Whipped votes, free votes and representative democracy

Posted on | September 2, 2010 | View Comments

In this post, I explained what representative democracy is:

In countries with representative democracy, we elect people to a legislative body to represent us. The representatives form an independent ruling body (for an election period) charged with the responsibility of acting in the people’s interest, but not as their proxy representatives, that is not necessarily always according to their wishes, but with enough authority to exercise swift and resolute initiative in the face of changing circumstances.

The key point here is that in countries such as Canada, the UK, Australia, the US, etc., elected officials act in the people’s interest, but not always according to their wishes. This means that in some instances, one’s MP (or congressperson, or representative, or MLA, etc.) will vote in a way that might run counter to prevailing opinion in his or her constituency because sometimes, what people want isn’t always the best way to procede, or doesn’t reflect current circumstances, or might not be in the best interests of the country.

In parliamentary democracies, there is another factor at play. Party politics and party discipline are incredibly powerful forces in countries such as Canada, the UK and Australia, etc., much stronger factors than they are in the US, for example, where the parties don’t campaign on single national manifestos. While an MP is elected to represent their constituents, I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to say that, the vast majority of the time, how an MP votes on various issues will be determined by their party’s whip and not by what their constituents want. The reality is that an MP who regularly (or sometimes, even only once) votes against their party’s official position on a given issue will soon find themselves ostracized by the party, if not ejected from caucus completely. Indeed, in many ways, it is an act of political courage for an individual MP to defy their party and vote the way their constituents want, or according to their own conscience.

What this means is that if a party has an official position on a given issue, its MPs are expected to vote that way if the issue comes up for a vote in the legislature, even if majority opinion in an MP’s constituency differs. While this might seem wrong on the surface, one could counter-argue that voters in that constituency knew what the various parties’ positions were on each major issue, and so it would be expected that whoever they elect will vote according to that party’s position. Consequently, if majority opinion in a riding is against  a carbon tax, for example, one would expect that whichever party opposes implementing a carbon tax would get a majority of votes and their candidate elected.

Of course, reality isn’t as straight forward. Election campaigns are frequently dominated by only handful of key issues – one of which is almost always the economy, and so voters may well ignore party positions on minor or secondary issues, focusing instead on where they stand on the larger issues of the day. There is also the issue of voting systems to take into account. In the UK and Canada, which still use First-Past-the-Post (FPTP), the vagaries of this electoral system are well known. FPTP really only works properly (so to speak) if there are only two parties which are serious contenders. In jurisdictions that have three (or more) very competitive parties, FPTP breaks down. For example, if four parties are contesting for a seat in a given constituency, three of which clearly favour strong environmental protection measures while one opposes it, the pro-environment vote can end up being split three ways,  allowing the  candidate representing the less pro-environment party to win. Such scenarios are not infrequent. Most MPs in Canada and the UK are elected with less than 50% of the vote cast in their ridings. Some win their seats with only a third of the votes cast, some with even less. Is it fair in such cases to say that voters are endorsing the positions on key issues held by the winning candidate’s party?

My point here is to attempt to highlight the fact that how an MP votes on a given issue will be governed by party discipline and not prevaling public opinion in that member’s riding. This is called a “whipped vote” – where members of a party are compelled to vote a certain way or else risk being reprimanded or punished by their party. Most votes in the Canadian House of Commons are whipped votes. The opposite of a whipped vote is a free vote:

There are no rules or Standing Orders defining a “free vote” in the House of Commons nor is there any requirement that free votes be identified as such in the Journals. Simply defined, a free vote takes place when a party decides that, on a particular issue, its Members are not required to vote along party lines, or that the issue is not a matter of party policy and its Members may vote as they choose. A free vote may be allowed by one or more parties or it may be allowed by all parties. When all parties agree to a free vote, the recorded division may be called as a row?by?row vote or in the normal manner of a party vote. The decisions taken by the parties (as to whether or not a matter should be decided in a free vote) are not issues on which the Speaker can be asked to rule.

In the Canadian system of responsible government, free votes have a special relationship to the confidence convention. The principle underlying this convention is simply that the government must enjoy the support of the majority of Members of the House of Commons and be responsible for its actions to this elected body. The confidence convention holds that where a motion does not contain an explicitly worded condemnation of the government, or where the government has not declared a particular vote to be a question of confidence, or where there is no implicit vote of non?confidence (such as in a motion to adopt the Budget, the Address in Reply or the granting of supply), then the government is at liberty to interpret the result of the vote in any manner it wishes. Consequently, when under such conditions the government declares that it will treat a matter as a free vote, the convention holds that the defeat of the item does not amount to a vote of non?confidence in the government.

It is not clear when the first free vote was held in the House of Commons; however, since the 1946 free vote on milk subsidies, there have been several free votes on government business. For example, free votes were held on the issues of the selection of a national flag, capital punishment, abortion, the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, constitutional amendments, and same-sex marriage. (House of Commons Procedure and Practice, 2nd Edition)

However, as C.E.S. Franks explains, even free votes often aren’t very free (PDF). The free votes on the issues of capital punishment and abortion were not free votes for the New Democratic Party. On both those issues the NDP has a clear, stated policy, and members were expected to toe the party line. The more recent vote on same-sex marriage (not mentioned in Franks’ article, which was published in 1992) in December 2006 was a free vote for the Conservatives and Liberals, but the NDP and Bloc Québécois whipped their vote.

Franks argues that:

Not only are free votes rare in Canada (and in other Westminster-style democracies), but their use has largely been restricted to matters of morality and conscience where the divisions cross party lines. To expect much greater use of free votes would be to demand massive changes in the processes of representation and decision making in the parliamentary system. It would change the system of responsibility and accountability: if members of Parliament rather than the government makes the decisions, then members rather than government should be held accountable. The opposition, in so far as its members had supported an item of business in a free vote, would no longer be in a position to oppose. The choices facing the electorate would be more blurred than at present.

Franks also points out that while voters frequently call for more independence for elected MPs, that they be more responsive to their constituents rather than the party, the reality is that more voters vote for a party and its leadership than they do for the local candidate representing that party.

Free votes certainly have their place in our political system, but I have to agree with Franks. It is not through increasing the number of free votes that we will strengthen the role of individual MPs – notably, backbenchers. I also agree with him that it wouldn’t be a bad thing if dissent was more generally tolerated by our political parties.

British Politics and Policy at LSE

Posted on | September 2, 2010 | View Comments

I recently discovered an excellent blog produced by the London School of Economics and Political Science, entitled British Politics and Policy at LSE.

From the blog’s About the blog page:

We seek to make available analysis of UK politics and public policy in an immediately accessible and highly relevant way for a wide readership, drawing primarily on the community of academics and researchers at the London School of Economics, but also including many outside contributors with LSE connections. We invite contributions and comments on blogs from any interested reader.

I have already linked to a few entries from this blog in previous posts. I’d like to highlight a few others here today.

Patrick Dunleavy wonders is this is the death of the Westminster model, now that there are no large “Westminster model” countries left in the world with single party majority governments. This blog entry will be of interest to Canadians. Dunleavy explains that four of the five key “Westminster model” countries have coalition governments in balanced parliaments where no party has a majority.”The one exception is Canada, where the Parliament has been hung since 2004, across three general elections. But somehow Canadian politicians have still not got the knack of constructing a coalition government.”

Another post that will be of interest to Canadians in particular is one by Anne White, written back in April before the UK general election, and looks at what the UK might learn from Canada’s recent experience with repeated hung parliaments.

In today’s post, Andy White explains why tactical voting isn’t a practical strategy under the Alternative Vote (AV), which, of course, the UK will be voting on in a referendum in May 2010.

Still on the topic of AV, Stephanie Rickard posits that the more proportional a country’s voting system is, the more likely it is to fully honour its international commitments on world trade issues, and wonders if switching to AV will make the UK a better player in international forums.

I can’t recommend this blog highly enough to anyone interested in UK politics in particular, but also to anyone interested in political reform, electoral reform, Westminister politics, and politics in general. You can also follow them on Facebook, and Twitter.

A Parliament, by any other name…

Posted on | August 27, 2010 | View Comments

In an earlier post, I vented about the Canadian media’s tendency to declare the results of recent elections “minority governments” even before it emerged what sort of government would be formed. I wrote that it would be preferable to refer to outcomes wherein no party won a majority of seats as a “hung parliament”, as occurs in the UK. Recently, a friend of mine referred me to a blog post that proposed the term “balanced parliament”.

Today I learned two things. First, that the term “hung parliament” is of relatively recent usage even in the UK, and second, that the Liberal Democrats (and the Scottish Nationalist Party) use the term “balanced parliament”.

Regarding the history of “hung parliament”, I refer you to this most informative blog post by Stuart Wilks-Heeg, “Uninventing the ‘hung Parliament’”. According to Wilks-Heeg’s research, the term “hung parliament” did not enter common usage until the mid-1970s:

Searches of media databases reveal that the results of the February 1974 General Election were initially described in The Times and The Guardian as ‘a balance of power position’, ‘a deadlock situation’ or a ‘stalemate general election’. The first use of ‘hung Parliament’ in the press appears to have been almost four months after the election, in an article in The Guardian by Simon Hoggart on 22 June 1974, while the term first appears in Hansard a full four years after the February 1974 election, in a speech made by Kevin McNamara MP on 6 March 1978.

Wilks-Heeg provides two charts that track the usage of “hung parliament” in the media from the mid-70s to 2010. He also identifies where the term seems to have originated:

Its introduction in British politics appears to have been based on an adaptation of the US expression ‘hung jury’, used to indicate a situation in which a lack of agreement among jurors requires them to be dismissed and a second trial with a new jury established. Hence, the House of Commons elected in February 1974 gradually came to be described as ‘hung’ by commentators as it became clear that, as the head of a minority Labour government, Harold Wilson was likely to dissolve Parliament once more and call a fresh General Election in the hope that a majority government would be returned.

Wilks-Heeg argues that hung parliaments are not negative things, and that a new way to describe such an outcome is needed – he suggests either a “negotiating parliament” or a “balanced parliament” – which is what the Liberal Democrats and SNP use.

In a related post, Paul Mitchell looks at Why “hung” parliaments and coalitions are normal in Western Europe, and expresses dissatisfaction with both the terms hung parliament and balanced parliament. No need for a special term, writes Mitchell, since “[V]irtually everyone else in Europe just calls such outcomes ‘a parliament’.”

I must say I do like the simplicity of referring to such outcomes as “a parliament”, because that is exactly what it is. I prefer this to “balanced parliament”, probably because “balanced” to me evokes a fairly equal result. The result of the recent Australian election is just that – a balanced parliament with only a one seat difference between the two main parties. The results of the last Canadian election were much less balanced, ditto the recent UK election. Some non-majority election results end up with one party literally only a seat or two shy of majority status – that’s not very balanced to me. I know this is simply an issue for me because of how I interpret the word “balanced” and many would probably disagree with me on this point, but because of this, I sort of prefer “hung” to “balanced”, or would use “hung” in some instances, and “balanced” in others, depending on the actual outcome (i.e. Australia 2010 – balanced, Canada 2008 – hung).

But my first choice would be to simply call a non-majority result a parliament. It would be a remarkable thing indeed, should our next general election here in Canada result, yet again, in no party winning a majority of seats, to hear news anchors state that “Canadians have elected a new parliament”, and let the parties work out amongst themselves what form of government will emerge.

Australia: Where to From Here?

Posted on | August 27, 2010 | View Comments

This will seem very lazy on my part, but I am simply going to link you to an excellent blog post by Antony Green on what might happen next following the hung parliament outcome in Australia. To refresh everyone’s memory, the seat count following last week’s election is 72 Labor (incumbent party), 73 Coalition Party, 1 Green and 4 Independents, with 76 seats needed for a majority government.

Australia’s political system is very similar to both Canada’s and the UK’s but just different enough for me to not feel comfortable voicing my own thoughts on the matter. However, I have absolutely no qualms about referring people to someone more knowledgeable than myself.

I would also recommend reading the comments posted. Many readers posed additional questions to Antony, which he’s taken the time to answer, and there is a lot more to be learned in the comment section as well.

Hung Parliament – Where to From Here?

Australia’s election and AV opponents

Posted on | August 26, 2010 | View Comments

While the vote counting isn’t quite over yet in the recent Australian election, it is certain that the country will have a hung (or if you prefer, balanced) parliament in its lower house, the House of Representatives. Currently, the two main parties each have 72 seats, while one Green party member and four independents have also been elected. With only one seat remaining undeclared (as of this writing), and 76 seats required for a majority government, it is clear Australia will have a minority government of some sort – either Labor or Coalition.

(Note to those who don’t follow Australian politics much or at all. Coalition here refers to a grouping of parties that run under the same banner, not a coalition government. The Coalition includes the Liberal Party, the Nationals, the Liberal National Party of Queensland, and the Country Liberals.)

Australia uses the Alternate Vote (AV) to elect members to the House of Representative. The Australian Electoral Commission provides an excellent overview of how the system works, but simply put, a voter is required to write the number ’1′ in the box next to the candidate who is their first choice, and the numbers ’2′, ’3′ and so on against all the other candidates until all the boxes have been numbered, in order of the voter’s preference. If a voter opts to not rank all the candidates on their ballot paper, that is considered an “informal vote” and is not counted, even if some of the candidates are ranked. The only exception is if only one box is left blank, then it is assumed that candidate is the voter’s least preferred, and the ballot will be counted.

The UK Coalition Government has tabled legislation to hold a referendum on adopting AV to replace First-Past-the-Post, something opposed by most supporters of the UK Conservative Party. Some are starting to point to the results of the Australian election as proof of why a move to AV would be a Very Bad Thing.

In particular, what they are finding abhorrent is that a candidate that might be running 3rd in the overall popular vote (based on first choice votes) could end up actually winning the seat once voter preferences are distributed, as has occurred in the Australian district of Denison, won by an independent. This is thought to be very unfair and undemocratic. Antony Green has an excellent blog post explaining how this outcome has come about. As informative as Green’s post is, what is perhaps more eye-opening is that he had to write a post explaining why this outcome was possible. He states that he has been “deluged with questions about Denison. The main one is how can Andrew Wilkie win the seat if the Liberal candidate is finishing second?” Even some commenters thank him for explaining to them how the system works. This ignorance of how the AV system works would be understandable if Australia had only recently adopted it, but this system has been in place since 1919, and voting is compulsory in Australia, so the ignorance can’t even be blamed on people not bothering to vote ever before and turning out for the first time for this election.

This combination of a 3rd place (or even lower place) candidate (in terms of overall popular vote) actually winning a seat due to the distribution of voter preferences and voters not understanding how to vote or how their system works is a toxic one for AV opponents. As far as they are concerned, this is proof of why moving away from FPTP would be a huge mistake.

Regarding the question of the perceived unfairness of a 3rd place candidate winning a seat, FPTP produces results that are equally “undemocratic” or “unfair”. In both Canada and the UK, few MPs actually win their seats with over 50% of the vote in their respective constituencies. I have previously posted about this with regards to the 2005 UK election. In Canada’s last general election (October 2008), 61% of MPs were elected with less than 50% of the votes in their respective ridings – a total of 189 MPs. Of that number, 149 received between 40% and 49% of the vote, 39 were elected with between 30% and 39% of the vote and one MP was elected with less than 30% of the vote. How anyone can consider the election of a candidate with the support of only 29% to be “fairer” confuses me.  The advantage of AV, at least in theory, is that the candidate elected is the most acceptable (or least objectionable) to a majority of voters, while under FPTP, all too often, the person elected is the preferred choice of only a minority of voters, and everyone else’s vote counts for naught.

Many commenters on Green’s blog post argue that the outcome isn’t fair because clearly, voters wanted the Labor candidate to win, and that clearly, Australia should adopt FPTP because it would put an end to such nonsense. Luckily, other commenters say otherwise:

Musings on rep by pop

Posted on | August 23, 2010 | View Comments

In countries with representative democracy, we elect people to a legislative body to represent us. The representatives form an independent ruling body (for an election period) charged with the responsibility of acting in the people’s interest, but not as their proxy representatives, that is not necessarily always according to their wishes, but with enough authority to exercise swift and resolute initiative in the face of changing circumstances.

While following the results of the recent Australian election, I noted that Australia’s House of Representatives has 150 seats, less than half the number of the Canadian House of Commons (308). Of course, Australia has a smaller population than Canada, but not quite that much smaller. Australia has about two-thirds the population of Canada, so the much smaller number of seats interested me.

I started wondering what would be the ideal level of representation. We frequently hear the expression “rep by pop” – representation by population – thrown around, but there are huge differences in what sort of representation various populations are getting. Just a few examples (all population figures from 2009):

Country	Population	Total seats in legislative body	Population per elected official
Australia	22.1 mn	150	147,702
Canada	33.7 mn	308	109,542
New Zealand	4.3 mn	120	35,965
United Kingdom	61.7 mn	650	95,064
United States	307.0 mn	435	705,762

I’ll be upfront – I have no idea what an ideal level of representation would be in a perfect world. However, I have to say that I don’t think having an average of over 700,000 people per elected representative would be considered ideal by anyone.

The number of seats in the US House of Representatives is fixed by law at 435, and each state must be guaranteed at least one seat. This means that California, with a population greater than Canada’s (approx. 36.9 mn in 2009) sends 53 elected representatives to Congress and each one represents roughly 697,389 people, while Vermonters are perhaps the best represented, with their sole congressperson representing all 621,760 residents of that state. That’s still a lot of people to represent.

The other extreme in our chart is of course New Zealand, with one elected representative per 36,000 people. My first reaction to that is to wonder if a population of just over 4 million people really needs 120 elected representatives. The Canadian province of Ontario has a population of just over 13 million and only 107 seats in its legislative assembly, an average of 121,495 Ontarians per MPP.

The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in the UK tabled a bill in June which, among other things,  seeks to reduce the number of seats in the UK House of Commons from 650 to 600. This would increase the average number of citizens per MP from the current 95,064 to 102,986 – still below the current average for both Canada and Australia. Meanwhile, there is a bill in the Canadian House of Commons to add 32 more seats to the House, which would increase the number of seats to 340 and reduce the citizens per MP average to 99,235.

Personally, I lean towards an average of about 100,000 citizens per elected representative – mostly because I like nice, round numbers. If we were to apply that benchmark to the countries in our chart, Australia’s House of Representatives would increase its number of seats from 150 to 222.  Canada’s seat total should then be about 337, an increase of 29 (so quite close to the 340 proposed by the bill), while New Zealand’s chamber would be cut from 120 seats to 43. The UK sees its number of MPs reduced to 618, and the US House of Representatives would balloon up to 3,070 seats, which probably isn’t very practical. And when you consider that India’s House of the People has 545 seats for a population of 1.1 billion (that’s 2.1 mn people per elected representative), the US isn’t doing that badly on the rep by pop front.

I can’t help but think that how effectively an elected official can represent his or her constituents will depend on how many constituents they have to represent. A single individual representing an entire state population of over 600,000 will have a more difficult time reflecting the divergent views of their constituents than would someone representing 100,000 constituents in a more concentrated area – say part of a city. That said, I don’t know how else one balances a manageable legislative body and a very large population base. The larger the population base, the greater the average number of citizens each elected official will represent.

Of course, there are other factors that determine the number of constituencies in a given country. An important one is geography. While it would be ideal to have very equal ridings in terms of both size and population, this isn’t always possible. Countries such as Canada, Australia and the US have areas that are geographically huge, and very sparsely populated. For example, the riding of Nunavut in Canada has a population of just under 30,000 people spread over 2 million square kilometres – most of which is accessible only by air. Merging that riding with part of another one to create a new riding with a population closer to 100,000 would simply create far more problems for the elected MP. The geographic area they would have to cover to consult with their constituents would be unreasonable.

Another factor is constitutional. Just as the US House of Representatives is fixed by law at 435 seats, other countries have similar conditions imposed on how seats are distributed. In Canada, for example, in order that each province’s representation in the House of Commons continued to reflect its population, section 51 of the Constitution Act, 1867 stated that the number of seats allocated to each province would be recalculated after each 10-year (decennial) census, starting with the 1871 census. The total number of seats was to be calculated by dividing the population of each province by a fixed number, referred to as the “electoral quota” or “quotient.” This quota was to be obtained by dividing the population of the province of Quebec by 65, the number of seats guaranteed for Quebec by the Constitution in the House of Commons.

This simple formula was to be applied with only one exception, “the one-twentieth rule,” under which no province could lose seats in a redistribution unless its share of the national population had decreased by at least five percent (one twentieth) between the last two censuses. In 1915, the first change was made to the original representation formula, by the adoption of the “senatorial clause.” Still in effect today, this clause states that a province cannot have fewer seats in the House of Commons than it does in the Senate. In 1915, it had the immediate effect of guaranteeing four seats to the province of Prince Edward Island, instead of the three it would otherwise have had. It has had four seats ever since. Other changes to the formula were introduced over the years, and in 1985, the Representation Act, 1985 brought into effect a new grandfather clause that guaranteed each province no fewer seats than it had in 1976 or during the 33rd Parliament. Consequently, provinces can gain seats, but they can’t lose any. The only way any semblance of representation by population can be maintained in Canada will be by increasing seats in some part of the country, since reducing the number of seats in other parts with declining populations isn’t an option.

In the end, each country has to assess what works best for it. My inner idealist favours smaller population to elected representative ratios, but my inner realist recognizes that isn’t always feasible.

Thoughts on the monarchy

Posted on | August 19, 2010 | View Comments

While campaigning during the course of a general election campaign in Australia, Prime Minister and Labor Party leader Julia Gillard stated:

I obviously am a Republican. I believe that this nation should be a republic. I also believe that this nation has got a deep affection for Queen Elizabeth.

What I would like to see, as Prime Minister, is that we work our way through to an agreement on a model for the republic but I think the appropriate time for the nation to move to being a republic is when we see the monarch change.

Obviously I’m hoping for Queen Elizabeth that she lives a long and happy life and having watched her mother I think there’s every chance that she will live a long and happy life. But I think that’s probably the appropriate point for a transition to a republic.

Debate on the monarchy in Australia is not new. The country held a referendum in 1999 on whether or not to become a republic, with the status quo option winning 54.8% to 45.1%. Republicanism emerged in Australia long before 1999, however. Many of Australia’s earliest colonists were Irish Nationalists exiled by the British for pushing the cause of Irish independence as well as English radicals including Chartists, machinery- wrecking Luddites, and the Tolpuddle Martyrs, a group of six farm labourers exiled from Dorset in 1834 for setting up a Trade Union. Many of these migrants brought revolutionary fervour with them and continued political activities in the early penal colony. But they were up against the British Empire at the height of its world dominating power. Small-scale rebellions were swiftly dealt with. In 1854 a group of disgruntled gold miners built a stockade around the Eureka Hotel in Ballarat, declaring it the “Republic of Victoria”. The British response was swift and bloody.

It was well over a century later that the republican cause gained widespread appeal. As the Second World War ended and the British Empire dissolved, the advantages of a close relationship with “the mother country” were less apparent. Some servicemen back from the Pacific believed that Britain had abandoned Australia during the war. This view was confirmed for many when the UK turned its back on Australia as a trading partner and joined the Common Market.

Indeed, demographics, trade and geography all favoured republican independence for decades. The democratic shortcomings in the existing arrangements were exposed in 1975 when the Governor General, the Queen’s representative in Australia, dismissed then prime minister, Gough Whitlam. At the time Labor was a monarchist party, but that changed when Whitlam came into conflict with Parliament and was sacked by Governor General Sir John Kerr.

The father of modern Australian republicanism is probably former Labor Prime Minister, Paul Keating. In 1993 Keating established a “Republic Advisory Committee” to look at the constitutional changes necessary. In the early 1990s Malcolm Turnbull, then a prominent lawyer, started the Australian Republican Movement (ARM). It was an attempt to increase public pressure for constitutional change.

This contrasts quite sharply with debate on the issue in Canada. While it is true that the most recent royal visits – one by Prince Charles and Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall in the fall of 2009, and one by Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip in June 2010 – have sparked various editorials, opinion pieces and pundit debates on whether Canada should remain a monarchy, the issue dies down almost immediately once the Royals have left the country. There isn’t the sustained interest in the issue that seems to exist in Australia, nor is the Canadian republican movement as organized or public. While Canada has held many referendums on various issues, there is no measurable interest in holding one on the question of should Canada become a republic.

I don’t purport to know why these differences exist, but I do have a few ideas as to what might explain them. As stated above, demographics, trade and geography all favoured republican independence in Australia. This is less the case in Canada. Granted, on the demographic front, Canada, like Australia, is increasingly less British. Immigration to both countries is significant, and newcomers hail from countries with no obvious ties to the British crown. Even without a strong republican movement, one would expect that over time, Canada’s demographic make-up would suffice to change public opinion about the role of the monarchy in this country. Despite the demographic changes taking place, however, there are other factors at play. Canada is geographically closer to the United Kingdom, and Canadian trade ties with the UK are stronger than are Australia’s. For example, in 2009, the UK was Canada’s 2nd  most important export market (far behind the US of course), while it was 6th main market for Australian exports. The UK ranked 6th as a source of imports to Canada, while it was 10th for Australia.

Canada’s geographic closeness to the UK probably explains why our trade figures are better than Australia’s, but trade figures alone aren’t enough to engender emotional attachment to the monarchy. Personally, I believe the monarchy helps define Canada for many Canadians as something that makes us different from Americans. Australia doesn’t have to worry about sharing a border with a country with ten times its population. Canadians not only look just like Americans, we sound like them too (to many foreigners anyway), and Canadians are notoriously sensitive about being mistaken for Americans when travelling abroad. No one mistakes an Australian for an American. For a Brit, perhaps, but certainly not an American. The cultural shadow of the US simply does not hang over Australia the way it does over Canada. Perhaps that explains in part why there is less interest in loosing our bonds with the monarchy.

Another important factor is that our main constitutional debate has focused for many decades, and continues to focus, primarily on the issue of Quebec’s role in Confederation. Similarly, when debate on political reform does arise in Canada, it tends to focus on issues such as senate reform and electoral reform. Australia already has an elected senate, so there is no need to debate that issue there. They also have various voting systems in place both federally and at the state level, ranging from IRV, to AV, to STV. While some of these options may be little better than First-Past-the-Post, the fact remains that FPTP is not used anywhere in Australia, while any attempt to adopt something other than FPTP in Canada has failed, while voter dissatisfaction increases and turnout continues to decline. My point here is simply that for most Canadians interested in political and constitutional reform, I don’t think becoming a republic is at the top of anyone’s list.

I don’t doubt that one day, Australia will indeed become a republic. Will Canada follow that road as well? Perhaps – once we address what I, and many others, consider much more urgently needed political and constitutional reforms.

Mr. Wright is wrong

Posted on | August 16, 2010 | View Comments

After three consecutive elections that have resulted in minority government in Canada (2004, 2006 and 2008), Ipsos pollster John Wright states in a video interview that nothing will change until legislation to add 32 new seats from the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario is passed and comes into effect two elections from now. In the meantime, his advice to the governing Conservative Party and to the Liberal Party is to “ignore” the province of Quebec as a source of potential seat gains. Why? Because the Bloc Québécois has a stranglehold on that province, which means neither the Conservatives or the Liberals will ever be able to win a majority under existing conditions. Only the addition of new seats will have the potential to change the current political stalemate.

I have a few problems with Mr. Wright’s views.

The first is his assertion that the BQ has a stranglehold on the province of Quebec. For readers of this blog who aren’t Canadian, the Bloc Québécois is a nationalist party that fields candidates only in the majority French-speaking province of Quebec. The party supports the idea of an independent Quebec, and actively seeks to defend what it interprets to be the best interests of Quebec in the House of Commons.

Mr. Wright’s own comments demonstrate that he is incorrect. According to the latest Ipsos poll, the BQ is polling at about 38% support in the province of Quebec, which means that 60% of Quebecers support other parties. Similarly, in the last federal election, only 38% of voters voted for the BQ. Almost 60% supported the other three main federalist parties (the Liberals, the Conservatives and the NDP). Yet the BQ won 49 of Quebec’s 75 seats – or 65% of the province’s seats. In 2006, the BQ won 52 seats with 42% of the vote, and in 2004, the party won 54 seats with 48.9% of the vote, their second-best election and almost identical to their best-ever election result in 1993 – the first general election the party contested.

Quebec is not the only province where one party dominates the political landscape. The situation in the province of Alberta is far worse, with the Conservative party sweeping or almost sweeping all 28 seats. In the 2008 election, the Conservatives won 27 of 28 seats with 64.6% of the vote, in 2006, they swept the province with 65% of the vote, and in 2004, they won 26 of 28 with 61.7% support.

The problem in both Quebec and Alberta isn’t that one party is far more popular than any of the others, it’s that Canada’s antiquated First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) voting system results in a seat count disproportionate to the party’s level of support. If 40% of Quebecers are voting for the BQ, that shouldn’t result in the BQ winning 65% of the province’s seats in the House of Commons. Similarly, the Conservatives shouldn’t win 96% of Alberta’s seats with 65% of the vote.

Mr. Wright’s solution to this situation is not to address the problems with FPTP, but to add seats to the House of Commons in provinces other than Quebec. This, in his words, will allow the three main federalist parties (the Conservatives, Liberals and the NDP) to gain seats, but not the Bloc. I am not going to argue that these provinces don’t deserve more seats – they are currently under-represented in the House of Commons. My issue with this approach is that increasing the number of seats does not guarantee an end to hung parliaments and minority governments. Any seats added to Alberta will be net gains for the Conservatives as long as FPTP remains in place.  That is the only sure thing in this scenario. New seats in BC and Ontario are liable to be competitive between all three parties, which might still make it difficult for any one party to emerge with a majority of seats. More importantly, however, the addition of 32 new seats will do nothing to address the non-proportional election results we end up with under FPTP.

I am also troubled with Mr. Wright’s advice that the two main parties should “ignore” Quebec as a means of eventually gaining enough seats to form a majority government. He doesn’t suggest that the Liberals and NDP should ignore Alberta, however, even though that province is under a far greater one-party stranglehold. Perhaps he assumes they already have, so it’s not worth mentioning. Granted, with 75 seats, Quebec’s ability to impact the overall result of a general election is greater than Alberta’s, but if Alberta was actually competitive for other parties, that could have a significant impact as well.

But no, the Liberals and Conservatives should “ignore” Quebec, and pin their hopes on 32 new seats being added to the House of Commons. Seats, as I mentioned above, which in Alberta at least, will benefit only the Conservatives, while those in BC and Ontario should be more competitive – for all three main parties. However, there is no guarantee that these new seats will result in either the Conservatives or Liberals winning a majority. If those parties take Mr. Wright’s advice and turn their back on Quebec, that may well strengthen the BQ’s hand in that province even more. If the BQ’s seat count in Quebec were to increase significantly because voters there see that the other parties have turned their back on them, that might nullify any potential gains made by those parties in some of those new seats that will be up for grabs. The regional entrenchment that has become such a chronic problem facing all parties in this country will only get worse, not better.

My final issue with Mr. Wright’s interview is his fixation on majority government. Of course, under FPTP, that is what is supposed to happen – one party is supposed to emerge with a clear majority of seats. However, FPTP was designed for two-party systems (or at least, 2 dominant parties and a few smaller fringe parties), which inevitably did result in one party winning a majority of seats. In multi-party systems, as Canada has emerged to be, with four very competitive parties at the federal level,  FPTP breaks down. The last true majority government elected in Canada occurred in 1984, when the Progressive Conservatives actually received just over 50% of the popular vote (and 75% of the seats in the House of Commons). Since then, all “majority” governments have won a majority of seats without the backing of a majority of voters.

There is nothing wrong with hung parliaments. It isn’t some sort of failing that not a single party has emerged with a clear majority of seats in the last three general elections. If anything, this more accurately reflects the reality that none of the main parties has the support of a majority of voters. The past three election results more closely reflect how voters are voting than would a majority government elected with only 38% support.

I don’t disagree with adding new seats to the House of Commons because population increases in some parts of the country aren’t reflected in the current seat distribution. However, I do think it’s somewhat of a defeatist attitude to see these new seats as some sort of beacon of hope for a return to majority government. The problem isn’t the number of seats, but our voting system and how it exacerbates regional entrenchment. Only the adoption of some form of PR will allow all parties (except the BQ) to elect members from all parts of the country. And only PR will truly overcome the BQ’s dominance of Quebec.

We don’t really need more seats – we need a better way to elect people to fill them.

Parliamentary Privilege: Overview

Posted on | August 10, 2010 | View Comments

I would like to begin a discussion on the topic of parliamentary privilege. My initial idea is that this will result in a series of posts, with the first, this one, explaining what is meant by parliamentary privilege.

The classic definition of parliamentary privilege is found in Erskine May’s Treatise on The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament. Erskine May is a parliamentary authority originally written by British constitutional theorist and Clerk of the House of Commons, Thomas Erskine May and published in 1844 (and revised many times since – it is currently in its 23rd edition). Considered to be the most authoritative and influential work on parliamentary procedure and British constitutional convention, the book has become part of the uncodified constitution of the United Kingdom and as a result is sometimes called the “parliamentary bible”, acting as a rule book for parliamentarians. The work has been influential outside the United Kingdom, particularly in countries which use the Westminster system, including Canada, where it is frequently cited by Speakers and Members alike at both the federal and provincial levels.

Parliamentary privileges were first claimed centuries ago when the English House of Commons was struggling to establish a distinct role for itself within Parliament. These privileges were necessary to protect the House of Commons and its Members, not from the people, but from the power and interference of the King and the House of Lords.

May defines parliamentary privilege as “the sum of the peculiar rights enjoyed by each House collectively … and by Members of each House individually, without which they could not discharge their functions, and which exceed those possessed by other bodies or individuals. Thus privilege, though part of the law of the land, is to a certain extent an exemption from the general law.”¹

These “peculiar rights” can be divided into two categories: those extended to Members individually, and those extended to the House collectively.

Privileges of the UK House of Commons

The ancient and undoubted rights and privileges of the Commons are claimed by the Speaker at the beginning of each new Parliament. The privileges are only codified in Erskine May’s Parliamentary Practice and the House itself is the only judge of its own privileges. Most of those specifically claimed are practically obsolete, but others remain very real:

1. Freedom of speech; (members speaking in the House are not liable for defamation)
2. Freedom from arrest in civil matters (practically obsolete);
3. Access of the Commons to the Crown (via the Speaker); and
4. That the most favourable construction should be placed upon the deliberations of the Commons.

Privileges not specifically mentioned:

1. Right of the House to regulate its own composition; (although election petitions are now determined by the ordinary Courts)
2. Right of the House to regulate its own internal proceedings, both as to matters and procedures;
3. Right to punish members and “strangers” for breach of privilege and contempt;
4. Right of freedom from interference (although members are no longer immune from all civil actions)

Privileges of the Canadian House of Commons

The privileges of Members of the House of Commons provide the absolute immunity they require to perform their parliamentary work while the collective or corporate rights of the House are the necessary means by which the House effectively discharges its functions. The rights and immunities accorded to Members individually are generally categorized under the following headings:

1. freedom of speech;
2. freedom from arrest in civil actions;
3. exemption from jury duty;
4. exemption from being subpoenaed to attend court as a witness; and
5. freedom from obstruction, interference, intimidation and molestation.

The rights and powers of the House as a collectivity may be categorized as follows:

1. the exclusive right to regulate its own internal affairs (including its debates, proceedings and facilities);
2. the power to discipline, that is, the right to punish persons guilty of breaches of privilege or contempts, and the power to expel Members guilty of disgraceful conduct;
3. the right to provide for its proper constitution, including the authority to maintain the attendance and service of its Members;
4. the right to institute inquiries and to call witnesses and demand papers;
5. the right to administer oaths to witnesses appearing before it; and
6. the right to publish papers without recourse to the courts relating to the content.

Why are parliamentary privileges necessary? That argument is summed up very nicely in Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, by David McGee, and it applies to all legislatures. McGee explains that privileges for a legislature are justified in law on the grounds that a legislature must enjoy an autonomy from control by the Crown and the courts (an aspect of the constitutional separation of powers); that it must possess certain powers to facilitate the carrying out of its functions; and that it, its members and others participating in its proceedings, must enjoy certain immunities if the legislature is to discharge those functions effectively:

The privileges that a legislature enjoys are not an end in themselves. They form part of a constitutional expression of parliamentary autonomy and are a means to achieving an end – an effectively functioning legislature able to operate in the public interest. Parliamentary privilege is thus designed to remove any impediments or restraints to the legislature going about its work and to enable it to deal with challenges to its authority in more indirect ways, such as attacks that affect its dignity and lower the esteem in which it is held.²

What I will do in future posts is cases involving breaches of parliamentary privilege and others where parliamentary privilege doesn’t apply.

__________

¹Erskine May, p. 75.
²McGee, p. 605.

Loose cannon or plain speaker?

Posted on | August 8, 2010 | View Comments

In a recent column, Con Coughlin asks if David Cameron becoming  the new Bush because of a series of foreign policy-related gaffes the British prime minister has made in recent weeks:

First there was the diplomatic rift with Israel over David Cameron’s description of Gaza as a “prison camp”.  Then there was the outrage in Islamabad over the prime minister’s accusations that Pakistan was looking both ways in the war on terror. Now Mr Cameron has completed his hat trick of diplomatic faux-pas with his claim that Iran has a nuclear bomb.

I’ve previously explained that according to journalist Michael Kinsley, a gaffe in politics is when a politician accidentally tells the truth, or inadvertently says something publicly that they privately believe is true, but would ordinarily not say publicly because they believe it is politically harmful. Using this definition, Cameron’s statements don’t qualify as gaffes.

I am not going to weigh in on whether or not Cameron is right to describe Gaza as a prison camp. Many in the UK media agreed with him when he made that comment, many others disagreed – it all depended on how they view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What is important to note, however, is that Cameron’s comments on this occasion were consistent with other comments he’s made in the past. During the Israel-Lebanon conflict in 2006, Cameron condemned Israel’s “disproportionate use of force.” He also condemned Israel’s attack on the Turkish flotilla that was bringing supplies to Gaza as “completely unacceptable”. Therefore, it’s rather difficult to view his prison camp comment as a case of him accidentally saying something publicly that he privately believes to be true – instead it seems to be a deliberate statement in line with his thinking on other similar actions involving Israel. Again, I am not defending what he said, or saying I agree or disagree with his position here – I am simply trying to point out that his statement would not qualify as a gaffe as defined by Kinsley.

Similarly Cameron’s statement on Pakistan, also fails the gaffe test. Cameron said:

“We cannot tolerate in any sense the idea that this country is allowed to look both ways and is able, in any way, to promote the export of terror, whether to India or whether to Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world.

“That is why this relationship is important. It should be a relationship based on a very clear message: that it is not right to have any relationship with groups that are promoting terror. Democratic states that want to be part of the developed world cannot do that. The message to Pakistan from the US and the UK is very clear on that point.”

Cameron made the above statement in answer to a question following a speech he delivered to Indian business leaders in Bangalore. As such, they were off-the-cuff, not part of his speech, and it is possible that he didn’t mean to say what he said. It’s possible, but not likely given that Cameron strenuously defended his comments afterwards, and even elaborated on the point. It’s clear Cameron believes what he said to be true (as do most, if not all, intelligence and security experts) and is comfortable, in this case at least, calling a spade a spade.

The negative reactions the above comments prompted weren’t solely, or even because, of what Cameron said, but rather, where he said them. The “Gaza is a prison camp” remark was made while Cameron was on an official visit to Turkey, which currently has rather strained relations with Israel because of the Israeli attack on the Gaza flotilla. While Cameron’s comments may very well have been consistent with his previous public denounciations of Israeli policy, by making them in Turkey on a state visit, they seemed rather gratuitous and Cameron came across as rather opportunistic.

Similarly, I don’t know if anyone in the media outside of Pakistan disagreed with Cameron’s comments about Pakistan and terrorism. Again, the problem wasn’t so much what Cameron said – which most agreed was true – but where he said them, in India, a country that has had a long, troubled history with Pakistan. Cameron’s comments weren’t so much gaffes as diplomatic faux-pas.

Cameron’s most recent eye-brow raising utterance, saying that Iran has nuclear weapons, was made during a Q&A session in Hove as he was justifying his support for Turkey joining the EU. While this statement clearly was a mistake on Cameron’s part, I don’t think it qualifies as a gaffe. The only way it could be a gaffe is if British intelligence recently found out that Iran does indeed have nuclear weapson, briefed Cameron accordingly, and he accidentally let the cat out of the bag. And I won’t completely discount that as being a possibility. However, I do think it’s highly unlikely, and that Cameron simply misspoke. Proof of that is that Cameron apologised later for his mistake, something he hasn’t done for his comments about Gaza and Pakistan. Quite the contrary – he adamantly stands by what he said in both instances, further proof that these were not gaffes. Diplomatically unwise, perhaps, but not gaffes.

Cameron also misspoke on his recent trip to the US, when he said during World War II, the UK was the “junior partner” to the US in 1940. Of course, the US didn’t enter WW II until 1941, and Cameron quickly apologised for that comment, saying he meant the 194os, not 1940. It’s obvious Cameron doesn’t believe the US was fighting in 1940, so again, this was a mistake, not a Kinsleyian gaffe.

Cameron was actually lauded by many after his Gaza and Pakistan comments (in particular latter) for being refreshingly candid. It only after his Iran comment that many in the media honed in on the gaffe-prone image. While some argue that he’d be better off making his candid remarks in private, others still welcome his approach, but chastise him for making them before “safe” audiences. For now at least, Cameron’s approach seems to have the support of the general public:

Asked to sum up their view of his comments abroad, 49 percent agreed that he was “being plain speaking and other countries will respect that” while 27 percent said he was “being a loudmouth and risks upsetting relations with our allies” in a YouGov/Sun newspaper poll released earlier this month.

(Technorati NRV838XKYDA2)

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This blog will focus on aspects of parliamentary procedure and politics in a general sense, concentrating on issues such as parliamentary and electoral reform rather than partisan debate and policy analysis. I am particularly fascinated by the coalition government in the UK, and blog quite a bit about the issues surrounding coalition governments in countries such as Canada and the UK, where coalitions are rarities. Please read the About this Blog page for more information.

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