three years. Senators, however, are elected for six-year terms. This means, that, under normal circumstances, when the House of Representatives is dissolved every three years for a new general election, the Senate continues to exist as Senators remain in office until the completion of their term and only half stand for election at any one time.

The most recent general election in Australia occurred on 7 September 2013. The House of Representatives was dissolved, and 40 of the 76 Senate seats were also contested.

Australia’s Constitution does allow for dissolution of the Senate, but only under very specific circumstances. This provision is called a double dissolution.

Double Dissolution

In Australia, as is the case in Canada and the United Kingdom, legislation must pass both Houses of Parliament before it can receive Royal Assent and become law.

In the UK, once a bill has passed third reading in both Houses, it returns to the House where it was introduced for the second House’s amendments (proposals for change) to be considered. Both Houses must agree on the exact wording of the Bill.

If the Commons makes amendments to the Bill, the Lords must consider them and either agree or disagree to the amendments or make alternative proposals. If the Lords disagrees with any Commons amendments, or makes alternative proposals, then the Bill is sent back to the Commons. A Bill may go back and forth between each House until both Houses reach agreement. This is usually referred to as the “ping pong” stage. In exceptional cases, when the two Houses do not reach agreement, the Bill falls. If certain conditions are met, the Commons can use the Parliament Acts to pass the Bill, without the consent of the Lords, in the following session.

The process is similar in Canada. The Senate often makes amendments to bills, some of which involve corrections to drafting errors or improvements to administrative aspects. The House normally accepts such amendments. If the House does not agree with the Senate amendments, it adopts a motion stating the reasons for its disagreement, which it communicates in a message to the Senate. If the Senate wishes the amendments to stand nonetheless, it sends a message back to the House, which then accepts or rejects the proposed changes. If an agreement cannot be reached by exchanging messages, the House that has possession of the bill may ask that a conference be held, although this practice has fallen into disuse, with the last one occurring in 1947. Over the years, the exchange of messages and the appearance of Ministers before House and Senate committees have considerably reduced the need for this procedure. If no agreement between the two houses is reached, the bill remains on the Order Paper where it dies at the end of the session; no new bill may be introduced in the Commons on the same subject matter and containing similar provisions.

As stated, the Canadian Senate and the UK House of Lords are not elected bodies, therefore, these upper chambers will tend to recognize the primacy of the elected chamber. In Australia, because Senators are elected, the situation is more complex.

When the government does not have a majority in the Senate a situation can arise that the two Houses disagree over proposed legislation. In most cases compromises are reached and amendments are made by one or the other House until the bill concerned is in a state acceptable to both.

However, there have been occasions when no agreement could be reached between the two Houses. The Constitution provides the double dissolution mechanism as a means of breaking a deadlock between the Houses when such compromise is not achieved.

In effect the legislation may be put to the people, presenting the electorate with the opportunity to change the composition of the Senate following a full Senate election. There is also of course the possibility of a change in the composition of the House (i.e. a change of Government)—the deadlock may be broken in either direction.

If, after a double dissolution and elections for both Houses, the Houses continue to disagree on the same bill, the Governor-General may convene a joint sitting of both Houses to enable the members of both Houses to vote together to resolve the matter. The House of Representatives has almost twice as many Members as the Senate, consequently a joint sitting is likely to see the will of a majority of the House overcome Senate resistance.

There have been only six double dissolutions; the last occurred in 1987.

Current Situation

The Liberal/National Coalition campaigned on a promise to (among other things) repeal the previous Labor Government’s carbon tax. After forming the Government following the September 2013 election, House of Representatives passed the Abbott Government’s legislation to repeal the Clean Energy Finance Corp. on 21 November 2013. The Senate rejected the bill on 10 December 2013. Three months have now passed, the the bill is scheduled to be re-introduced in the House of Representatives on 27 March 2014. If the Senate again refuses to pass the bill, the Prime Minister will be in a position to advise the Governor-General to dissolve both Houses. The Coalition had indicated even before the September 2013 election that it would trigger a double dissolution if it was prevented from repealing the carbon tax.

These are the steps which must take place before a double dissolution is possible.

Double dissolution

  1. The House of Representatives passes a bill and sends it to the Senate.
  2. The Senate rejects the bill, or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree.
  3. After an interval of three months (but in the same or the next session of Parliament), the House of Representatives passes the bill a second time and sends it to the Senate again. The bill reintroduced must be the original bill, except that it may be modified by amendments made, requested or agreed to by the Senate.
  4. The Senate again rejects the bill, or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree.
  5. The Prime Minister may now advise the Governor-General to dissolve both Houses. Once the preceding conditions have occurred, whether and when to advise a double dissolution is a matter for the Prime Minister. There is no constitutional necessity to do so, or to do so within any period of time.However, a double dissolution cannot occur within six months of the end of a three year term of the House of Representatives.
  6. Elections are held for both Houses.

Joint sitting

  1. In the new Parliament the House of Representatives passes the bill again and sends it to the Senate. The bill may be reintroduced with or without amendments made, requested or agreed to by the Senate. There is no constitutional necessity to reintroduce a bill that was the cause of the double dissolution.
  2. The Senate again rejects the bill, or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree.
  3. The Prime Minister may now advise the Governor-General to convene a joint sitting of the members of both Houses.
  4. The joint sitting votes on the bill as last proposed by the House of Representatives and on any amendments made by one House and not agreed to by the other. To be passed, amendments and the bill (as, and if, so amended) must be agreed to by an absolute majority—i.e. more than half of the total number of the members of both Houses.

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